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ABSTRACT 
Authenticity in agriculture, food and resource markets has been an ongoing policy challenge to 
regulators and food industries, and a major concern to consumers given the complex nature of 
global food supply chains and the increasing spate of market fraud reports across the world. In a 
bid to boost their economic return, some firms may engage in illicit activities that comprise 
authenticity including: adulteration, substitution of substandard products, unapproved 
enhancements of food products, false and misleading quality claims. Such actions, often times, 
create negative reputation externalities for other agri-food firms in the sector, and may also result 
in trade conflicts and border rejections; while consumers incur transaction (search) costs in 
verifying product attributes due to quality uncertainty. This dissertation focuses on collective 
reputation and contributes to an understanding of authenticity issues in agri-food and resource 
markets. The analysis examines the role of industry-led quality assurance systems and evolving 
technologies in enhancing authenticity signals and reducing information asymmetry in the context 
of market fraud and collective reputation within food and resource supply chains.  
 
This dissertation consists of three papers. Paper 1 examines technological solutions to authenticity 
issues in the context of international trade. The paper explores the role of an emerging authenticity 
technology, International Barcode of Life (IBOL) in strengthening the enforcement of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES). The 
focus of the analysis is CITES restrictions on commercial trade in the endangered species tree of 
Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra). The first paper provides an overview of the applications of 
the IBOL technology in species identification to date. A graphical partial equilibrium trade model 
examines three scenarios consisting of adoption of IBOL authenticity technology by a single major 
importing country, multilateral adoption, and adoption by the exporting country. The scenarios 
suggest that a threat of multilateral testing for the authenticity of imported rosewood could 
eliminate cross border commercial trade in the endangered species. Upstream testing and 
certification of authenticity in the exporting country could increase importers’ confidence and the 
demand for legally harvested rosewood. The results suggest that technological solutions to 
authenticity issues in international markets have the potential to reduce quality uncertainty and 
could act as a complement to regulatory enforcement under CITES.  
 
Paper 2 explores the industry-led Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) quality assurance system for 
Canadian wines to examine how an industry seeks to signal authenticity assurances to protect its 
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collective reputation. Hedonic and Probit models are estimated using data on wine attributes 
sourced from the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO). Hedonic models examine whether 
VQA certification, versus other collective and individual reputation signals (region, winery), 
elicits a price premium. The Probit analysis examines factors that determine a winery’s decision 
to seek VQA certification for a specific wine. The results suggest that while a number of attributes 
including VQA certification, percentage alcohol content, sweetness (sugar level), volume of wine 
supplied and vintage, have a significant influence on the price of wine, VQA adds a premium 
beyond other signals of reputation (winery and region). The magnitude of the effect of individual 
and collective reputation on the price of wine differs for the different types/colours of wine. The 
Probit model results suggest that wineries that supply large volumes of wine (more than 1000 
cases) in Ontario and produce icewine and non-blended wines have a higher tendency of seeking 
VQA status. The results imply that VQA could be used as a shorthand for quality, while premium 
and reputation driven by authenticity in the wine industry could serve as an incentive for other 
agri-food industries to establish similar quality assurance systems. 
 
Paper 3 examines the incidence of mislabelling and substitution in fish markets using supply, 
demand and welfare analysis. The paper focuses on incentives for the private sector (retailers) or 
a third party to adopt IBOL technology to protect their reputation and for supply chain monitoring. 
The feasibility of IBOL technology for a typical retail store in Canada is assessed using a simple 
simulation analysis. The analysis suggests that the costs of switching to the IBOL system, the 
number of retailers already using the technology and their market shares are likely to influence a 
retailer’s adoption of the technology. The ease of catching cheaters along the fish supply chain 
through third party monitoring is expected to depend on the accuracy of the technology in detecting 
fraud, the sampling frequency (rate) and rate of species substitution; while enforcement of legal 
penalties and other costs would serve as a disincentive to cheat as these costs negatively affect 
expected profit. The simulation analysis suggests that presently IBOL technology appears to be 
feasible for a typical retail store in Canada if testing is done in an external facility, but may not be 
feasible if fixed and other costs associated with the IBOL system are considered. The paper 
suggests that reducing the size of the technology to a hand-held tool and coordination of small 
scale retailers are potential ways to make the technology affordable and expand its use.  
 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My sincere and profound gratitude goes to my major supervisor, Dr. Jill. E. Hobbs for her advice, 
motivation and unrelenting support throughout my program at the University of Saskatchewan. I 
am most thankful to my dissertation committee members; Dr. Richard Gray, Dr. Peter W.B. 
Phillips and Dr. Joel F. Bruneau for their invaluable insights and motivation. I must say that I am 
blessed to work with such an amazing team of scholars. Special thanks to Dr. William Kerr and 
other faculty members in the department of Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics (BPBE) 
for their kind assistance. 
 
I would like to thank the department of BPBE and all the staff especially Lori Hagen and Melissa 
Zink. Thanks to the Canadian Agricultural Innovation Research Network (CAIRN) and the 
Alliance for Food and Bioproducts Innovation (AFBI) for providing funds for my research. My 
appreciation goes to Dr. Robert Hanner and staff of the International Barcode of Life (IBOL) 
laboratory of the Biodiversity Institute of Ontario (BIO), Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) 
and Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) of Ontario for providing me with the necessary information 
and data for this study. 
 
Special thanks to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Sunday Ugochukwu and my siblings for their 
wonderful support and prayers all through my school years. To my beloved wife, Vivian, I say a 
big thank you. You stood by me all these years. Your love and support took me to the end of this 
race. To our children, Cindy and Jaden, I appreciate your contribution in making me happy after 
each day’s hard work.  
 
Finally, I am most thankful to the Almighty God for granting me life, protection and guidance all 
through my school years. Blessed be thy holy name. 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PERMISSION TO USE ................................................................................................................... i 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ x 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................................. 1 
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 
References ....................................................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................ 10 
Technological Solutions to Authenticity Issues in International Trade ................................. 10 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2 International Barcode of Life (IBOL) Technology and the DNA Barcoding Process ........ 13 
2.2.1 Application of IBOL technology in species identification and authentication ................ 16 
2.2.1.1 Seafood and meat cuts ............................................................................................... 16 
2.2.1.2 Invasive alien species ................................................................................................ 18 
2.2.1.3 Natural health and herbal products ............................................................................ 20 
2.2.1.4 Vectors of zoonotic diseases...................................................................................... 21 
2.3 The CITES regulatory framework to reduce illegitimate trade in endangered species ...... 22 
2.4 Modelling authenticity and quality verification in international trade: CITES case study 
using Brazilian Rosewood ......................................................................................................... 26 
Base case ................................................................................................................................ 27 
Scenario 1: Adoption of IBOL technology by the U.S. to test for rosewood at the border .. 31 
Scenario 2: The U.S. and the ROW impose testing regulation for rosewood timber ............ 36 
Scenario 3: Potential upstream response (testing and certification) in the exporting market 40 
2.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 45 
References ................................................................................................................................. 48 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 56 
CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................................ 57 
vi 
 
Authenticity, Collective Reputation and Quality Signals: An Empirical Analysis of VQA 
wines ............................................................................................................................................. 57 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 57 
3.2 Quality Assurance Systems/Programs in the Wine Sector.................................................. 60 
3.2.1 Authenticity in the Canadian Wine Industry through Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA)
 ............................................................................................................................................... 61 
3.3 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 65 
3.3.1 The data ........................................................................................................................ 65 
3.3.2 Analytical techniques ................................................................................................... 66 
3.4 Empirical results and discussion ......................................................................................... 79 
3.4.1 Hedonic model .............................................................................................................. 79 
3.4.2 Probit Model ................................................................................................................. 90 
3.5 Implication of results ........................................................................................................... 99 
3.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 101 
3.7 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research .......................................... 102 
References ............................................................................................................................... 104 
Appendix 3.I ............................................................................................................................ 110 
Appendix 3.II .......................................................................................................................... 111 
Appendix 3.III (a) .................................................................................................................... 113 
Appendix 3.III (b) ................................................................................................................... 114 
Appendix 3.III (c) .................................................................................................................... 115 
Appendix 3.IV ......................................................................................................................... 116 
Appendix 3.V .......................................................................................................................... 117 
Appendix 3.VI ......................................................................................................................... 118 
Appendix 3.VII........................................................................................................................ 119 
CHAPTER 4 .............................................................................................................................. 120 
Private Incentives to Adopt the International Barcode of Life Technology for Fish Species 
Authentication ........................................................................................................................... 120 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 120 
4.2 Existing Systems of Authentication and Problems Arising from Authenticity Issues in       
Canada ..................................................................................................................................... 123 
4.3. Incidence Analysis and Incentives to Adopt IBOL Technology...................................... 127 
4.3.1 The IBOL technology ................................................................................................. 133 
vii 
 
4.3.2 Distribution of Potential Welfare Benefits from Adoption of International Barcode of 
Life (IBOL) Technology in Fish and Seafood Authentication ............................................ 135 
4.4 Modelling Incentives to Adopt IBOL Technology for Fish Authentication ..................... 140 
4.4.1 IBOL Technology adoption by a retailer .................................................................... 142 
4.4.2 Outcomes of third Party adoption of IBOL technology for supply chain monitoring 151 
4.4.3 Feasibility of IBOL technology for a typical retail store in Canada .......................... 157 
4.5 Commercialization of IBOL technology ........................................................................... 163 
4.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 164 
References ............................................................................................................................... 166 
Appendix 4.I ............................................................................................................................ 170 
Appendix 4.II .......................................................................................................................... 171 
Appendix 4.III ......................................................................................................................... 172 
Appendix 4.IV ......................................................................................................................... 173 
CHAPTER 5 .............................................................................................................................. 178 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research................................ 178 
5.1 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 178 
5.2 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research .......................................... 183 
References ............................................................................................................................... 184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1: Ramsey RESET Specification Tests And Summary Statistics………………………71 
Table 3.2: Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test For Heteroscedasticity........................................72 
Table 3.3: White's Test For 
Heteroscedasticity………………………………………………………………………………..72 
Table 3.4: Definition And Measurement Of Variables…………………………………………..73 
Table 3.5: Canadian Wine Prices By Colour/Type, VQA Certification Status, Varietal And Sales 
Volume…………………………………………………………………………………………...76 
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics Of Wines By Colour/Type ……………………………………...77 
Table 3.7: Parameter Estimates For Hedonic Function - Type/Colour Of Wine (Pooled 
Regression) ……………………………………………………………………………………...81 
Table 3.8: Parameter Estimates For Hedonic Function - Red Wines …………………………...84 
Table 3.9: Parameter Estimates For Hedonic Function - White Wines …………………………86 
Table 3.10: Parameter Estimates For Hedonic Function (Red Wines) - Interaction Of Varietals 
With VQA ……………………………………………………………………………………….88 
Table 3.11: Interaction Of VQA With Winery Region In The Pooled Regression ……………..89 
Table 3.12: Classification Of Wineries Based On Use Of VQA Certification ………………….93 
Table 3.13: Probit Regression For The Use Of VQA Certification By Wineries ……………….94 
Table 3.14: OLS Regression Results Of Wine Price Against Other Independent Variables ….98 
Table 3.15: Regression Of VQA Against Estimated Values Of Price And Residuals Of The Error 
Term …………………………………………………………………………………………....99 
A3.1: LCBO pricing formula for wines (750ml bottle)  ……………………………………….110 
A3.2: Correlation matrix for independent variables (hedonic regression) …………………….111 
A3.3: Hedonic pricing result (pooled regression) with VQA and province  …………………113 
A3.4: Hedonic pricing result (pooled regression) with VQA and region ……………………...114 
A3.5: Hedonic pricing result (pooled regression) with VQA and winery ……………………..115 
A3.6: Hedonic pricing result for icewine …………………………………………………..116 
A3.7: Hedonic pricing result for rose wine ………………………………………………….....117 
A3.8: Hedonic pricing result for sparkling wine ……………………………………………....118 
ix 
 
A3.9: Correlation matrix for independent variables (Probit regression) ………………………119 
 
Table 4.1: Border cases involving fish in Canada from exporting regions (1999 - 2002) ….....125 
Table 4.2: Retail profit for IBOL technology adoption as a function of number of retailers  …149 
Table 4.3: Fees for authenticating fish samples …………………………………………….....157 
Table 4.4: Market (store-level) data analysis for Atlantic salmon fish ………………………..159 
A4.1: Trend in the cost of DNA barcoding …………………………………………………....170 
A4.2: Costs of testing and authenticating fish samples using IBOL technology ……………...171 
A4.3: Costs of establishing a DNA Barcoding laboratory ………………………………….173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Base case: Undifferentiated rosewood market with no testing ……………………..30 
Figure 2.2: U.S. adoption of IBOL technology to test for illegal (endangered species) of 
Brazilian rosewood - Dalbergia nigra …………………………………………………………...34 
Figure 2.3: Multilateral adoption of IBOL technology for illegal (endangered species) of 
Brazilian rosewood - Dalbergia nigra ……………………………………………………….......39 
Figure 2.4: Potential upstream response by Brazil on the U.S. and ROW adoption of testing 
regulation for Brazil rosewood (Dalbergia nigra) ……………………………………………….42 
Figure A. 2: DNA Barcding 
Process..……………………………………………………………566 
Figure 4.1: Border cases in Canada by seafood species groups ……………………………… 126 
Figure 4. 2: Mislabelling of fish species in the United States …………………………………128 
Figure 4.3: Effect of mislabelled farmed salmon entering the market for wild salmon ……….130 
Figure 4.4: Trend in the cost of DNA sequencing ……………………………………………..134 
Figure 4.5: Fish supply chain in Canada………..………………………………………………138 
Figure 4.6: Disincentive to adopt IBOL technology due to initial costs .………………………143 
Figure 4.7: Technology adoption when profit is zero  …………………………………………144 
Figure 4.8: IBOL technology adoption by a retailer when profit is positive …………………..145 
Figure 4.9: Derivation of premium for IBOL authenticated fish ………………………………146 
Figure 4.10: Technology adoption by the first retailer …………………………………….......150 
Figure 4.11: Technology adoption by the second retailer…...…………………………………150 
Figure 4.12: Technology adoption by the third retailer ……………………………………......151 
Figure 4.13: Analytical framework for modelling third party adoption of IBOL technology for 
supply chain monitoring ……………………………………………………………………….153 
Figure 4.14: Average total costs of testing a fish sample ………………………………….158 
Figure 4.15: Estimated contribution margin from technology adoption at different testing rates 
for a large retail store …………………………………………………………………………..162 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Authenticity in some agri-food and natural resource supply chains has become a major concern 
globally in recent years. The increasing publicized cases of food fraud in agricultural markets and 
cross border trade of unidentified or endangered species of plants and animals can reduce 
consumers’ confidence in the food system, as well as the perceived capability of the regulators to 
assure the quality and safety of food products (Gallup, 2008). An authenticity (quality) scare 
caused by a firm can have aftermath effects on a large scale (Marucheck, 1987) and create negative 
spillover (reputation) effects that harm other firms in the sector. These have spurred government 
and industry-led investments in quality assurance, traceability and authenticity-enhancing 
technologies. It has also prompted consumers to become interested in the authenticity and origin 
of their food, as well as how it was produced.  
 
The dissertation primarily focuses on the issues of collective reputation and authenticity in agri-
food and resource markets, which have not been widely explored in the literature. Previous studies 
have tended to focus on traceability and other methods of signalling quality, such as third party 
certification and labelling. Reputation, which is the belief consumers have about a firm or an 
industry, is expected to play a major role in shaping consumers’ perceptions of quality and 
therefore their purchase decisions (Anderson, 2002; Castriota and Delmastro, 2014) and can make 
or mar a firm or an industry, particularly those producing products with credence attributes. 
Reputation could reflect the authenticity (quality) and uniqueness of a firm’s product, and can be 
individual or collective. Individual reputation refers to the reputation of a single firm, while 
collective reputation relates to that of an industry. Fraud in the context of agri-food markets is “the 
deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food 
ingredients, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements made about a product, for 
economic gain” (Spink and Moyer, 2011, p.158).  
 
Authenticity in the context of this dissertation relates to the process of testing and validation of 
claims made by a producer on the product’s label and at the same time identifying other 
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components of the product that are absent or present but not declared by the producer. A producer 
has more information (e.g. quality, composition, origin) about his product than consumers, and 
may have an incentive to engage in fraudulent activities for economic gain. For example, a product 
described as “100% apple juice” may contain some percentage of pear. Verifying the truthfulness 
of the claims made on a product’s label and other hidden information about the product helps to 
ascertain the genuineness of the product as well as uncover deceptive practices that are capable of 
misleading consumers and prevent them from making informed purchase decisions.  
 
Globalization and trade liberalization have led to an increased volume of trade in agricultural 
products and complex agri-food supply chains. Food supply chains are becoming longer and 
interconnected (Roth et al. 2008; Whipple et al. 2009), hence these products pass though long 
distances and many intermediaries before reaching the end users. Potentially this creates 
opportunities for intentional illegitimate market activities for economic gain. 
 
In the process of competing for economic gains in the market, firms along the food supply chain 
may engage in illegitimate market activities including: adulteration (e.g. addition of undeclared 
substances in order to increase the volume of a product), dilution (reducing the amount of valuable 
component of a product), substitution of substandard products, mislabelling and misrepresentation, 
false or misleading claims and unapproved enhancement of products. Prime examples have 
included: substitution and mislabelling of rosewood timber made from other species of Brazilian 
rosewood as timber from Dalbergia nigra which commands a premium, addition of melamine to 
infant milk formula (Roth et al. 2008) and pet food (Brown et al. 2007) to increase protein levels; 
substitution of cane and maize syrup for sucrose and natural sugars in honey production (Bogdanov 
and Martin, 2002) and the fake Canadian icewine produced and sold in Asian markets (AAFC, 
2011). Such actions result in the classic ‘market for lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970) and create negative 
reputation externalities for other agri-food firms, transaction (search) costs for consumers, 
international trade conflicts and border rejections. These call for a more advanced timely and 
accurate method of detecting these fraudulent activities.  
 
Recently, uncovering fraud and delivering authenticity assurances in agri-food and natural 
resource markets have been facilitated through alternative approaches. One of the approaches is 
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technological innovations such as the recently emerged DNA barcoding (International Barcode of 
Life (IBOL) technology), which has been used to identify mislabelling and substitution of plants 
and animal species through DNA sequencing. A prime example is the recent horse and goat meat 
scandals in Europe and South Africa that were identified using DNA Barcoding technology. In 
addition, contractual agreements, supply chain monitoring and industry-led traceability and 
certification systems (e.g. Vintners Quality Alliance for Canadian wines) have also been used to 
enhance the delivery of quality and authenticity assurances. Emerging quality verification and 
monitoring technologies have helped in overcoming the limitations of the existing methods of 
signalling quality given the many avenues for fraud. For example, a traceability system can be 
used to trace the movement of a food product from the farm to the table, particularly when there 
is a food safety problem, but may not be sufficient to guarantee the authenticity of the product. 
Further, it has been argued that the effectiveness of third party certification has been undermined 
by the proliferation of third party certification agents (Anders et al. 2007). Consumers often find 
it difficult to determine the credibility of these agents (Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010), and therefore, 
become confused regarding which agent to trust (Auriol and Schilizzi, 2003).  
 
Food authenticity is a growing area of interest that has not been widely explored in the literature. 
Previous economic studies focus on the applicability, acceptance and economics of traceability 
systems (e.g. Hobbs, 2003, 2004; Golan et al 2004; Boecker et al 2013; Asioli et al 2014). A 
traceability system is primarily a tool to trace the origin of a food product should there be any 
problem along the supply chain, and does not necessarily guarantee authenticity (quality) and 
safety. A food product may be traceable based on the origin label but may not be genuine 
(authentic). Hobbs (2003) argues that although traceability systems enhance quality signalling to 
consumers and could serve as a motivation for safety practices by producers, some existing 
traceability systems do not efficiently provide ex-ante desired quality signals. Since much of the 
previous literature focuses on traceability, this creates a gap in the literature with regards to the 
concept of authenticity as a separate (albeit related) concept.  
 
A product is authentic if there is no form of fraud. This study differs from previous studies by 
examining the issue of authenticity and its potential impacts on industry-wide collective reputation. 
There are relatively few economic studies of authenticity. This study draws insights from 
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economic studies of authenticity and collective reputation, including: Fishman and Rob (2002), 
Caswell and Mojduszka (1996), Fombrum (1996), Costanigro and McCluskey (2007), Sundus 
(2008), Wong and Hanner (2008), Menapace and Moshini (2010), Castriota and Delmastro (2012, 
2014), among others. Some of these studies emphasize the importance of reputation in agri-food 
markets. For example, Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) argue that reputation is very important for 
markets with credence attributes to operate successfully. Therefore, there is need to complement 
existing quality signalling methods with authenticity regimes to maintain and enhance genuineness 
along the food supply chain as well as protect the integrity and reputation of food industries.  
 
Taking cognizance of these issues, this study examines the importance of quality verification and 
signalling in establishing authenticity assurances as a collective reputation building mechanism in 
agri-food and natural resource markets. The study explores the incentives to adopt authenticity 
technologies by private sector firms or third parties, and the implications of authenticity signals 
for industry-wide collective reputation.  
 
The dissertation is comprised of three papers and therefore, organized in five chapters. Although 
each of these papers forms a stand-alone study, they are inter-linked and explore the adoption of 
authenticity technologies and verifications in international markets and in the Canadian agri-food 
sector. Chapter two presents the first paper that examines technological solutions to authenticity 
issues in an international trade context, and the role of an emerging authenticity technology, the 
International Barcode of Life (IBOL) in facilitating the enforcement of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES) trade restrictions. The 
focus of the analysis is an endangered tree species of Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra). The 
paper develops a partial equilibrium trade model to present a graphical analysis of three scenarios 
mapping potential outcomes of adoption of the IBOL authenticity technology by exporting or 
importing countries. Key research questions include: what potential role do testing and monitoring 
technologies (e.g. IBOL) have in providing a solution to authenticity issues in international trade? 
Can IBOL technology facilitate the enforcement of CITES trade restrictions for an endangered 
tree species of Brazilian rosewood? Verifying quality claims using authenticity and monitoring 
technologies could potentially reduce quality uncertainty and enhance industry-wide collective 
reputation. 
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Results of the analyses suggest that enforcement of CITES trade restrictions on the endangered 
tree species of Brazilian rosewood may be more effective through a multilateral implementation 
of regulations requiring authenticity testing by importing countries. Further, upstream adoption 
and implementation of testing and certification of authenticity in the exporting country may help 
differentiate timber made from different species of rosewood. Product differentiation in the 
exporting market potentially may reduce the equilibrium quantity and price of illegally harvested 
rosewood timber (Dalbergia nigra), and therefore would reduce the incentive for illegal 
harvesting.  
 
The second paper, presented in Chapter three, is an empirical paper focusing on VQA quality 
assurance system for Canadian wines. In this paper, a hedonic regression model and Probit analysis 
respectively are used to examine the following research questions: does Vintners Quality Alliance 
(VQA) certification (versus collective and individual reputation signals) elicit a price premium and 
enhance the collective reputation of Canadian wines? What factors determine a winery’s decision 
to seek VQA certification for a specific wine?  
 
A hedonic pricing model was first estimated to identify the attributes that significantly influence 
the price of wine. The results indicate that, controlling for other reputation signals, there exists a 
premium for VQA certified wines suggesting that the VQA system appears to be valued by 
consumers. This result has implications for collective reputation and for the uptake of similar 
quality assurance programs by other agri-food industries. Despite the premium, not all wines have 
VQA certification. To identify the factors that shape a winery’s decision to seek VQA certification 
for a specific wine, a Probit regression analysis is conducted. The results indicate that large 
wineries (wineries that supply more than one thousand cases of wine to retail outlets) in Ontario 
that produce icewine and non-blended wines have a higher tendency of seeking VQA status. 
 
Chapter four (the third paper) examines potential incentives to adopt the IBOL technology for 
seafood (fish) species authentication in Canada by the private sector. Results of previous studies 
show that mislabelling and substitution in fish supply chains is high relative to other food products, 
and the IBOL technology, though not yet commercialized, has been used by the technology 
developers in market surveys to detect this opportunistic behaviour in the market. The paper 
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addresses the following research questions: what are the potential incentives for private sector 
firms (e.g. retailers) or third parties to adopt IBOL technology for fish authentication in Canada? 
Is IBOL technology feasible for a typical retail store? The technology could be a more effective 
alternative in the authentication of fish species and could potentially help in protecting the 
collective reputation and integrity of the fish industry. Given the increase in publicized cases of 
fraud in fish markets and increase in Canadian imports of seafood and domestic consumption, 
there is the potential for mislabelling and substitution for economic gain.  
 
A theoretical model is developed to illustrate incidence analysis (species substitution) in fish 
markets. The incentive by fish retailers to adopt IBOL technology to protect their reputations and 
third party (e.g. consumer/environmental group) for supply chain monitoring is modelled using a 
vertical market structure model under autarky situation. Whether the technology would be feasible 
for a typical retail store is evaluated and the potential for the technology to be commercialized 
discussed. Chapter five offers concluding comments. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Technological Solutions to Authenticity Issues in International Trade 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The paper examines technological solutions to authenticity issues in an international trade context 
and, using a partial equilibrium trade model, examines the role of an emerging authenticity 
technology, the International Barcode of Life (IBOL) in facilitating enforcement of trade 
restrictions for endangered species listed by the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES). 
 
Consumers, food industries and regulators have been faced with challenges including quality 
uncertainty, product misrepresentation in agri-food and resource markets, and escalation of high 
profile food related disease outbreaks. These have resulted in increased consumer awareness and 
demand for transparency, authenticity, credible information and quality reassurance. Consumers 
are now increasingly interested in where their food and other products come from and how they 
were produced. This is particularly the case for products with credence attributes.1 Consumers’ 
inability to identify these attributes serves as an economic incentive for producers/sellers and 
intermediaries to engage in fraudulent activities. 
 
Fraud in agriculture, food and resource markets occurs in different forms including substitution 
and mislabelling. Examples include substitution and/or mislabelling of low-valued seafood (fish) 
species for high-valued species in food markets for economic gain. In resource (e.g. forest 
products) markets, price and availability of substitutes have been identified as major drivers of 
purchase decisions (FAO, n.d). For example, it has been argued that in timber markets, the price 
of a particular product (species) with unique attributes relative to others is a major factor that drives 
demand, and this has encouraged product substitution (FAO, n.d). A prime example is the case of 
Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra), an endangered species of tree that has been depleted 
                                                          
1 Credence goods are products whose relevant attributes are difficult to ascertain prior to purchase and even after 
purchase without additional labelling or quality information (e.g. organic, origin) (Hobbs, 2001).  
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because of the premium for wooden products made using timber from the species as a result of 
some unique attributes including its waxy appearance, high resonance and resistance to insect 
attack (Taylor et al. 2012). Other closely related species of rosewood have been mislabelled and 
sold as D.nigra (Gasson et al. 2010).  
 
It appears that these fraudulent activities have been going on in these markets with little or no 
success in identifying the sources, which gives the perpetrators a competitive advantage, and 
therefore, raises the question of whether the inability to prevent these activities in the domestic 
and international markets signals a regulatory oversight or inefficiency in existing testing and 
monitoring systems. This has resulted in some species of plants, animals and other resources 
(particularly those traded across national borders) going extinct, and therefore calls for routine and 
real-time monitoring. In the absence of labelling or other methods of signalling quality, this creates 
an information asymmetry problem, which often results in sellers’ opportunistic behavior, and 
consequently market failure. Consumers in their efforts to identify product attributes ex ante before 
purchase incur transaction (search) costs. Credible verification of the authenticity and quality 
claims lowers these search costs.  
 
Several mechanisms and/or actions have been taken by governments and firms to signal quality 
and ameliorate information asymmetry problems in markets. Prime examples of governments’ 
actions include mandatory traceability and third party certification/labelling. On the other hand, 
firms signal quality through provision of warranties, product attribute information disclosure on 
labels and third party certification. Although some traceability systems provide consumers with 
information on where their products come from, help identify the source of food safety problems 
(in the case of food products) along the supply chain and facilitate the removal of affected products 
to reduce possible externality or spill-overs to other producers, traceability alone cannot provide 
information on quality (authenticity) claims, which requires verification using appropriate 
technologies and/or supply chain monitoring and auditing.  
 
Migone and Howlett (2012) argue that certification enhances the achievement of the minimum 
standards set for a product, boosts consumer trust, and strengthens sustainable methods of 
production and quality control. It has been argued that proliferation and competition among 
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certification agents has undermined its effectiveness (Anders et al. 2007), and it is often difficult 
to determine the credibility of the existing certification entities (Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010). 
Consumers are therefore confused as to which agent to trust (Auriol and Schilizzi, 2003). Lizzeri 
(1999) also argues that certification, in some cases, is not credible to consumers as producers 
“strategically manipulate information on labels” (p.1). On the other hand, monopoly 
intermediaries sometimes do not fully disclose vital information about product attributes 
(credence) on the label.  
 
Several technologies used in verifying quality claims and authenticity have recently emerged. 
Some of these technologies are linked to genomics and proteomics, involving the use of molecular 
markers in identifying species and products. They also have the potential of rapid confirmation of 
the authenticity and origin of products thereby reducing quality uncertainty and overcoming the 
limitations of market-based solutions to information asymmetry. Of the emerging technologies, 
this paper focuses on the International Barcode of Life (IBOL) technology specifically developed 
to identify plant and animal species through DNA sequencing. A potential application of the IBOL 
technology is in reduction of commercial trade in endangered species, which is the main objective 
of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora 
(CITES).  
 
It has been argued that government policies on conservation of some plant and animal species, 
especially the ones threatened with extinction, are driven by the fact that the species may have 
commercial (e.g. food, tourism) and existence value (Metrick and Weitzman, 1996). Hence, some 
national governments have spent significant amounts of money in eradicating invasive species and 
recovering of some endangered species.  For example, the United States federal and state agencies, 
within three years (1989 – 1991) spent the sum of $171.1m in recovering a total of ten animal 
species. These include: “Bald eagle ($31.3m), Northern spotted owl ($26.4m), Florida scrub jay 
($19.9m), West Indian manatee (17.3m), Red-cockaded woodpecker ($15.1m), Florida panther 
($13.6m), Grizzly bear ($12.6m), Least Bell’s vireo (15.5m) American peregrine falcon ($11.6m) 
and Whooping crane (10.8m)” (Metrick and Weitzman, 1996, p.2). In the case of plants, the annual 
costs incurred by the U.S. government in recovering endangered plant species have always been 
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higher than the actual amount allocated for conservation of the species by the Congress (Negrón-
Ortiz, 2014).   
 
Given the large size and growing demand for some plants and animal species (wildlife) in the 
international market, it has been argued that international trade is a major cause of overexploitation 
of species facing extinction (Alagappan, 1990; Broad et al. 2003). This, therefore, calls for 
adequate market and supply chain monitoring to curtail trade in these species with endangered 
status. Taking cognizance of these issues, the key research questions examined in this paper are: 
what potential role do testing and monitoring technologies (e.g. IBOL) have in providing a 
solution to authenticity issues in international trade? Can IBOL technology facilitate the 
enforcement of CITES trade restrictions for an endangered tree specie of Brazilian rosewood? 
Proper identification of the at-risk species in the markets would discourage illegal harvesting and 
enhance their sustainability.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. Following the introduction, section 2 describes the IBOL 
technology and profiles a wide range of its application in species identification and verification of 
quality claims (authentication). Section 3 looks at the CITES regulatory frameworks, while section 
4 models (using three scenarios) the potential role of technologies (IBOL) in authenticity and 
quality verification in the context of international trade using the case of an endangered tree species 
of Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra). Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.2 International Barcode of Life (IBOL) Technology and the DNA Barcoding Process 
IBOL technology is an emerging molecular-based authenticity technology that uses genetic 
markers to identify plants and animal species through DNA sequencing (Hebert et al. 2003). DNA 
barcode refers to “a short gene sequence used to identify species taken from a standard position 
in the genome” (Yancy, 2007, slide no.4). 
 
The IBOL project started in Canada in 2003 with a group of scientists at the Biodiversity Institute 
of Ontario located at the University of Guelph. The project is aimed at application of “DNA 
barcoding to real world problems, such as forensics, conservation, market place regulation, control 
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of diseases and ecosystem monitoring”.2 The scientists collect specimens from different species, 
generate and store barcode records from the specimens, and develop a comprehensive database 
and repository (reference library) for storage of the DNA barcode records and taxonomic 
information of different species. The consortium provides the public and private sectors open 
access to the reference library for easy cross-matching and identification of species as well as 
enhancing the discovery of new species. The process is designed to help in reduction of cross-
border trade in harmful, invasive and endangered species, and other food (raw and processed) 
products.3 The DNA barcoding process is explained further in the appendix to this paper. 
 
The choice of IBOL over existing authenticity technologies for this study was informed by the 
following: first, it is a new authenticity technology involving the use of DNA molecules. Although 
not yet commercialized and used in a major way in food supply chains in Canada, the developers 
(Biodiversity Institute of Ontario) have conducted several market surveys and used the technology 
in species identification and food product authentication relative to other techniques. Most 
biological tissues contain DNA molecules, which have high stability relative to proteins, and 
therefore are a good alternative to existing protein-based analysis (Gachet et al. 1999; Lockey and 
Bardsley, 2000). DNA can be extracted from plant and animal products even in processed form, 
and is less sensitive to degradation (Nielsen and Hansen, 2008) unlike proteins that degrade at high 
temperatures.  
Second, IBOL technology has been used in the identification of plant species. For example, the 
technology has been used to identify endangered tree species such as the incense tree (Aquilaria 
sinensis)4 commonly found in South China (Jiao et al. 2013) and listed on the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list of threatened species.5  In addition, the technology has 
been used in tracing illegal timber logging (Degen and Fladung, 2007; Lowe and Cross, 2011). 
Further, existing authenticating technologies (e.g. physical identification using external 
morphological features, Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), electrophoresis, chromatography, 
                                                          
2
 http://ibol.org/about-us/what-is-ibol/ 
3ibid 
4
 Extract (resin) from the tree is used in the production of natural herbs and incense, while the back of the tree is used 
in paper production (http://www.greening.gov.hk/en/planting_knowledge/aquilaria_sinensis.html).  
5
 www.iucnredlist.org  
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among others) have some inherent limitations that make authentication and identification difficult, 
and sometimes unreliable. For example, morphological features may be absent for processed 
products (e.g. wood) and, therefore, may not be effective in identification. The process will not 
only take some time, but may record little or no success. PCR is specie specific in identification 
and authentication (Wong and Hanner, 2008). Hence additional costs will be incurred in acquiring 
and adopting other techniques to cover a wide range variety of species found in the market today.  
 
One major feature that distinguishes IBOL technology from other DNA-based authenticity 
technologies, such as PCR, is that IBOL can be used to detect the presence of several animal and 
plant species in a product and, therefore, goes a step further in identifying the particular specie of 
the animal or plant used and, possibly, the origin. For example, the widely publicized scandals 
involving the substitution of horse meat for beef in a number of processed food products (e.g. 
hamburgers) across Europe in 2013;6 substitution of pork meat for beef in Halal meat pies and 
pasties supplied to UK prisons;7 and substitution of donkey, water buffalo and goat meat for beef 
in sausages, burger patties and dry meats in South Africa8 were all detected using DNA based 
technique (PCR).9 Considering the case of substituting horse, goat and buffalo for beef in 
processed meat products that attracted media attention in 2013, IBOL technology would offer an 
advantage over the PCR technique by generating barcodes and using it to identify the species of 
horse, goat and water buffalo.  
 
Fundamentally, the technology is designed to identify all biological species – fish, meat, insects, 
plants, among others. At the present time it has not been commercialized (adopted and used to 
verify quality claims by the private sector) but to an extent has been used on several products 
including timber (wood products) by the developers to test the accuracy of the technology in tree 
species identification. The reference library is maintained and managed by the IBOL consortium, 
                                                          
6http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21406778 
7http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/pork-dna-found-in-halal-prison-food-8478152.html 
8http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21588575 
 
9
 PCR is specie specific. For example, it can only detect the presence of a plant specie in a product (e.g. natural health 
or herbal products) but cannot be used to identify the specie of the plant in the product. 
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a research institute owned by the University of Guelph. Free access to the reference library is part 
of the agreement and a precondition for Canadian government and private sector funding. The 
technology is still under development on a test basis in terms of using it to identify other biological 
species. The next section examines the different areas in which the technology has been applied in 
species identification and authentication. 
 
2.2.1 Application of IBOL technology in species identification and authentication 
Essentially, IBOL technology (DNA barcoding) has potential in three major areas including 
authenticity, safety and sustainability, and has specifically been used in the identification of 
seafood, invasive alien species (including species listed on the Convention on the International 
Trade in Endangered Species of wild faura and flora (CITES)), natural health/herbal products, 
vectors of zoonotic diseases, among others. 
 
2.2.1.1 Seafood and meat cuts 
Seafood, particularly fish, is among the agricultural commodities traded in high volumes across 
the world (Anderson, 2003; Smith et al. 2010) with about one third being traded across national 
boundaries (FAO, 2012). According to FAO (2012), the global share of seafood products (fish) 
traded in international markets is consistently increasing with about 39 percent of commercial 
fishery production traded in 2010. This is driven by increasing consumers’ awareness of the health 
benefits associated with fish consumption. Increased demand for fish products has led to 
competition between domestically produced and imported fish products in different countries 
(Tveteras et al. 2012); and has served as an incentive for some members of the fish supply chain 
to consciously misrepresent their products for economic gains. 
 
Past decades have recorded an increasing trend in overexploitation and depletion of fishery stocks 
globally (UNEP, 2009). To address this problem, government policies have focused on market-
based initiatives with emphasis on certification, which is expected to facilitate sustainable 
management of fisheries, value addition, as well as social and environmental benefits. Notable 
third party certification entities in the fishery sector include the Marine Stewardship Council 
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(MSC)10, Marine Eco-label in Japan11, UK Seafish Responsible Fisheries Scheme12 and Friends of 
the Sea13. These certification bodies, along with international and regional-specific regulations 
(e.g. European Union control14 and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) regulation15), have 
been used to promote sustainable fishery management practices, enhance traceability, reduce 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing which comprises an estimated one fifth of the 
global catch (Agnew et al. 2009; Flothmann et al. 2010), and as a marketing strategy to signal 
quality. Despite the growth in the number of certification bodies, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge studies have not shown any reduction in illegal fishing and there has been increasing 
publicized cases of fraud in fish markets which potentially have called into question the 
effectiveness of these schemes. IBOL technology has been used to identify some fish species that 
have been depleted (e.g. Atlantic cod, European hake) as a result of overexploitation and IUU 
(Nielsen et al. 2012), indicating its potential as a complement to certification. 
 
Studies identify several cases of mislabelling and species substitution occurring at fish retail outlets 
in different countries (e.g. Jacquet and Pauly, 2008; Miller and Mariani, 2010). For example, the 
survey results of Jacquet and Pauly (2008) suggest that one third of all the fish products sold in the 
United States may be mislabelled. Results of other studies that show high levels of seafood (fish) 
mislabelling and species substitution in different countries include: Barbuto et al. (2010) and 
Filonzi et al. (2010) in Italy; Miller and Mariani (2010) in Ireland; Garcia-Vazquez et al. (2011) 
in Spain and Greece; Wong and Hanner (2008) in Canada; and Cawthorn et al. (2012) in South 
Africa. IBOL technology through DNA barcoding has been used to detect these fraudulent 
activities in fish markets. Prime examples include: identification of “puffer fish” mislabelled as 
“monk fish” in the United States in 2007 (Leschin-Hoar, 2011); farmed Atlantic salmon labelled 
as wild pacific salmon (Cline, 2012); and narrow-barred Spanish mackerel labelled as Japanese 
                                                          
10
 http://www.msc.org/ 
11
 http://www.melj.jp/eng/index.cfm 
12
 http://www.gtcert.com/responsible-fishing/ 
13
 http://www.friendofthesea.org/ 
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November. Official Journal of the European Union L, L 343/1, 50 
(2009). 
15
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September. Official Journal of the European Union L, 286/1, 32 
(2008). 
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Mackerel (Scomberomorus niphonius) (Changizi et al. 2013).16 The technology has also been 
successfully used in identifying fish species that were mislabelled in various markets such as red 
snapper (Warner et al. 2013); tuna (Terol et al. 2002; Warner et al. 2013); flat fish (Espineira et 
al. 2008); anchovy (Jerome et al. 2008); and sharks (Barbuto et al. 2010).  
 
Interestingly, IBOL technology can be used to identify and distinguish between farm raised and 
wild caught fish only if they are different species. For example, the technology can distinguish 
farm raised Atlantic salmon from other species (e.g. Chinook, Coho, Chum, Pink, Sockeye) of 
wild caught salmon. It therefore, would not distinguish, for example, wild caught from 
acquacultured grouper if both are the same species. The inability or low accuracy of the traditional 
methods of fish species identification (e.g. use of morphological features), especially for fillets or 
processed fish products potentially diminishes sellers’ incentives to play by the stipulated rules. 
Hence verifying the authenticity of the final product on the store shelves is very important. 
 
2.2.1.2 Invasive alien species 
Invasive alien species have been identified as one of the major causes of decline in biodiversity 
(Chapin et al. 2000; Pimentel et al. 2005). According to Bryan (1996) and Shine (2005), increased 
cross border trade has been a major pathway through which invasive alien species of plants and 
animals are introduced outside their natural place of habitation. Invasive species have the 
capability of contesting and in most cases, out-competing indigenous species, act as predators and 
transmit diseases (Dejean et al. 2012). They can also cause changes in the chemical and physical 
properties of the soil, and general functioning of the entire ecosystem (Weidenhamer and 
Callaway, 2010). Identification of these species, particularly at international borders has posed a 
great challenge using the traditional morphological features and can be time consuming and labour 
intensive. Hence, scholars such as Ball and Armstrong (2006); Darling and Blum (2007) advocate 
for a standard protocol that can identify these species at every stage of their life cycle.17  
                                                          
16
 These incidences were detected using IBOL technology at the Biodiversity Institute of Ontario, University of Guelph 
where the tests were carried out. 
17
 It is worth noting that not all alien species are invasive when introduced into a new environment. While some create 
negative environmental, economic and health impacts, others tend to be beneficial (Shine, 2005). For example, some 
exotic species of plants (e.g. corn, wheat) and animals (e.g. poultry) have greatly increased agricultural productivity 
across the world. On the other hand, the introduction of the golden apple snail specie into The Philippines as a good 
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DNA barcoding has been successfully used in detecting the presence of alien invasive plants and 
animal species in various parts of the world. Examples include:  
a) Detection of American ‘bullfrog’ Rona catesbeiana (Dejean et al. 2012), an invasive 
species found in South-western France, which D’Amore (2012) describes as being among 
the worst 100 world’s invasive species. 
b)  Identification of invasive ‘lionfish’ Pterois volitans and their prey on coral reefs of the 
Mexican Caribbean, the world’s second largest reef system (Valdez-Moreno et al. 2012). 
Barcoding of the DNA identifies “fishes from five orders, 14 families, 22 genera and 34 
species in the stomach contents” (p.1) as prey. 
c) Identification of invasive agricultural insect pests such as ‘fruit flies’ Tephritidae 
(Armstrong et al. 1997), ‘tussock moths’ Lymantriidae (Armstrong et al. 2003) and 
‘armyworm moths’ Spodoptera spps (Nagoshi et al. 2011). 
 
Species identification using DNA barcoding has been generally more effective for animals than 
plants.18 The major challenge is that plants contain secondary compounds (inhibitors) including 
cellulose, lignin, resins, waxes and hemicellulose which make DNA extraction and PCR reactions 
difficult (Lee and Cooper, 1995; Degen, 2013), particularly from processed wood. Despite this 
challenge, DNA barcoding of IBOL technology has been applied in the forest sector (dry woods) 
given the size of the industry and the impact it has on the environment. Application of PCR reagent 
that neutralizes the inhibitors facilitated DNA extraction from dry (including processed) wood 
products (Nielsen and Kjaer, 2008). Identification of morphologically indistinct species of wood 
would enhance reduction of illegal trade of protected or invasive species. This implies that the 
technology has a potential role in identification (and protection) of species listed under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 
 
                                                          
protein source from Latin America caused damage estimated at US$1b to rice crops in the 1980s while it cost North 
Carolina US$19m to eradicate European gypsy moth in 1983 (Pimentel et al. 2000). 
18
 Personal communication with Biodiversity Institute of Ontario 
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CITES is a “voluntary international agreement between governments”19 and came into force on 
July 1, 1975. The agreement sets a common framework to be used by parties (member countries) 
in controlling cross border trade in selected plant and animal species that are endangered or 
threatened with extinction as a result of overexploitation. To date, the convention has 181 parties. 
Accurate identification and possible inclusion of additional species in CITES requires a reliable 
standard technique, taxonomical information and a well-established reference database containing 
common names of identified species. The potential role of IBOL technology in the identification 
of CITES listed species will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.1.3 Natural health and herbal products  
Natural health products (NHPs) according to Health Canada refer to “vitamins and minerals, herbal 
remedies, homeopathic medicines, traditional medicines such as traditional Chinese medicine, 
probiotics and other products like amino acids and essential fatty acids”. 20 In the United States, 
NHPs are referred to as supplements. NHPs are usually non-prescription products (i.e. such 
products can be bought over the counter without a doctor’s prescription).   
 
Aside from wood, there are numerous valuable products (e.g. roots, leaves, seeds, tree backs, etc) 
extracted from the forest, processed and used as medicines (natural health products), ornamentals 
and edibles (Laiou et al. 2013). Recently, natural health products are traded in high volumes in 
domestic and international markets. There is potential for misidentification and substitution of 
species, which may be intentional or as a result of morphological similarities among plant species. 
This could lead to severe health risks (Sundus, 2008) as it is difficult to recognize and identify 
them especially in processed form (Govindaraghavan et al. 2012). Previous studies (e.g. Techen 
et al. 2004; Song et al. 2009; Srirama et al. 2010; Heubl, 2010) have discovered adulteration and 
substitution in medicinal plant products given the increasing demand for herbal products globally. 
 
IBOL technology has been used to verify and authenticate label claims on ingredients used for 
natural health products (Wallace et al. 2012). For example, in a recent study, Newmaster et al. 
                                                          
19 www.cities.org/eng/disc/what.php  
20
 http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodnatur/index-eng.php  
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(2013) used IBOL technology to detect contamination and substitution in herbal products sold in 
North America (Canada and United States). In the study, a blind test of 44 herbal products of 12 
different companies was conducted. The result shows that 59% of the tested products contain DNA 
barcodes of plant species that are not listed on the label, while one-third of the products contain 
unlabelled contaminants (Parthenium hysterophorus, Senna alexandrina) and fillers (rice, soy, 
alfalfa). S. alexandrina is a laxative that could cause chronic diarrhea and liver damage if taken 
for a long period of time (Hietala et al. 1987; Spiller et al. 2003). The products of only 2 companies, 
out of 12, were found to be free from contamination, substitution and fillers. 
 
2.2.1.4 Vectors of zoonotic diseases 
Accurate identification and understanding of vectors that transfer pathogens and cause diseases in 
humans and animals would be a good step towards their effective management and control. DNA 
barcoding has been used to identify some vectors. For example, Gariepy et al. (2012) use the 
bloodmeal analytical method to identify ticks and their hosts. DNA barcoding has also been used 
to identify Sigmodontine rodents in Brazil (Muller et al. 2013). Taking cognizance of the 
discussion above, it suggests that IBOL technology has the potential of providing solutions to 
information asymmetry and authenticity issues in agriculture, food and resource markets. 
 
There is potential for continued increase in the movement of goods and services across national 
boundaries due to globalization and trade liberalization. As stated earlier, the major pathway 
through which endangered and invasive plants and animal species are intentionally or 
inadvertently introduced is international trade (Bryan, 1996; Shine, 2005). Therefore, an increase 
in cross-border trade would potentially mean an increase in the spread (or depletion) of these 
species (Ruiz and Carlton, 2003, p.323). Although governments have established diverse 
frameworks aimed at reducing the spread of endangered and invasive species, and protect human 
health and the environment; successful achievement of this objectives would require the use of 
accurate mechanisms that will facilitate easy identification of these species, as well as coordinated 
efforts by governments of different countries.  
 
In the next section of this paper, the CITES regulatory frameworks in reducing commercial trade 
in endangered plants and animal species are discussed.  
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2.3 The CITES regulatory framework to reduce illegitimate trade in endangered species 
There are several international regulatory mechanisms in place to enhance international trade, and 
protect human and animal health, as well as the environment. These include: Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD)21, Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMSWA)22, 
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES)23 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) (Morici, 2002; Burgiel and Foote, 2006). Of these 
mechanisms, CITES, an agreement by some governments to protect certain plants and animal 
species that are threatened with extinction, is examined as a backdrop to the analysis of the 
potential role of a technology such as IBOL in reducing trade in endangered species. 
 
The main objective of CITES is to enhance the sustainability of species and prevent their over-
exploitation, particularly those threatened with extinction, by regulating their cross border trade 
(IUCN, 2000). Species regulated by CITES are listed and/or categorized into three appendices 
with each category having specific regulatory measures as follows: 
 
a. Appendix I contains the list of species that are threatened with extinction and are potentially 
affected by international trade. Trade in these species for commercial purposes is prohibited among 
member countries. Non-commercial trade is only allowed with export and import permits issued 
by the government and scientific authorities of the exporting and importing countries, indicating 
that the species would not pose any risks to the environment (Article III). The list contains 630 
plus 43 sub species of animals and 301 plant species.24 
 
b. Appendix II includes species that are not necessarily threatened with extinction but trade in these 
species needs to be strictly regulated to prevent them from going extinct. Trade for commercial 
purposes is allowed only with an export permit from the exporting country, and this permit must 
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be verified and accepted by the importing country (Article IV). Included in this list are 4,827 plus 
11 sub species of animals and 29,592 plant species.25 
 
c. Appendix III includes species that individual CITES member countries recognize need 
protection, and requires the cooperation of other parties to assist countries in controlling trade in 
those species. Trade in these species requires only an export permit issued by the member country 
that solicits for the support of other parties. Nonetheless, if the species is not originally from the 
party that listed it, a certificate of origin must be presented to the authorities of the importing 
country by the exporter in the member country wishing to export the product (Article V). There 
are a total of 135 plus 13 subspecies of animals and 12 plant species in this group.  
 
It is important to note that CITES permits trade with non-parties under the condition that the non-
party state (exporter) must provide dual (export and import) permits certifying that the species 
would not pose any risk to indigenous species in the importing country (ICUN, 2000). Non-
compliance or engagement in illegal trade between parties attracts a sanction in the form of a trade 
ban. A prime example is the trade ban instituted against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from 
1985 to 1987 for engaging in illegal trade in specimen (ivory)26 of CITES listed species (African 
Elephant) that was depleted by 700,000 between 1979 and 1989 and listed in appendix I (CITES, 
1987; 2014). Thus, the dual system of control, particularly for species listed under appendix I, and 
a continuous increase in the number of parties to CITES, would potentially facilitate international 
cooperation and regulation of illegal trade in these products. 
 
Having listed the species, their proper identification, and possibly origin remains a challenge. 
Presently, CITES listed species are identified by non-species experts (customs officers) at the 
borders through physical examination using identification manuals containing pictures of various 
species (UNEP, 2009, pp.24-25). This raises a question of whether this method of identification 
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has been effective, particularly for transformed and species that “look-alike”.27 There is potential 
for exporters to misrepresent their products (e.g. misdeclaration of wood products at the border 
(Brack and Hayman, 2001, p.5)) even when the permit has been issued for a particular wood 
species. Credible enforcement of these regulatory measures requires appropriate and accurate 
testing methods to verify claims on the export permits, and to uncover illegitimate activities 
especially for processed products containing CITES listed species. Emerging technologies, such 
as the International Barcode of Life (IBOL) can be used to identify the listed species and processed 
products containing the species, as well as their country of origin given its wide range of 
applications to date. Complementing the existing method of identification (physical examination) 
by verifying claims on an export permit using authenticity technologies such as the IBOL would 
strengthen its credibility and potentially may serve as a safety assurance to the indigenous species 
and the environment in the importing country. 
 
On the other hand, technologies could be used to complement and strengthen the existing physical 
identification method presently used to identify CITES listed plants and animal species. For non-
listed species, adequate record keeping and frequent identification of a particular species using 
emerging technologies would potentially signal over-exploitation, and therefore, inform regulatory 
authorities of the need to regulate trade in those species for sustainability. Further, incorporating 
technological solutions in the monitoring system for listed species would enable the establishment 
of records on volume of trade in such species, which to the best of the author’s knowledge is not 
available presently.  
 
The regulatory framework of CITES involves export and import permits as preconditions to allow 
trade in the listed species for commercial purposes.28 These are costs to the exporters. Additionally, 
payment for an export or import permit does not guarantee its approval as the species may not pass 
the “non-detriment finding” test conducted by the scientific authorities of both exporting and 
importing counties (ICUN, 2000). This could be an incentive for exporters to take the risk of 
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bypassing the borders and smuggling their products into the importing countries. Therefore, 
adequate control in trade of the endangered species requires extensive monitoring not only at the 
official border entries but on other avenues used by smugglers. 
 
Although the costs of substituting and/or complementing existing methods used in monitoring 
cross border trade in plant and animal species with technologies (e.g. IBOL) may be high, these 
costs may be lower than the recurrent national budgets for promoting sustainability of these 
species. For example, in the case of invasive alien species, it may be more economical to invest in 
technologies that would rapidly and accurately identify these species at the borders and deny them 
access into the country than incurring significant costs in eradicating the alien species when 
introduced, in addition to the damages invasive alien species may cause to the environment and 
the entire ecosystem.  
 
Potentially, species that are overexploited may be in high demand. Therefore, strict monitoring 
and regulation of trade in these species could enhance their sustainability. A validated reference 
library (e.g. IBOL database) for comparison and easy identification is an important feature of 
emerging technologies. Hence proper identification of species would inform when regulation is 
required for a particular species, facilitate possible inclusion of additional species that seem to be 
overexploited on CITES lists, and ultimately reduce the incidences of illegitimate trade in 
endangered species.  
 
Regulation of international trade is assumed to be a major means of protecting certain plant and 
animal species listed by CITES from over-exploitation. This implicitly means that incorporating 
emerging technologies in monitoring, and regulating trade in these species, presumably at the 
borders, would have a negative effect on the supply of listed species. That is, the supply curve will 
shift inwards, as proposed by Burgiel and Foote (2006). Nonetheless, this would be true if the trade 
regulations are implemented and coordinated in such a way that there is little or no opportunity for 
trade diversion of the species threatened with extinction.  
 
The next sub-section models the potential role of IBOL technology in the regulation of trade in 
endangered species using the Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra) tree as a case study. To the 
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best knowledge of the researcher, this is the first attempt to model the implications of authenticity 
explicitly in the context of international trade. 
 
2.4 Modelling authenticity and quality verification in international trade: CITES case 
study using Brazilian Rosewood  
Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra), one of the most valuable trees in Brazil, is among the over 
100 species of a genus found mostly in the eastern part of Brazil (Vales et al. 1999) including 
Bahia, Espirito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo (Varty, 1998). Other countries 
import sawn wood made from rosewood (D.nigra) from Brazil. Wood from D.nigra is said to be 
characterized by its waxy appearance with variable colours, high resonance, resistance to insect 
attack and hardness, which makes it last longer (Flynn and Holder, 2001; Taylor et al. 2012). These 
characteristics mean that wood from D.nigra  commands a premium and is used in the production 
of high priced furniture, cabinet, cutlery handles, musical instruments (e.g. piano, guitars, violins), 
among others (Taylor et al. 2012).  
 
Wood from D.nigra tree was listed in Appendix I of CITES since June 11, 1992 and Annex ‘A’ 
of the European Union Wildlife Trade Regulation on July 20, 1992 (Taylor et al. 2012). The high 
demand for wooden items produced using D.nigra serves as an incentive to deplete the tree 
population through illegal and unreported logging (Anonymous, 2012). Hence following an 
assessment of D. nigra carried out by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
in 1998 in which it was considered to stand a high risk of extinction if appropriate measures were 
not taken, D.nigra was included in the IUCN red list as a species threatened with extinction (Varty, 
1998).  
 
It has been argued that a major concern in regulating trade in D.nigra is “species identification” 
(Gasson et al. 2010, p.46; Taylor et al. 2012, p.12). That is distinguishing D.nigra from other 
Dalbergia species that are not threatened with extinction. There are several species of Brazilian 
rosewood (Dalbergia) with similar morphological characteristics. Of these species, D.nigra and 
D.spruceana have the closest physical similarity and can easily be exchanged for each other 
(Miller and Wiemann, 2006). Of these species, only D.nigra is listed in CITES Appendix I.  
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Physical identification with the aid of CITES Identification Guide (CITES, 2002) has been used in 
distinguishing these closely related species of rosewood. Attempts have been made using Chemical 
Analysis (Kite et al. 2010) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (Gasson et al. 2010) to 
distinguish D.nigra from other similar timber traded as rosewood. The PCA gave about 36.36 
percent false positives, resulting in Gasson et al. (2010) advocating for an alternative approach 
with higher levels of precision in identification.  
 
This paper examines the potential effects of using IBOL technology to implement a CITES 
commercial trade ban on D.nigra using a partial equilibrium trade model. This is analyzed in three 
scenarios. Assumptions are made for each scenario, and possible outcomes (e.g. trade effects) 
under each scenario are identified. The models start with a base case in which there is free trade 
and no testing with an authenticity technology, hence the timber (wood) market is undifferentiated 
(i.e. rosewood timber made from different tree species cannot be differentiated). The first scenario 
involves a situation where only the United States (a major importer) adopts the IBOL technology, 
and uses it as a monitoring tool to test for imported rosewood timber at the border. This is a trade 
diversion scenario as the regulation potentially will be weakened by Brazilian exporters diverting 
trade to a third country which does not observe CITES and where there is no testing regulation. 
The second scenario examines the potential outcomes when the U.S. and the rest of the world 
(ROW) adopt the technology (multilateral adoption of IBOL technology by all CITES member 
states) and use it to monitor imports of wood. Scenario three models potential upstream response 
(e.g. adoption of testing and certification systems) in the Brazilian wood supply chain and the 
possible implications that could arise from such a response.  
 
Base case 
This depicts a situation where there is free trade in rosewood timber between Brazil and importing 
countries without any testing for authenticity. A number of assumptions underlie the modelling of 
the base case:29 
a) There are two importing countries, the U.S. and a third country (rest of the world). The 
United States is the largest single importer of sawn wood from Brazil. About 26 percent of 
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Brazilian sawn wood exports go to the U.S. while 74 percent are imported by the rest of 
the world.30 
b) Rosewood is only produced in Brazil and neither of the importing countries produce 
rosewood. As a result, in the following model there is no domestic supply curve for 
rosewood in the importing countries. 
c) The United States is a high priced market for rosewood relative to the third country. Hence 
the domestic demand curves for rosewood in the U.S. and third country cut the price axis 
at different points (U.S. at a higher price and third country at a lower price). The demand 
curves in the importing countries have different elasticities, with the demand curve in the 
U.S. being more inelastic than that of the third country.  
d) Buyers of rosewood cannot differentiate wood made from different (legally and illegally 
traded) species of rosewood at the time of purchase. In other words, the markets are 
undifferentiated.   
e) Legal rosewood is supplied at a higher cost relative to the illegal rosewood (D.nigra). 
 
The illegal rosewood comprises the endangered species of rosewood (Dalbergia nigra) that is 
threatened with extinction and listed in appendix I of CITES with a ban on commercial trade, while 
the legal rosewood represents timber made from other species of rosewood that are not threatened 
with extinction. Figure 2.1 illustrates the base case with no testing for authenticity. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the base case where the market for rosewood is undifferentiated. In other words, 
there is no testing for authenticity, hence the importing countries cannot differentiate between the 
legal and illegal rosewood. In panel (a), Db represents the domestic demand curve for rosewood in 
Brazil, SI and SL respectively represent the supply curves for illegal rosewood (Dalbergia nigra) 
and legal (other species of rosewood), while ST is the total market supply of rosewood in Brazil 
(horizontal summation of SI and SL).31 In panel (c), Dus is the demand curve for rosewood in the 
U.S. and in panel (d) Dtc represents the demand curve in the third country – another potential 
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importer of rosewood. Panel (b) represents the world market for rosewood, XSI and XSL represent 
the export supply curves for legal and illegal rosewood respectively, while XST is the total export 
supply curve derived from the intersection of the total market demand and supply curves in Brazil. 
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Figure 2.1: Base case: Undifferentiated rosewood market with no testing 
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In panel (b), MDT represents the total import demand for rosewood, comprised of U.S. and third 
country imports. Line ‘abc’ represents the U.S. import demand curve. At any price above ‘b’ on 
MDT, only the U.S. imports rosewood, so MDUS = MDT over the section ‘a-b’. At prices below ‘b’, 
both the U.S. and third country are importers of rosewood. MDT is the total import demand curve 
for the U.S. and the third country. Intersection of the total import demand and export supply curves 
in panel (b) gives rise to the equilibrium world market price, Pw and quantity, qw. At Pw, Brazil 
exports qx quantity of rosewood, while the U.S. and third country import qdUS and qdt quantities 
respectively. Of the qx quantity of rosewood exported by Brazil at price Pw, qdL and qdI represent 
export quantities of legal and illegal rosewood respectively. There is free flow of trade without 
any restriction, and the products are undifferentiated on the world market.  
 
The next sub-section examines possible outcomes when a large importing country (U.S.) adopts 
an authenticity technology and uses it to test for rosewood at the border. 
 
Scenario 1: Adoption of IBOL technology by the U.S. to test for rosewood at the border 
This scenario illustrates a situation where the U.S. imposes a regulation requiring authenticity 
testing of rosewood at the border. Assumptions in this model, shown in figure 2.2, include: 
a) U.S. adopts an authenticity technology (IBOL) for testing imports of rosewood at the 
border as a measure to enforce the CITES ban on commercial trade in Brazilian rosewood 
(D.nigra), while there is no technology adoption and testing in the third country. 
b) Testing (monitoring) using IBOL is effective and involves some costs. 
c) For simplicity, assume the U.S. imports all the legal rosewood, while the illegal rosewood 
goes to the third country (therefore XSL intersects MDT above point ‘b’). That is the demand 
for legal rosewood in the U.S. is greater than the supply from Brazil. 
 
Following the base case, all the curves in panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) in figure 2.2 remain as defined 
in the base case.  
 
At the world market price Pw without any testing the market is undifferentiated, qx quantity of legal 
and illegal rosewood is exported by Brazil while qdUS and qdt quantities are imported by the U.S. 
and third country respectively, as in the Base case. If the U.S. imposes a regulation of adopting the 
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IBOL technology and uses it to test the species of rosewood at the border, there is a cost 
(monitoring) associated with such regulation. Testing at the U.S. border implies differentiating the 
products in the international market. The U.S. will import only the legal rosewood while the illegal 
rosewood will not be allowed into the U.S. Differentiating the products results in separate import 
demand functions/curves (MDUS and MDtc) in the world market in panel (b), where MDUS is the 
US import demand function (only legally harvested rosewood), and MDtc is the third country 
import demand function (undifferentiated rosewood). The testing regulation imposed by the U.S. 
will have some effects including:  
1) An increase in the cost of importing rosewood into the U.S. The effect of the testing 
(monitoring) costs is shown as a downward shift in the U.S. domestic (DUS) and import 
demand (MDUS) curves by the amount of the testing cost. In other words the incidence of 
the testing cost will result in a decrease in demand for rosewood in the U.S. at all prices. 
Hence, the monitoring costs is modelled as the vertical distance (δ) between DUS and DUS’ 
in panel (c).32 The rationale for considering a downward shift in the U.S. domestic and 
import demand curves instead of an inward shift in the import supply curve of legal 
rosewood to show the effect of the testing cost is because since the U.S. is adopting the 
technology, only legal rosewood is allowed into the country. We are more interested in the 
impact (welfare effects) of the testing costs (increase in the domestic price of legal 
rosewood and decrease in demand) on U.S. consumers.33 Given the downward shift in the 
U.S. domestic demand curve which results in a downward shift in the U.S. import demand 
curve, the new equilibrium price (PLUS) and quantity (qwUS) for legally traded rosewood in 
the world market is derived by the intersection of the new U.S. import demand curve 
(MDUS’) and the export supply curve for legal rosewood (XSL) in panel (b). The increase in 
price, all other factors remaining constant, will lead to a decrease in quantity of rosewood 
demanded in the U.S. (from qdUS when the market is undifferentiated to qdUS’ when only 
the legal rosewood is allowed into the U.S.) in panel (c). The new quantity (qdUS’), at price 
PLUS, reflects trade in the legal rosewood. 
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2) Being a large importing country of rosewood from Brazil, the U.S. testing regulation would 
have a decreasing effect on the world market price given the fall in demand for illegal 
rosewood. The new world market price (Pw’) is the price at which the illegal rosewood will 
be imported by the third country, hence Pw’ = Ptc. The third country’s new equilibrium price 
(Ptc) and quantity (qwtc) for illegal rosewood is derived from the intersection of the third 
country import demand curve (MDtc) and the export supply curve (XSI) for illegal rosewood 
in panel (b). The model therefore shows that while the legal rosewood is sold at a higher 
price in the U.S., the illegal rosewood is sold at a lower price in the third country. 
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Figure 2.2: U.S. adoption of IBOL technology to test for illegal (endangered species) of Brazilian rosewood - Dalbergia nigra 
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The efficiency of the unilateral U.S. action (regulation) potentially would be offset by the incentive 
for Brazil to engage in trade diversion (reallocation of trade to other countries) as exporters in 
Brazil would have the option of diverting the illegal rosewood (D.nigra) to a third country where 
there is no testing regulation. The illegal wood from Brazil will be imported by the third country 
at a lower price PItc which is equal to Pw’. Importing at a lower price PItc would serve as an incentive 
for the third country to import more, hence quantity of imports will increase from qdt (before 
product differentiation to qd’t after differentiation) in panel (d).34 On the other hand, the decrease 
in the price of illegal wood would serve as a disincentive to harvest the illegal rosewood, D.nigra. 
 
Comparing the welfare effects, since there are no supply curves in the U.S. and third country as 
they do not produce rosewood, we can only comment on the gains and/or losses to the consumers 
in the importing countries, as well as welfare impacts in Brazil. In the U.S., differentiation of the 
product due to testing primarily results in an increase in the U.S. price, and consequently a decrease 
in quantity demanded of rosewood. The price increase to PLUS as well as the fall in quantity 
demanded result in a loss to consumers while suppliers of legal wood from Brazil will gain.35 In 
addition, at price Pw’, there is a loss to Brazilian suppliers of illegal rosewood. The third country 
imports and sells illegal rosewood at a lower price PItc. At this price, quantity demanded of the 
illegal rosewood in the third country increases which results in a gain in consumer surplus. 
Nevertheless, we cannot ascertain (with certainty) whether the gain by suppliers of legal wood to 
the U.S. is larger (lower) than the loss to suppliers of illegal wood to the third country.  
 
The results of the analysis in this model convey some key messages. Adoption of an authenticity 
technology for testing imports of rosewood at the border by one country potentially may not be 
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effective at reducing commercial trade in the endangered species of Brazilian rosewood (D.nigra) 
as the regulation will be weakened through diversion of D.nigra by Brazil to a third country where 
there is no test for authenticity. In the U.S. (panel (c)), there is a decrease in the quantity demanded 
for rosewood presumably because the U.S. no longer imports illegally harvested rosewood. On the 
other hand, there is an increase in the quantity demanded (from qdt to qd’t) for illegal rosewood in 
the third country (panel (d)). The use of technologies (e.g. IBOL) to verify authenticity could 
enhance product differentiation (market segmentation) and reduce information asymmetry in 
rosewood timber within the wood supply chain of a country that uses the technology to test for 
authenticity.  
 
The potential outcomes of multilateral implementation of testing regulation for rosewood is 
examined in the next scenario. 
 
Scenario 2: The U.S. and the ROW impose testing regulation for rosewood timber 
In this scenario, the potential outcomes of a multilateral (U.S. and the rest of the world) adoption 
of IBOL technology for testing rosewood are modelled. Assumptions in this model include:  
a) All export markets for Brazilian rosewood are part of CITES and impose a regulation 
requiring authenticity testing for rosewood imports. In other words, the rest of the world 
(ROW) includes other CITES member countries outside the U.S.;  
b) Testing for rosewood in the U.S. and ROW involve some costs and is effective in detecting 
fraud;  
c) Brazil does not test for rosewood timber before it is exported and therefore does not enforce 
CITES ban on commercial trade in D.nigra in the domestic market; and 
d) The U.S. and ROW import some quantity of legal rosewood. For this reason, the export 
supply curve for legal rosewood (XSL) crosses the total import demand curve (MDT) below 
point ‘b’ in the world market (unlike in the base case).  
 
If the U.S. and ROW multilaterally impose regulations requiring testing of rosewood timber 
imports using an authenticity technology, it means that wood markets in the importing countries 
will be differentiated. Thus, only the legal rosewood will be traded in the world market and 
imported by the U.S. and ROW. Trade diversion of illegal rosewood will no longer be a possibility 
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for Brazil due to strict compliance with the CITES regulation by the U.S. and ROW. This suggests 
that illegal rosewood can only be sold in the Brazilian market, as indicated in panel (a) of figure 
2.3. Scenario 2 is different from scenario 1 in that the U.S. and ROW implement a testing 
regulation. This implies that the cost of importing rosewood in the importing countries will 
increase with the testing cost. With product differentiation in the importing countries, we will no 
longer have a separate import demand curve (undifferentiated rosewood) for the third country as 
was the case in scenario 1.  
 
The demand curves (DUS and Dtc respectively) in the importing countries and the import demand 
curve will shift downwards by the amount of the testing cost (indicating the effect of the testing 
cost on the demand for imported legal rosewood). The vertical distance between the demand curves 
in each importing country shows the magnitude of the monitoring cost.36 Prior to authenticity 
testing and product differentiation at the borders of the importing countries, the intersection of the 
total import demand and export supply curves gives rise to the world market price (Pw) and quantity 
(qw). The new equilibrium price (PL*) of legal rosewood is derived by the intersection of new total 
import demand curve (MDT’) and the export supply curve for legal rosewood (XSL) in the world 
market. The downward shift in the total import demand curve to MDT’ in panel (b) follows the 
decrease in demand (downward shift in the demand curves) of the legal rosewood in the U.S. and 
ROW. At price PL*, U.S. and ROW will import qdUS’ and qd’t quantities of legal rosewood 
respectively.  
 
Comparing the welfare effects, suppliers of legal rosewood gain by selling at a high price in the 
U.S. and third country as there is no competition with lemons, while consumers in the importing 
countries lose as a result of the higher price and the lower quantity. Further, the low price PIb of 
illegal rosewood in Brazil makes the suppliers worse off.  
 
Figure 2.3 shows that the testing regulation imposed by the U.S. and ROW reduced the quantity 
of illegal rosewood traded but does not completely eliminate illegal harvesting. As mentioned 
earlier, illegal rosewood can be sold in Brazil where the market is still undifferentiated. Since the 
                                                          
36
 Although not certain, it is possible that the amount of the testing cost might differ in the importing countries. 
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illegal rosewood cannot be exported to any country, the domestic supply exceeds demand. This 
reduces the equilibrium domestic price of illegal rosewood to PIb and quantity qdI derived from 
the intersection of the domestic demand and supply curve for illegal rosewood in panel (a). Again, 
this could be a disincentive to harvest illegal rosewood in Brazil. The analysis in this scenario 
shows some interesting results. Testing for rosewood imports by the U.S. and ROW using an 
authenticity technology potentially eliminates cross border trade in illegal rosewood. Rather the 
trade is restricted to Brazil at a lower price and quantity (due to demand/supply factors) which may 
discourage illegal harvesting. In addition, with product differentiation only the legal rosewood is 
traded across national boundaries, and at a higher price. 
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Figure 2.3: Multilateral adoption of IBOL technology for illegal (endangered species) of Brazilian rosewood - Dalbergia nigra 
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Scenario 3: Potential upstream response (testing and certification) in the exporting market 
Multilateral implementation of the CITES ban on commercial trade in D.nigra through a threat of 
authenticity testing of imported rosewood potentially may trigger a pre-emptive upstream response 
to introducing testing and certification of authenticity by the exporting country, Brazil. Some 
assumptions are made in modelling this scenario including: 
a) Brazil adopts an authenticity technology (IBOL) and a certification system, and uses them 
to differentiate legal and illegal rosewood on the world market;  
b) Testing and certification in the Brazilian market are associated with some costs; 
c) Consumers in Brazil are indifferent between timber made from legal or illegal rosewood; 
d) Certification of authenticity for imported rosewood is seen as being credible in the U.S. 
and ROW markets, and leads to an increased demand in the importing countries due to the 
assurance that the wood is legally harvested; and 
e) Both the U.S. and ROW import some quantity of legal rosewood, hence the export supply 
curve for legal rosewood crosses the total import demand curve below point ‘b’ in the 
world market (as in scenario 2). 
 
This model has assumed that consumers in Brazil are not concerned about illegal harvesting and 
therefore about product differentiation in the domestic wood market, however, international 
pressure (through a threat of authenticity testing of imported rosewood by importing countries) 
may trigger an upstream response in Brazil. Such a response could be in the form of adopting an 
authenticity technology such as the IBOL, and the establishment of a credible certification system 
within the domestic wood supply chain. This is capable of boosting the collective reputation of 
Brazilian wood exporters/distributors and the integrity of the wood supply chain. It will also 
increase the confidence level of importers in Brazilian wood supplies assuming the certification 
system in Brazil is perceived to be credible by the importing countries.  
This is shown in figure 2.4.  
 
Prior to Brazil implementing testing, the base case situation prevails: at price Pw, wood markets in 
Brazil, U.S. and ROW are undifferentiated; hence qx quantity of rosewood exported by Brazil 
(consisting of both legally and illegally harvested rosewood) is traded in the international market, 
while the U.S. and third country import qdUS and qdt quantities respectively. Differentiating between 
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legal and illegal rosewood in Brazil using an authenticity technology and a credible certification 
system is associated with some costs. The effect of the costs of testing and certification within the 
Brazilian supply chain for legal rosewood is shown as an upward shift in the supply curve (SL to 
SL’) of legal rosewood in panel (a) by the amount of the testing and certification costs.37 This 
causes the export supply curve (XSL) for legal rosewood to shift to XSL’ in panel (b). 
 
Differentiating legal from illegal rosewood through testing and credible certification would mean 
signalling quality and reducing information asymmetry for buyers (domestic and importers), and 
this is assumed to shift the demand for certified (legal) rosewood outwards in the U.S. and ROW 
markets. The shift in domestic demand curves in the importing countries causes the import demand 
curve for legal rosewood (MDT) to shift out to MDT’ in panel (b).38  
                                                          
37
 The nature of the shift (parallel or pivotal) in supply curve affects the size of welfare distribution (Mensah and 
Wohlgenant, 2010), particularly producer surplus (Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001, p.274). Pivotal shift in the 
supply curve of legal rosewood was used (by assumption) because this is a theoretical analysis. 
38
 It is important to note that from the international trade perspective, adoption of a testing regulation for rosewood 
either by the exporting country (Brazil) or importing countries yield equivalent results. If Brazil adopts an authenticity 
technology and uses it to test rosewood exports, the effect could be seen as an export tax. On the other hand, if the 
importing countries adopt and test rosewood imports, the effect could be described as an import tariff. The effect of 
an export tax is equivalent to that of an import tariff. 
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Figure 2.4: Potential upstream response by Brazil on the U.S. and ROW adoption of testing regulation for Brazil rosewood (Dalbergia nigra) 
  
 
An increase in demand for legal rosewood by importing countries resulting from the authenticity 
assurance, all other factors remaining constant, would raise the price to PL*, which is derived by 
the intersection of the new total import demand curve (MDT’) and export supply curve (XSL’) of 
legal rosewood in panel (b). The high price for legal rosewood in Brazil will serve as an incentive 
for firms in Brazil to cheat. This is why we assume perfect testing with IBOL technology. In 
addition, the decrease in quantity demanded (from qdI to qdI’) and price (from Pw in the base case 
to PIb) will further discourage illegal harvesting in Brazil. The certification system could be Green 
Labelling, which has been used in several countries including Singapore, Hong Kong, Denmark, 
France, Germany, among others39; and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),40 a certification body 
supported by international organization such as Greenspace and World Wildlife Fund (WWF).  
 
Testing and certification of authenticity in Brazil would affect the quantities of legal and illegal 
rosewood as well as their prices. In terms of welfare, surplus (producer surplus) to suppliers of 
legal rosewood in Brazil depends on the price and quantity of legal rosewood supplied (size of the 
shift in supply curve) as well as the costs of implementing testing and certification. Although the 
increase in demand for legal rosewood in the U.S. and ROW due to authenticity assurances will 
be beneficial to suppliers of legal rosewood from Brazil as they will sell at a higher price, the actual 
outcome (magnitude of the producer surplus) depends on the degree to which the increase in 
demand for legal rosewood outweighs the costs of testing and certification. Suppliers of illegal 
rosewood in Brazil will lose by selling at a lower price PIb and lower quantity in Brazil. On the 
other hand, the higher price of legal rosewood in the importing countries create losses to 
consumers.  
 
Results of this scenario have implications for the endangered species of rosewood. For example, 
while upstream certification of authenticity for the legally harvested species of rosewood supplies 
would increase the demand in the importing markets, the reduction in price and quantity of the 
illegal rosewood supplied (in panel (a)) will serve as a disincentive to supply the illegal rosewood, 
thereby reducing the overexploitation of the endangered species. 
                                                          
39
 http://www.sec.org.sg/sgls/ 
40
 https://ca.fsc.org 
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Analyses of the three scenarios show some interesting outcomes. Implementation of a regulation 
requiring authenticity testing of imported rosewood by one country potentially may not be 
effective at reducing commercial trade in the endangered species (D.nigra) of Brazilian rosewood. 
This is because a testing regulation implemented by one country alone will give room for trade 
diversion to a third country where there is no testing. Nonetheless, multilateral testing of rosewood 
imports could eliminate cross border trade in illegal rosewood, thereby restricting the trade only 
in Brazil. An upstream adoption of an authenticity technology for testing, and certification system 
in Brazil as a response to a threat of authenticity testing of imported rosewood by importing 
countries would mean signalling authenticity assurances, which potentially could increase 
importing countries’ confidence in supplies from Brazil. Signalling authenticity through credible 
certification would increase demand for legal rosewood in importing countries, and consequently 
the market price. This implies that enforcement of CITES trade regulation on the endangered 
species of Brazilian rosewood using authenticity technologies potentially may create market for 
timber made from rosewood species that are not threatened with extinction.  
 
On the other hand, although illegal harvesting may not be completely eliminated, product 
differentiation through testing and certification of authenticity in Brazil potentially would reduce 
the domestic demand and price of illegal rosewood. This would serve as a disincentive for illegal 
harvesting, and therefore, enhance the sustainability of the endangered species. 
 
The results of the analyses in the different scenarios are intended to lay out potential outcomes 
which are driven by a number of factors, particularly the assumptions underlying the models. A 
prime example is the magnitude of the testing costs. Perhaps the exporting country (Brazil) only 
tests and certifies once while the importing countries require multiple testing. Going by this 
presumption, it may cost Brazil less to test than the importing countries. As mentioned earlier, the 
size of the testing costs will determine the magnitude of the surplus accruing to suppliers of legal 
rosewood. In addition, the size of the demand shift in the importing countries would implicitly 
show the extent to which the upstream testing and certification of authenticity is credible and 
valued in the importing countries. The assumptions underlying the models also have welfare 
implications in the exporting and importing countries. For example, if testing is done by the 
importing countries, consumers in the importing countries will lose due to high domestic price of 
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legal rosewood and reduced demand. On the other hand, suppliers of legal rosewood in Brazil will 
gain from the increase in price of legal rosewood at the international market, while illegal 
harvesters lose. In contrast, if testing is done by the exporting country, consumers in the importing 
country will lose due to high price although there would be an increase in demand for legal 
rosewood in the importing countries. Further, the results are contingent on who adopts the 
technology for testing imports of rosewood and where, as well as the degree to which countries 
become CITES member states. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The paper examines technological solutions to authenticity issues in international agri-food and 
resource markets, and discusses the role of technology in verifying authenticity, and enhancing the 
enforcement of trade regulations on endangered species (Brazilian rosewood – Dalbergia nigra) 
listed by the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora 
(CITES). Information asymmetry and quality uncertainty in agriculture, food and resource markets 
have eroded consumers’ confidence, particularly for products with credence attributes; and spurred 
their demand for authenticity and quality reassurance. Government regulatory policies and 
industry-led initiatives aimed at providing credible product information to ensure that price of 
products reflect their true quality and consumers make informed choices are imperfect as there 
have been several reported cases of fraud. Results of recent studies have reinforced the potential 
of technologies in the identification and authentication of products. These technologies are capable 
of removing credence characteristics or verifying if the attribute is present in the products, thereby 
saving consumers, government and industries the cost of searching for these attributes, supply 
chain monitoring and negative externalities or spillovers associated with fraud. 
 
Emerging technologies, such as the IBOL technology, potentially have a role to play in enhancing 
the implementation of regulations regarding cross border trade and sustainability of endangered 
species, which is the major objective of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES). Using the case of an endangered tree specie, Brazilian 
rosewood (Dalbergia nigra), the theoretical analysis maps out the potential outcomes of adopting 
an authenticity technology (e.g. IBOL) to test for imported Brazilian rosewood at the international 
borders under different scenarios (pathways) including: a base case (undifferentiated markets) 
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where there is free trade without any testing regulation, the adoption of IBOL technology by a 
major importer (U.S.) in which trade diversion occurs and export of the endangered species are 
diverted to a third country; the adoption of IBOL technology and timber testing by all major 
importers (CITES member countries representing the rest of the world), and potential upstream 
adoption of an authenticity technology and certification system within the wood supply chain of 
the exporting country (Brazil).  
 
The outcomes of the analyses, which are primarily driven by assumptions underlying the models, 
also depend on who adopts the technology, when and where; as well as the extent to which 
countries are signatories to CITES. The theoretical analysis presented in this paper provides a basis 
for future research on international trade regulation of endangered species listed by CITES. The 
analysis is limited by non-availability of data such as the volume and economic impacts of trade 
in endangered species. Availability of such data would inform an empirical analysis to quantity 
some of the outcomes, and test the consistency and reliability of the theoretical results. Future 
studies could use data on costs/economic impacts of trade in endangered species to explore the 
costs/benefits trade off in using IBOL technology to enforce CITES trade regulation in these 
species. 
 
Results of the analyses suggests that testing of rosewood imports by only one country would not 
yield the desired outcome of reducing commercial trade in the endangered species. Rather a 
multilateral enforcement of testing regulations, though it may not put to an end illegal harvesting, 
could eliminate cross border trade in D.nigra if opportunities for trade diversion are curtailed. 
Upstream implementation of testing and certification of authenticity in the exporting country 
potentially would increase demand for legal rosewood if importing countries perceive the 
authenticity testing and certification system in the exporting country to be credible. Nonetheless, 
the magnitude of the costs associated with testing and certification, and the size of the demand 
shift in the importing markets determine the size of the gain (surplus) to suppliers of legal 
rosewood, and also the extent to which there is an incentive for the exporting country to adopt 
testing and reduce illegal harvesting. 
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Essentially, certification to signal quality in the wood supply chain or that of any product could be 
tenable, but verifying the authenticity of the certified product through testing with a monitoring 
and authenticity technology would make the certification system more reliable, acceptable and 
credible to consumers and importers. In the light of these issues, testing and monitoring 
technologies have a potential role in providing a solution to information asymmetry and 
authenticity issues in international markets, and are likely to act as a complement to, rather than a 
substitute for, regulatory enforcement. In the case of endangered species, the CITES commercial 
ban on international trade in D.nigra species of Brazilian rosewood could be more effectively 
enforced through multilateral testing of imported rosewood, rather than testing by one country 
irrespective of the market size, while upstream adoption of testing and certification systems in the 
exporting country may enhance product differentiation and sustainability of the species threatened 
with extinction. 
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Appendix 
The DNA Barcoding Process 
Bio-identification for animals is done using the mitochondrial gene cytochrome c oxidase sub unit 
I (COI) (Hebert et al., 2003; Ward et al., 2005)41; while two-locus system (rbcL + matK) is used 
for plants (CBOL, 2009)42. In the IBOL system, a tissue sample is taken from a specimen to be 
identified after a high resolution photograph of the specimen is taken for scanned digital images 
that will be stored in the reference library. Taxonomy information about the specimen is recorded. 
The DNA is extracted from the standard (specific gene region) part of the genome from the sample 
tissue. The next step involves the amplification of the barcode region (COI) using the Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR) and generation of a barcode using a DNA sequencer. The barcode is 
matched and/or compared with sequenced reference barcodes in the library database for 
appropriate identification.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
41The region of DNA used to generate a barcode must contain unique identifiers, be short enough to allow sequencing 
in a single reaction, and contain matching regions which can be used to establish universal primers (Rubinoff, 2006). 
 
42
 This was recommended as the standard plant barcode by the plant working group of the Barcode of Life based on 
their assessments of “recoverability, sequence quality and levels of specie discrimination after comparing the 
performance of seven leading DNA plastid regions of atpF-atpH spacer; matKgene; rbcL gene; rpoB gene; rpoC1 
gene; psbK-psbI spacer; and trnI-psbA spacer.” 
 
43
 http://ibol.org/about-us/what-is-dna-barcoding/  
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Figure A.2: DNA barcoding process 
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CHAPTER 3 
Authenticity, Collective Reputation and Quality Signals: An Empirical 
Analysis of VQA wines 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The paper explores authenticity, quality signals and collective reputation in the agri-food sector by 
examining the role of Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) in ensuring the authenticity and quality 
signalling of wines produced in Canada, and the factors that influence a winery’s decision to seek 
VQA certification. The wine industry is chosen because it is an agri-food industry with a well-
established authenticity and quality assurance system. 
 
Authenticity of food products has become a global concern given the increasing spate of food fraud 
cases. Food fraud encompasses illegitimate market activities including: adulteration, dilution, 
substitution of substandard products for legitimate gains, false or misleading claims, among others. 
Such actions often create negative reputation externalities for other agri-food firms resulting in the 
classic ‘market for lemons’. These serve as an incentive to take appropriate measures aimed at 
protecting not just an individual firm’s reputation but also collective industry reputation. While 
food quality uncertainty has spurred consumers’ interest and demand for quality assurance, the 
food industry is making investments in quality, authenticity and reputation-enhancing programs, 
such as the industry-led VQA system for Canadian wines in order to gain consumer confidence, 
collective reputation and market share.   
 
A prime example is the fake icewine issue the Canadian wine industry has faced in China. Canada 
has unique weather conditions for icewine production and Asia, particularly China, is a major 
export market for icewine. Canada exported icewine worth about $8.6 million to China in 2012. 
This represents 55 percent of the total quantity of icewine exported by Canada in 2012 (FATDC, 
2013). Wine consumption has been on the increase in China particularly in urban centers. 
However, China does not have a grading and quality assurance system for wines and, therefore, 
Chinese wines are often rated low in terms of quality and taste by wine experts (AAFC, 2011).  
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Canada is a major producer of icewine in the world and the Canadian wine industry has a credible 
quality assurance system, the VQA, which ensures the authenticity of Canadian wines. The price 
premium commanded by Canadian icewine serves as an economic incentive for some Chinese 
local wineries to produce counterfeit icewine labelled “made in Canada” (AAFC, 2011).  
 
In the context of agri-food markets, the term reputation refers to consumers’ beliefs about a firm, 
which could reflect the authenticity (quality) and uniqueness of its product. A consumer’s belief 
about a firm provides an indication of whether the consumer has trust and confidence in the firm’s 
product based on past experience with the firm’s product (Fombrum 1996; Gosti and Wilson, 2001; 
Fishman and Rob, 2002) or prior belief (reputation) about the firm (Menapace and Moschini, 
2010). Reputation could be individual or collective. Individual reputation relates to the reputation 
of a single firm, while collective reputation refers to that of an industry. In the context of the 
Canadian wine sector, individual reputation reflects the reputation of a single winery while 
collective reputation relates to the reputation of a wine producing region, such as the Niagara 
Peninsula in Ontario or the Okanagan valley in British Columbia, or the reputation of a wine 
producing country, such as Canada. It has been argued that reputation is a paramount factor that 
influences consumers’ wine purchases (Castriota and Delmastro, 2014). The reputation of a firm 
or an industry is driven by the quality of its products, especially products with experience and 
credence attributes whose quality consumers cannot ascertain at the time of purchase (Costanigro 
and McCluskey, 2007). 
 
Wine is one of the commodities whose quality consumers have difficulty in ascertaining ex-ante 
or prior to purchase (Charters et al., 1999), and often make purchase decisions based on 
information provided on the label, including: producer name (winery), its region of origin and 
reputation; grape variety used in production; year of production and third party rating provided by 
wine experts (Ling and Lockshin, 2003). Potentially, many consumers may neither look at the 
quality rating nor have the time to go through the information provided on wine labels and 
therefore, may pay a premium for low quality wines. This raises the question, could VQA be a 
signal and/or a short hand for quality and reduce transaction (search) costs for consumers? 
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Previous studies (e.g. Oczkowski, 1994; Combris et al., 2000; Schamel and Anderson; 2003, 
Rabkin and Beatty, 2007; Kwong et al., 2011) have used hedonic models to estimate the marginal 
contributions of perceived wine attributes to the market price of different types of wines in 
different regions. However, only Rabkin and Beatty (2007) estimate the marginal contribution of 
VQA certification to wine prices in British Columbia. This paper is different in scope and 
approach. It uses data for wines from Ontario and British Columbia and includes wineries and 
appellation of origin to separate the effect of individual and collective reputation on the price of 
wine. In addition to estimating the implicit values of wine attributes, particularly VQA, using 
hedonic models, it also estimates a Probit model to identify the factors that influence a winery’s 
decision whether to seek VQA status, which (to the author’s knowledge) no previous study has 
examined. The VQA system is voluntary, and it is of interest to identify empirically the factors 
that influence its uptake, despite the costs associated with using the VQA system. 
 
In light of these issues, the key research questions examined in this paper are as follows: Does 
VQA certification (versus collective and individual reputation signals) elicit a price premium and 
enhance the collective reputation of Canadian wines? What factors determine a winery’s decision 
to seek VQA certification for a specific wine? These questions are important for several reasons. 
VQA is the only quality assurance system in the Canadian wine industry. It is therefore pertinent 
to determine empirically the value of VQA certification, which will indicate the difference in 
prices of VQA and non-VQA wines. In addition, it is clear that not all wineries seek VQA 
certification on all their wines. The data set include wines from the same winery both with and 
without VQA certification. It is also important to know why and what could trigger a winery to 
apply for VQA certification on some of its wines. The first question is addressed by estimating a 
hedonic pricing model to determine the marginal value of VQA certification and other relevant 
wine and winery attributes to the market price of wine. This will inform whether VQA certification 
contributes to boosting the collective reputation of Canadian wines. For the second question, a 
Probit model is estimated to identify the factors that shape a winery’s decision to use the VQA 
system for specific wines.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 examines the wine industry and industry-led quality 
assurance systems. Section 3 discusses the methodology (analytical techniques) used in the 
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analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discussion, while section 5 summarizes the 
implications of the results and draws some conclusions. 
 
3.2 Quality Assurance Systems/Programs in the Wine Sector 
The increasing cases of food adulteration and counterfeiting have resulted in many consumers 
becoming mindful of quality. In the wine sub-sector, wine industries in different countries have 
engaged in quality assurance (QA) and sustainability programs to promote and gain support for 
regional wines. According to Falcheck (2008), the increase in uptake of quality assurance 
programs by wineries are driven by two major factors – “consumer bias” for regional wines and 
the proliferation of wineries across regions. 
 
Wine industries in various countries have different industry-led quality assurance programs that 
operate in a similar way. Examples include: Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) for Canadian 
wineries, the Common Wealth Quality Alliance (CWQA) for Virginia wineries, the Washington 
Wine Quality Alliance (WWQA) established in 1999, California Sustainable Wine established in 
2001 by the California Association of Winegrape Growers, and California Wine Institute’s wine 
growers, among others. A common feature of these quality assurance programs is that wines 
approved by each of the programs must be made with 100% grapes grown in the region and bear 
the logo/seal of the quality assurance system on the bottles to signal quality and enable consumers 
to make informed choices. However, each QA program has slightly different standards. For 
example, quality verification for wines by VQA starts from the grape field where grapes are 
inspected before harvest to ensure that they are harvested at the appropriate ripening stage, while 
for some QA programs (e.g. CWQA for Virginia wineries); bottled or pre-bottled wines could be 
submitted for analysis.44 However, the Canadian wine industry is the main focus of this paper; 
hence VQA will be examined in detail. 
 
The rationales for examining wine quality assurance in this study include:  
                                                          
44
 http://www.vawine.org/quality_ap.html 
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a) the Canadian wine industry uses an industry-led QA system (VQA) to ensure authenticity, 
signal origin and quality to consumers and protect the collective reputation of the industry, 
and 
b) data on wine prices are available from the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO). 
 
3.2.1 Authenticity in the Canadian Wine Industry through Vintners Quality Alliance 
(VQA) 
The Canadian wine industry consists of producers (vintners) who are involved in the production 
of wine and brandy using grapes and other types of fruits (AAFC, 2012). Wine production in 
Canada started in 1862 in southern Ontario, while Canadian wine became available in the 
international market in 1981 (VanSickle, 2011). Wine is produced in four provinces in Canada 
including: Ontario and British Columbia, which together produce about 98% of total production; 
with Quebec and Nova Scotia together producing only 2% of total production (VanSickle, 2011). 
 
The total number of licensed wineries in Canada increased from 299 in 2006 to 432 in 2011.45 Of 
this number in 2011, 49.1% (212 wineries) are located in BC while 30.1% (130) are in Ontario. In 
Ontario, as at March 2013, the number of registered wineries increased to 17246 out of which 140 
(81.4%) are registered with VQA (VQA, 2013, p.12). Of the 140 registered VQA wineries, 6 
operate on a large scale (over 750,000 litres of VQA wine annually), 21 medium (between 100,000 
and 750,000 litres annually) and 113 small (up to 100,000 litres of VQA wine annually) (VQA, 
2013, p.12). This presumably suggests that many wineries are becoming interested in authenticity 
and recognize the importance of signalling quality to consumers. VQA participating wineries pay 
a fee of $250 for every wine sample tested and certified by VQA, and a mandatory check-off of 4 
cents per litre of every VQA wine sold through any channel across Canada goes to VQA.47 It is 
therefore of interest to empirically verify whether there exists a price premium for VQA wines as 
a reward for authenticity, quality and origin. 
 
                                                          
45www.winebusiness.com/news/?go=getArticle&dataId=102231 
46
 http://www.ontariowinesociety.com/about/ows-resources/ontario-wineries-by-region/ 
47
 Personal Communication with VQA staff. This serves as a source of revenue to VQA. 
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Canadian wine producers started production with Labrusca grapes grown in Canada (the Okanagan 
valley in British Columbia and the Niagara region of Ontario), along with riesling, cabernet 
sauvignon, chardonnay and merlot grape juice imported from Europe.48 The industry made a land 
mark achievement in 1988 during which 100% Canadian wine was produced from home grown 
vinifera grapes. The same year, the Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA)49 was established and Canada 
also signed a free trade agreement with the U.S. which paved the way for competition from U.S. 
wines and created a stronger incentive for quality improvements in the Canadian wine industry. 
Wines produced in Canada include: fruit wines, table wines, ciders, and icewines. Canada is known 
to be the largest producer of icewine in the world because of its extreme cold winter weather that 
favours production of icewine.50 
 
Canadian icewine attracts a price premium because of its quality resulting from its unique 
processing method favoured by Canadian climatic conditions (AAFC, 2013). The harvest time of 
grapes used in making icewine is usually delayed, with a greater risk of animals and birds feeding 
on the grapes, reducing production volumes. Harvesting of grapes used for icewine production 
occurs during the winter when the temperature is below -10 degrees Celsius (14°F). At this 
temperature, the grapes are naturally frozen on the vines and contain less juice than normal, which 
makes the wine sweeter. Throughout the production process, there is no artificial refrigeration of 
grapes and juice used in making icewine “except for tank temperature cooling during fermentation 
and/or cold stabilization prior to bottling.”51 VQA supervises the production process to ensure that 
wineries use only grapes grown within Canada are used and without addition of artificial sugar 
                                                          
48http://winesinniagara.com/2011/07/how-the-wine-industry-got-started-in-canada-and-the-men-who-dared-to-
dream/ 
49Vintners Quality Assurance (VQA) is Canada’s symbol of quality wine and is similar to other regulatory systems in 
other countries such as Appelletion d’ origine Controlee (AOC) in France; Denominazione di OrigineControllata 
(DOC) in Italy; and QualitätsweinmitPrädikat (QMP) in Germany. Its name was later changed to Vintners Quality 
Alliance. 
50www.winesofcanada.com 
51http://www.winesofcanada.com/icewine_standards.html 
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(AAFC, 2013).52 In addition, production of icewine requires intensive and specialized labour and 
output is usually small relative to other wines. For example, a 375ml bottle of icewine is produced 
using 3.5kg of grapes, whereas this quantity of grapes would produce about six bottles (375ml) of 
ordinary table wine.53 These factors, presumably along with a growing demand for this premium 
wine, explain the difference in price between icewine and ordinary wine, and therefore, serve as 
an incentive for counterfeiting, especially in China where there have been reports of fake icewine 
labelled ‘made in Canada’ in Chinese markets (O’Donnell, 2011; AAFC, 2011). About 74% of 
Canadian icewines are exported to Asian markets, with China being the second biggest market 
after Japan (AAFC, 2011). The uniqueness and price premium for Canadian icewine serves as an 
incentive for some Chinese wine producers’ to produce fake wine by bottling and packaging water 
mixed with colourant, grape juice and alcohol, and labelling the fake product as “Canadian 
icewine” (AAFC, 2011). 
 
Several key agencies have played major roles in the development of the Canadian wine industry 
including: industry organizations (e.g. Canadian Wineries Association (CWA)), support 
institutions (e.g. Liquor Control Boards across the provinces), and wine regulatory bodies and/or 
agencies (e.g. Vintners Quality Alliance). The CWA is an organization that represents wineries 
and promotes the adoption of production-enhancing innovations that improve grape and wine 
production (Pelling and Hira, 2012).  
 
The provincial Liquor Control Boards (LCBs) help in marketing imported and Canadian made 
wines, and alcoholic beverages in each province (Carew and Florkowski, 2012). The LCBs also 
engage in wine promotion practices, except in Alberta where wine distribution was privatized in 
1993 (AGLC, n.d). The LCBs promote wine sales by creating consumer awareness on physical 
and sensory attributes of wines, such as “tasting notes, wine critics ratings, measured sulphite 
contents in the case of organic wines, and organic/biodynamic certification status, among others” 
(Kwong et al. 2011, p.362). In addition, the LCBs control which wines can be imported and 
                                                          
52
 The sugar content of icewine exclusively comes naturally from the grapes. This is why the production process is 
monitored by VQA. 
53
 http://winecountryontario.ca/media-centre/icewine 
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distributed in each province, thereby acting as a monopoly that inhibits the diversity of wines 
available. Consequently, wine producers face the challenge of having their wines pass through the 
provincial monopolies (LCBs) in order to be distributed and sold. Further, retail prices set by the 
LCBs do not always result in high profit margins for wine producers, and inter-provincial trade 
restrictions make it difficult to sell wines produced outside of a province as they are seen as imports 
(Madill et al. 2001).54 The Ontario Liquor Control Board has a standard mark-up price for all 
domestic and imported wines irrespective of whether the wine has VQA certification. See 
appendix 3.I for an example of how LCBO sets retail prices of wines.  
 
How does VQA regulate and ensure the authenticity of Canadian wine? VQA is the first industry-
led quality assurance system established to enforce standards that support quality and ensure 
authenticity in the Canadian wine industry (Hira and Bwenga, 2011). Vintners Quality Alliance 
started in Ontario as a non-profit organization in November 26 1988 and has been given the 
responsibility of implementing the provincial Vintners Quality Alliance Act enacted on May 4 
1999 and passed into law on June 29 2000.55The VQA Act sets up a designation of origin which 
consumers can use to identify quality wines produced in Ontario and other wine producing regions 
of Canada using home grown grapes, the production method and other set standards.56 
 
The VQA system was adopted by the provincial government of British Columbia in 1990. Ontario 
and BC VQAs are managed under different provincial legislations (Rabkin and Beatty, 2007) 
although they have some common standards.57 Registration and use of VQA is voluntary for 
wineries, and wines that pass VQA authenticity tests bear the VQA logo on the bottle label to 
signal quality. Consumers can use the logo to identify quality wines with assured regulated 
production practices and produced using 100% regionally grown grapes. 
 
                                                          
54
 A provincial Liquor Control Board restricts quantities of wines produced in other provinces that can be sold within 
the province. 
55http://www.vqaontario.ca 
 
56
 ibid 
 
57
 For the different standards, see www.winesofcanada.com/bc_standards.html and www.vqaontario.ca/wines/Qualitystandards 
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VQA has the mandate of ensuring authenticity of all VQA wines produced in Canada. It is also 
responsible for the development of standards and regulations that govern VQA Canadian wines. 
For example, VQA establishes quality and process standards for grapes used by wineries, carries 
out tests to ensure authenticity (i.e. ensuring that the wine is made from 100% Canadian grown 
grapes in designated regions), and reviews wine labels to ensure that the wine inside the bottle 
correctly reflects what is on the label before the wine is placed on the shelf (VQA, 2004). Wines 
that meet VQA standards can carry the VQA symbol on their labels. 
 
In the area of regulation, VQA regulates the grape varieties used in wine production and the 
specific level of ripeness at which the grapes must be harvested to ensure quality wine. The 
monitoring is usually carried out by the representatives of the Grape Growers’ Association (GGA) 
within each province. In addition, techniques used in wine making, labelling requirements, and 
sensory/chemical criteria for finished wine are also standardized and regulated by VQA.58 
 
As a rule, a wine receives VQA approval and is certified as of Canadian origin after passing a 
series of quality assurance tests including: taste, laboratory analysis and packaging review tests. 
Further, the VQA carries out on-site audits of all wineries every 5 – 8 months as well as random 
wine inspection at Canadian retail stores in order to ensure that the packaging and labelling 
standards are strictly observed by wineries using the VQA symbol. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 The data 
Secondary data on Canadian wines sold in Ontario and sourced from the Liquor Control Board of 
Ontario (LCBO) were used for the analysis. The data comprise 1537 observations on wines 
produced in Ontario (89.86%) and British Columbia (10.14%) and sold in Ontario between 2007 
and 2012. Of this number, 1340 (87.18%) are VQA wines (547 red, 608 white, 92 icewine, 45 rose 
and 48 sparkling) and 197 (12.82%) are non-VQA wines (76 red, 94 white, 10 rose and 17 
                                                          
58The regulation ensures that only authorized grapes of Canadian origin are used in wine production. VQA monitors 
the grapes before harvest to ensure that a minimum level of ripeness is reached before use in wine production. Details 
of the regulation and standards can be found in the VQA Act 1999  at  
www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_000406_e.htm 
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sparkling). Each observation contains information on the following attributes: LCBO retail price, 
certification status (i.e. VQA or non-VQA), percentage alcohol content, varietal, sweetness (sugar 
or brix level), vintage (year of production), product score (ranking by wine experts), colour, and 
the name of the wine, from which it was possible to identify the winery and the region. 
 
The data set contains multiple observations of some wines produced by the same winery. For the 
same wine, the prices are the same for some observations and vary for other observations. 
Nevertheless, for the same wines produced by a winery that appear multiple times with different 
prices in the data set, the data did not indicate the different years these wines were sold. Rather, 
the data set shows only the year each wine was produced. We cannot observe the prices over time 
for a particular wine that appears multiple times in the data set as information on the year each 
wine was sold was not available. For this reason, it was not possible to carry out a panel data 
analysis using the data set. If the data set had provided price information on wines with multiple 
observations and the different years they were sold to allow for a panel data analysis, the data 
could have been arranged in clusters and estimated using robust standard errors. This would 
address the issue of clustering of standard errors. 
 
The data set shows that wines with high alcohol content are sold at higher prices. This leaves one 
to wonder whether wineries could intentionally increase the alcohol content of their wines to enjoy 
higher prices. If this is the case, then potential endogeneity exists between the percentage alcohol 
content of a wine and its price. A potential way to address this issue is to include the lagged values 
of wine price in the model as an independent variable to ascertain if the current percentage alcohol 
content of a wine is determined by the previous year’s price of the wine. Unfortunately we do not 
have such information in the data set. 
 
3.3.2 Analytical techniques 
To address the research questions, the data were analyzed using two econometric approaches: 
hedonic pricing and probit models. The hedonic model is used to determine the marginal 
contributions of wine attributes (including VQA certification) to the market price of wine. Clearly 
not all wineries choose to pursue VQA certification on all their wines. Therefore, to identify who 
would choose VQA and factors that would influence a winery’s decision whether or not to seek 
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VQA certification for a specific wine, a Probit analysis was carried out. A major assumption in the 
models is that the error term is independently and identically distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance, which supports OLS but does not work for a panel data analysis where the error 
term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables (i.e. strict exogeneity 
assumption). This assumption implies that the OLS estimates of the models will be unbiased. 
 
3.3.2.1 Hedonic Pricing Model 
The hedonic pricing model has been widely employed in wine research in the economics literature 
to estimate the relationship between the price of wine and its underlying attributes (Rosen, 1974).  
 
The theoretical foundation of hedonic studies, which has served as a basis for all studies that utilize 
hedonic analysis, is Lancaster’s (1966) consumer theory and Rosen’s classic paper of 1974. In 
hedonic pricing analysis, the price (market value) of a product or good is determined by estimating 
the contributory market values of each of the attributes associated with that good. It is therefore 
used to estimate the price differential of goods based on their characteristics. A prime example is 
the price differential between a wine that has certification for quality and one that did not pass 
through a quality assurance system. 
 
In a competitive market where information on products’ attributes and quality signals are available, 
it is expected that price should have a strong relationship with quality (Combris et al. 2000). 
However, the choice of appropriate functional form in hedonic price analysis remains an issue of 
concern in the literature (Linneman, 1980; Halvorsen and Pollakowski, 1981, Cropper et al., 1988; 
Coelli et al., 1991, Halstead et al., 1997) as economic theory provides little guidance on the choice 
of a particular functional form for hedonic price analysis (Butler, 1982; Walpole and Lockwood, 
1999). Choice of appropriate functional form is very important as incorrect functional form could 
result in parameter estimates that are inconsistent (Goodman, 1978; Bloomquist and Worley, 
1981). Hedonic pricing models assume several functional forms, including linear and nonlinear 
forms. Several studies have utilized different functional forms chosen using certain criteria. For 
example, Rosen (1974) assumes a non-linear relationship, which was chosen using “goodness-of-
fit criterion” determined by a likelihood ratio test that was derived through a flexible Box-Cox 
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transformation (Box and Cox, 1964). This was widely used by early studies that applied hedonic 
pricing models (e.g. Rasmussen and Zuehlke, 1990). 
 
There were many critics of the goodness-of-fit criterion adopted by Rosen (1974). For example, 
Cassel and Mendelson (1985) argue that a Box-Cox transformation does not give an accurate 
estimate of the implicit marginal price of each attribute, while Linneman (1980) maintained that a 
Box-Cox transformation cannot be applied to binary (dummy) variables, which according to So et 
al. (1996) are often used to represent discontinuous factors or attributes. Recursive residual of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is another technique used to detect model misspecification in 
hedonic price analysis (Brown et al., 1975). A suggested rule of the thumb is that if the hedonic 
price model is correctly specified, the recursive residuals would be normally, independently 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance, and the residuals will not sum to zero (Sumner, 
1990). 
Galpin and Hawkins (1984) argue that regression residuals are not suitable to detect model 
misspecification as they may be correlated, have the same variance, the scatter plots particularly 
for a large data set may not reveal useful information patterns, and their distribution is dependent 
on an observational matrix as the residuals will not be independently or identically distributed. 
 
Another standard test for choice of functional forms in hedonic price models, which has been 
widely used in the literature (e.g. Oczkowski, 1994; Anglin and Gencay, 1996; Walpole and 
Lockwood, 1999; Kwong et al., 2011) is the Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test 
(Ramsey’s RESET) (Ramsey, 1969). RESET is used to identify the correct functional form. This 
is a test of linear (null) against non-linear (alternative) functional form specifications, where the 
correct specification is not indicated. The functional form is tested with an F-test. If the F-statistic 
is greater than the F-critical value, we reject the null hypothesis of linear specification. 
Misspecification of variables is another problem associated with hedonic pricing models. This 
could be in the form of omitting an important explanatory variable in the model (i.e. under-
specification), which could yield biased and inconsistent estimates; or inclusion of an irrelevant 
explanatory variable (over-specification), which could give unbiased and consistent estimates that 
are inefficient (Chin and Chau, 2002). The latter may not be a serious problem as it does not affect 
properties of OLS estimators, although the included
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variable thereby resulting in multicollinearity. The problem of misspecification could be avoided 
through the use of homogenous data set59, which supports the use of the hedonic price technique 
(Chin and Chau, 2002). 
 
In this paper, a hedonic price equation for Canadian wine is estimated to determine whether there 
is a premium for VQA certified wines. Several studies (e.g. Oczkowski, 1994; Combris et al. 2000; 
Schamel and Anderson, 2003; Fogarty, 2006; Rabkin and Beatty, 2007; Costanigro et al. 2007; 
Yang et al. 2009; Carew and Florkowski, 2010) have applied the hedonic technique to wine 
pricing. Wine is assumed to comprise a bundle of qualitative attributes, while the market value of 
a particular wine is assumed to be the summation of the implicit values of the individual attributes. 
The estimated value of each attribute measures the willingness to pay for that attribute.  
 
As stated earlier, hedonic theory gives little guidance on the choice of specific functional form. 
The study therefore explored the two approaches (linear and log-linear) widely employed in the 
literature. Each approach has its unique characteristics. For example, for a linear hedonic price 
function, the marginal effect or price increase (premium) induced by a wine attribute will be 
constant for all levels of attributes affecting the price (Champ et al. 2003; p.353). On the other 
hand, interpretation of coefficients is easier in log-linear models since coefficients represent the 
percentage change in wine price as a result of a unit change in attributes (Rodriguez and Castillo, 
2009).  
 
The choice of the correct functional form for this study was based on classic econometric tests 
including: RESET for model specification and Breusch-Pagan and/or White’s test for 
heteroscadasticity widely used in the literature on wine hedonic models. To reduce the possible 
effect of multicollinearity, a dataset with a large number of observations was used and the variables 
carefully defined and measured. In addition, a correlation analysis of the independent variables 
was carried out to test for multicollinearity. The result is shown in appendix 3.II. 
 
                                                          
59A homogenous data set is one that comes from a single source. For example, a data set for a single product (e.g. 
wine) in a province.  
 70 
 
Previous studies on wine (e.g. Oczkowski, 1994; Landon and Smith, 1998; Combris et al., 2000; 
Ling and Lockshin, 2003; Schnettler and Rivera, 2003; Schamel and Anderson, 2003; Geve, 2005; 
Rabkin and Beatty, 2007; Cardebat and Figuet, 2009;Ortuzar-Gana and Alfranca-Burriel, 2010; 
Kwong et al., 2011) identify colour, region of origin, alcohol content, vintage, varietals, sweetness 
(sugar level) and winery as important attributes that influence wine prices. However, Rabkin and 
Beatty (2007), in addition to these also identified VQA certification as an attribute that affects the 
price of Canadian wines. Therefore, the choice of attributes for this study was informed by the 
research questions and the economics of wine literature. Of the attributes chosen for this study, the 
attribute of VQA certification is particularly of interest as the study seeks to determine whether 
VQA certification is associated with a price premium, and enhances the collective reputation of 
Canadian wines.  
 
Following Brentari and Levaggi (2010), assume a brand of Canadian wine has “n” attributes that 
influence its price, implicitly described as: 
																																																							 = , , … , 	
																																																																					3.1
 
where X represents an attribute. Given that the market price of the wine implicitly depends on the 
values of the attributes, equation (3.1) can be rewritten as 
 
																																																			
 = , , … , 	
																																																																	3.2
		 
 
Equation (3.2) can be explicitly expressed as 
																																											 =  +
	

+  			 = 1, … , 																																																		3.3
 
where,  = Observable market retail price of a Canadian wine  = Vector of attributes of wine i (discussed below)  = Number of wine attributes 
 = Estimated coefficient of attribute i (i.e. = )  =Stochastic error term that accounts for unobserved attributes 
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Functional form specification 
Results for the standard tests (RESET for model specification error or incorrect functional form, 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and White’s tests for heteroscedasticity) are shown in Tables 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.3 below. 
 
Ramsey specification test 
This test identifies model specification problems. In hedonic models, linear and non-linear 
functional forms are used. The RESET test is used to identify the appropriate functional form that 
gives a better interpretation of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
in the model. The null hypothesis is that the correct functional form is linear and the alternative is 
non-linear. The suggested decision rule is that at the 5 percent level, if the F-statistic is greater than 
the F-critical value (F-tab), we reject the null hypothesis that the true specification is linear and 
accept the alternative (non-linear). The test result shows that the non-linear form is significant at 
the 5 percent level (p-value less than 0.05) and the F-stat > F-tab indicating that the log-linear 
functional form appears to better describe the data. 
 
Table 3.1: Ramsey RESET Specification Tests and Summary Statistics 
Functional Form 
 
P-Values (Pr > F) 
Linear RESET(2) ~ F(3, 1527) = 1.93 
R2 = 0.1602   R-2 = 0.1561 
N = 1537       D.F = 1529 
0.1547 
Log-Linear RESET(2) ~ F(3, 1527) = 50.40 
R2 = 0.3129   R-2 = 0.3032 
N = 1537       D.F = 1530 
0.0000 
Data Source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
Breusch-Pagan and White’s general tests 
Both Breusch-Pagan and White’s general tests for heteroscedasticity were conducted. The reason 
is that there are different forms of heteroscedasticity including linear and non-linear. The Breusch-
Pagan test specified by “hettest”60 in Stata specifically identifies linear forms of heteroscedasticity, 
and therefore, does not work well for non-linear forms. The White’s test (White, 1980) is a special 
case of Breusch-Pagan that can detect heteroscedasticity in non-linear functional forms. However, 
                                                          
60
 ‘Hettest’ in Stata was used because it has the advantage of testing all the variables in the model together. 
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in each case, the decision rule is that a smaller value of chi-square indicates that heteroscedasticity 
is probably not a problem. Based on the results of the three tests, the log-linear functional form 
gives a better predictive performance and is therefore used to analyze the data. 
 
Table 3.2: Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity  
Functional Form Hypothesis/Chi2 Prob> chi2 
Linear  
 
 
Log-Linear 
 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: Fitted values of wine price (price) 
Chi2(1) = 4404.66 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: Fitted values of wine price (lnprice) 
Chi2(1) = 36.48 
0.000 
 
 
0.000 
Data Source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
Table 3.3: White's Test for Heteroscedasticity 
Functional Form Hypothesis/Chi2 Prob> chi2 
Linear 
 
Log-Linear 
Ho: homoscedasticity 
Ha: unrestricted heteroscedasticity 
Chi2(24) = 4405.09 
Ho: homoscedasticity 
Ha: unrestricted heteroscedasticity 
Chi2(24) = 34.62 
0.000 
 
 
0.000 
Data Source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
Having chosen the log-linear model for analysis, the dependent variable (observable wine retail 
price) in equation (3.3) is transformed into logarithmic form. This transformation will modify how 
the coefficients are interpreted. In this case, the coefficients will be interpreted as the percentage 
change in the price of the attribute. This implies that if the ith attribute changes by one unit, the 
price of wine will change by approximately  ∗ 100 percent. 
 
Taking note of that, following Brentari and Levaggi (2010) and transforming equation (3.3), we 
have: 
																																															 
 =  +
	

			 = 1,… , 																																												3.4
 
where, 
 
 = Natural logarithm of wine price 
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 = Percentage change in price of ith attribute (e.g. VQA certification over non-VQA wines) 
i.e.  =  ∗  
 
Table 3.4 contains the list of variables included in the hedonic pricing model, their abbreviations, 
definitions, and how they are measured.61 
Table 3.4: Definition and measurement of variables 
Variable Abbreviation Definition Measurement 
Price Price LCBO retail price per unit (standard 750ml 
bottle size)d of wine 
Continuous 
Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Natural logarithm of wine price Continuous. Icewines are sold in 200ml 
and 375ml bottles only. The price is 
therefore normalized to the standard 
750ml base volume using [(750/bottle 
size)*Price] 
VQA VQA Describes whether a wine received 
certification from VQA quality assurance. 
Dummy variable.1= Certification and 0 
= otherwise 
Volume of 
wine 
supplied 
Volume This is the volume of wines in the data set 
supplied by a winery to the Ontario retail 
market. 
Classified into large (≥1000 cases), 
medium (500~999 cases), small 
(200~499 cases) and very small (≤ 200 
cases). A case contains 12 standard 
750ml bottles of wine. Dummy 
variables are used for each volume 
category (1 = volume; 0 = otherwise). 
Very small volume is used as the base 
category in the regression. 
Wineries wineries These include individual wineries in the data 
set 
The six biggest (in terms of volume of 
wines produced) wineries were 
represented individually while the 
remaining were grouped as “others”. 
Others is used as the base (reference 
category) for each regression. 
Colour Colour Different wine colours and/or types which 
consumers consider important in making 
purchase decisions. For wines sold in Ontario, 
they are classified based on the following 
types: red, white, rose, sparkling and icewine. 
Dummy variables are used for each 
colour (1= colour; 0 = otherwise). Rose 
is used as the base colour. 
Region Region This describes appellation of origin (i.e. the 
region where a wine is produced). 
Dummy variables are used for each 
region – Niagara, Lake Erie, Prince 
Edward County and Okanagan (BC) (1 
= region; 0 = otherwise). BC is used as 
the base region for each regression. 
Varietal Varietal Defines the type of grape variety used in wine 
production in Ontario. Blend represents a 
mixture of (non-single) varietals. 
Dummy variable is used for each 
varietal and the following varieties are 
controlled for: Chardonnay; 
gewürztraminer; Riesling; sauvignon 
                                                          
61
 Since the dependent variable of the hedonic model is in logarithm form, the independent variables that are not in 
logarithmic form (dummy variables) are interpreted as exponent of the estimated coefficients. That is, wine price 
changes by 100(eβi -1)% for a unit increase in any of the independent dummy variables (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 
1980). 
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blanc; blend; pinot grigio and pinot gris 
(1 = varietal; 0 = otherwise for white 
wine)a, while blend; cabernet franc; 
cabernet sauvignon; gamay noir; 
merlot; pinot noir and syrah/shiraz (1 = 
varietal; 0 = otherwise for red wine)b
.  
For the individual regressions, Pinot 
noir is used as the base varietal for red 
wines, chardonnay for white, and 
cabernet franc for icewine in the 
regression for each wine type/colour.
 
Ln(alcohol) 
content 
Alcohol% Percentage of alcohol in the standard 750ml 
bottle of wine. 
Continuous. Exact number indicated on 
the bottle 
Vintage Vintage Year of wine production. This shows the 
different years each wine distributed was 
produced. 
Dummy variable (1 = vintage for a 
particular year under consideration; 0 = 
otherwise). ≤ 2005 is used as the base 
year 
Sweetness Sweetness Amount of sugar in the wine. Each wine sold 
in Ontario has a sweetness code – sweet (S), 
medium sweet (MS), dry (D), medium dry 
(MD) and extra dry (XD) 
Categorical variable for the pooled 
regression and dummy variable for 
individual regressions.e Measured on a 
5-point scale (XD=5; D=4; MD=3; 
MS=2; and S=1) for the pooled 
regression and dummy for different 
levels in individual regressions. For 
individual wine regressions, extra dry is 
used as the base sugar level.  
LCBO 
Product 
scorec 
Prod. Score Rating given by the LCBO wine experts. A 
maximum score of 5 points is given. 
3.0-5.0 points are measured as ‘high’ 
and below 3.0 are measured as ‘low’. 
Dummy (1 = high; 0 = low) 
Notes: a,bOther varietals that are not listed are grouped as ‘others’ and are therefore, assigned zero 
 
cMany of the wines do not have product score and such observations were dropped. 
 
dicewines are sold in 200ml and 375ml bottles 
 
eMeasuring ‘sweetness’ as a categorical variable for individual regressions would result in few 
 observations and loss of degrees of freedom. It was measured as a series of dummy variables to have more 
 observations and degrees of freedom, as well as to capture the effects of different levels of sweetness (dry, 
 extra dry, medium dry, etc) for the individual regressions. 
 
It is important to note that the VQA label is voluntary. The decision of whether to choose VQA 
potentially starts from the vineyard as part of the vineyard’s problem. In this case, the vineyard 
chooses the type of grape to plant and other production and/or management practices to adopt. The 
question that arises is whether vineyards/wineries seek VQA for high priced wines or whether 
VQA certification leads to high wine prices. A test of endogeneity (causality test) is carried out 
using the Hausman specification or t-test in section 3.4.2 to resolve this issue.  
 
The summary tables with descriptive statistics of Canadian wine prices sold in Ontario according 
to colour/type, VQA certification, region, varietals and the volumes of wines produced by different 
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categories of wineries are presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.62 Table 3.5 shows that 87.18 percent 
(1340 of 1537) of wine samples in the data set have VQA certification while 12.82 percent (197of 
1537) have no VQA certification. Further, on average, the price of red, white, ice and sparkling 
VQA wines appear to be higher than their non-VQA counterparts in the same category. In addition, 
red and white wines comprise 86.21 percent of the total sample while ice, rose and sparkling wines 
constitute the remaining 13.79 percent (212 of 1537).  
 
Within the VQA category, icewine commands the highest price followed by red, white and 
sparkling wines respectively. The difference in price presumably is attributed to processing and 
grape production costs, and demand (Rabkin and Beatty, 2007). Icewine takes more time to 
produce, the process is very rigorous and requires specific climatic conditions, as described earlier.  
 
The high price of Canadian icewine, both in domestic and international markets, potentially could 
be the reason why all the icewines in the sample passed through the VQA certification system. 
There are 172 wineries in the dataset with large, medium, small and very small wineries (by 
Ontario sales volume) comprising 1.74, 4.06, 19.77 and 74.43 percent respectively. 
 
                                                          
62 Data was sourced from Ontario LCB but about 10 percent of the wines are from BC. Thus, the actual volume of 
wine produced by each of the BC wineries in the dataset was not accurately captured. Hence, a large winery, such as, 
“Mission Hill” falls under the category of small wineries in terms of the volumes supplied to the Ontario market. 
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Table 3.5: Canadian wine prices by colour/type, VQA certification status, varietal and sales volume 
Certification 
status 
Varietal No. of 
observations 
Mean 
(CAD$) 
Min (CAD$) Max  
(CAD$) 
Std. Dev 
Red wines 
VQA Cabernet franc 60 25.61 10.95 110 15.71 
 Cabernet sauvignon 38 27.17 11.95 75.2 13.46 
 Gamay noir 18 17.65 9.45 29.95 6.18 
 Merlot 62 23.71 10.95 81.95 13.29 
 Pinot noir 97 30.27 9.95 75.00 13.71 
 Syrah/shiraz 26 25.66 10.95 48.2 10.24 
 Blend 224 22.28 3.5 93.95 14.57 
 Others1 22 22.81 9.95 48.2 11.99 
Non-VQA Cabernet sauvignon 9 17.62 7.20 42.95 13.91 
 Merlot 11 19.14 7.95 39.95 12.46 
 Pinot noir 1 10.95 10.95 10.95 - 
 Syrah/shiraz 11 19.77 8.95 42.95 13.64 
 Blend 43 16.45 3.60 40.95 9.14 
 Others2 1 10.95 10.95 10.95 - 
White wines  
VQA Chardonnay 235 24.31 3.95 71 11.99 
 Gewurztraminar 34 17.49 7.95 29.95 5.69 
 Riesling 122 18.04 8.70 35.20 6.07 
 Sauvignon blanc 44 17.28 3.50 34.95 5.33 
 Pinot grigio 15 13.97 4.95 21.00 3.54 
 Pinot gris 21 19.38 13.95 35.00 4.63 
 Blend 92 15.31 7.95 48.20 5.79 
 Others3 45 18.50 8.25 40.15 6.89 
       
Non-VQA Chardonnay 14 21.15 3.45 41.95 14.03 
 Gewurztraminar 2 15.2 10.45 19.95 6.72 
 Riesling 3 20.97 9.95 36.95 14.17 
 Sauvignon blanc 12 17.5 6.95 38.95 12.54 
 Pinot grigio 16 18.43 6.95 42.95 11.32 
 Blend 41 19.92 6.45 39.95 9.99 
 Others4 6 16.96 9.45 35.95 9.16 
Ice-wines 
VQA Cabernet franc 15 119.99 63.4 206.06 35.71 
 Riesling 19 114.12 74.81 159.90 25.18 
 Vidal 41 91.08 29.90 159.90 27.34 
 Cabernet sauvignon 4 187.63 93.38 399.90a 143.61 
 Others5 13 134.24 63.90 229.95 41.83 
Rose wines 
VQA Rose 45 15.00 7.95 34.95 3.93 
Non-VQA Rose 10 15.45 7.95 32.95 9.08 
Sparkling wines 
VQA Sparkling 48 25.12 11.70 44.95 7.98 
Non-VQA Sparkling 17 14.42 5.90 78.00 16.77 
Total  1537     
Region 
Ontario  1381 22.79 3.45 199 14.71 
BC  156 28.55 7.95 99.95 16.30 
Volume of wines supplied (in the Ontario market) 
Category Large 3  1075 1527 232.03 
 
Medium 7  542 850 123.07 
 Small 34  206 443 78.69 
 Very small 128  8 197 52.28 
Total wineries  172     
%Alcohol 
content 
 1331 12.49 6.50 15.90 1.13 
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Vintage 
Category ≤2005 35 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
2006 40 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 2007 93 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 2008 112 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 2009 158 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 2010 153 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 2011 74 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 2012 266 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Sweetness 
Category Sweet (S) 64 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Medium sweet (MS) 124 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Medium Dry (MD) 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Dry (D) 601 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Extra dry (XD) 538 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1Includes: baco noir, malbec, marechal foch, nebbiolo, petit verdot, and pinot meunier. 
2Includes: moscato  
3Includes: aligote, auxerrios, chenin blanc, fume blanc, moscato, pinot blanc, Semillon, seyval blanc, vidal, and viognier 
4Includes: moscato and vidal 
5Includes: blend, chardonnay, chenin blanc, gewurztraminar, muscat, pinot blanc, sauvignon blanc, Semillon, and syrah/shiraz. 
aProduced using muscat grape variety, the oldest domesticated grape 
 
A breakdown of the totals according to wine colour or type and summary statistics of data on the 
price of red, white, ice, rose and sparkling wines are shown in Table 3.6. The table shows that a 
greater percentage of the wines in the dataset (87.8% of red, 86.61% of white, 81.82% of rose and 
73.85% of sparkling) have VQA certification, while all the icewines are certified by VQA. Icewine 
has the highest average price (CAN$115.38), while rose wines have the lowest average price 
(CAN$15.08) per 750ml bottle. 
 
Table 3.6: Summary statistics of wines by colour/type 
Colour No. of 
obs. 
VQA Non-
VQA 
Mean 
(CAN$) 
Min. 
(CAN$) 
Max. 
(CAN$) 
Std. dev. 
(CAN$) 
Red 623 547 76 24.47 3.50 150.00 16.17 
White 702 608 94 20.05 3.45 154.00 10.91 
Ice 92 92 0 115.38 29.90 399.90 56.97 
Rose 55 45 10 15.08 7.95 34.95 5.13 
Sparkling 65 48 17 22.31 5.90 78.00 11.81 
Total 1537 1340 197 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
Note: N/A = Not applicable 
 
The hedonic price equation for Canadian wines sold in Ontario is therefore, stated as follows: 
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The variables included in this model help address the research questions. For example, the 
coefficient of VQA status is used to determine whether there is a premium for VQA certified 
wines. Wineries and regions (appellation of origin) are included in the model in order to separate 
the effect of individual and collective reputations on the price of wine, while other variables are 
believed to be relevant attributes that would influence the price of wine. The data set provided only 
the names of wines. The researcher used these names to identify the wineries and regions of 
production for each wine. This is how the variables, region and winery, were created to separate 
the effect of individual and collective reputations on the price of wines. The variable, volume of 
wine supplied, was constructed using the volume of wine supplied by wineries to the Ontario retail 
market for sale. 
 
An additional attribute, product score, was initially included in the model. This is a third party 
subjective judgment which gives an indication of quality assessment by wine experts (some of 
whom are local wine writers/critics selected by the LCBO) and this presumably would have a 
direct relationship with wine price. Product score serves to provide information for consumers in 
helping them make a more informed purchase decision “as an expert has tasted and endorsed the 
product.”63 For some wines in the data set, the product scores range from 1 to 100 percent, while 
for others, they rank them between 1 and 5.  For consistency, however, all the scores were 
converted to a 5-point scale.64 
  
This variable was eventually dropped from the hedonic model for several reasons. First, of the 
1537 observations, only 302 (19.6 percent) observations have product scores. Of the 302 
observations with this attribute, 298 are VQA wines, while only 4 are non-VQA wines. When 
                                                          
63
 Personal communication with LCBO, September 2014. 
64
 For wines with product scores ranging from 1 to 100 percent, the scores were converted to a 5-point scale by dividing 
the posted score by 100 and multiplied by 5. 
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LCBO was contacted, they confirmed that this was not a coincidence. Wines exclusively released 
for experts’ ranking are mostly VQA than non-VQA and International Canadian Blends (ICBs)65 
suggesting that product score is biased towards VQA wines. Second, a greater percentage of non-
VQA wines are blends of imported and domestic grown grapes, hence most wines submitted by 
wineries for experts’ evaluation are wines of origin (often VQA). Third party ratings are mostly 
used in marketing wines of origin (wines produced in a particular region).66 Third, when the data 
were sorted based on product score, there were very few observations (less than 10 for rose and 
sparkling wines) left for the regression, which would affect the degrees of freedom. 
 
Taking note of these issues, a correlation analysis and hedonic model estimation were carried out 
on the data sorted based on “product score.” In the two analyses, the variable, product score, 
correlates closely with “VQA”, which suggests that experts’ ranking of Canadian wines sold in 
Ontario favours mostly VQA wines. In addition, only one variable (percentage alcohol content) 
was statistically significant in the result of the hedonic model for the sorted data based on “product 
score”. These issues, therefore, informed the decision to drop the variable from the model. 
 
3.4 Empirical results and discussion 
3.4.1 Hedonic model 
The hedonic price regression was carried out in two stages. The first stage is the general (pooled) 
regression that shows the effect of VQA certification on the price of different types/colours of 
wine.67 The second stage involves individual regressions for red, white, ice, rose and sparkling 
wines respectively, showing grape varieties used for each type and years of production 
(vintages).68 To avoid the problem of the dummy ‘variable trap’ (collinearity between dummy 
variables), a reference (base category) is used for each set of dummy variables in the same 
category. However, the choice of the base category is arbitrary. The estimated coefficient of the 
reference dummy variable is used as a comparative benchmark – coefficients of other dummy 
variables within the same category are interpreted relative to the base category (Ling and Lockshin, 
                                                          
65
 ibid 
66
 Personal communication with VQA office in Ontario, September 2014. 
67
 Each wine type/colour has a separate column on the spreadsheet and a dummy variable (1 for any wine with the 
colour under consideration and 0 otherwise) is used.  
 
68
 The data were sorted based on these colours and each category was used for an individual regression. 
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2003; Troncoso and Aguirre, 2006; Gujarati and Porter, 2009, p.281). Further, following 
Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the coefficient of each dummy variable in the hedonic model is 
interpreted as a semi-elasticity obtained by subtracting 1 from the anti-log of the estimated 
coefficient of the dummy variable, and multiplying by 100%. That is: 100F$G − 1I%. 
 
VQA signifies quality, authenticity and origin. To capture these reputation effects and also separate 
the effect of individual and collective reputation on the price of wine, attributes of origin (the wine-
growing region) and individual wineries were included at every stage of the hedonic regression. 
Further, different levels of sweetness were included in the individual regressions for red, white 
and sparkling wines in order to identify the sweetness level that significantly affects the price of 
wine. Some observations for the variable “sweetness” were missing in the data; hence such 
observations were dropped to avoid problems arising from missing data.69 The hedonic regression 
results are shown below. 
 
Red, white, ice, rose and sparkling wines (pooled): 
Table 3.7 shows the hedonic model results for the pooled regression (first stage as indicated 
earlier). The dependent variable of the hedonic model is in logarithm form. Therefore, independent 
variables that are binary (and non-logarithm) are interpreted as exponents of the estimated 
coefficients as indicated above. This implies that wine price changes by [100(eβi -1) %] for a unit 
increase in any of the independent dummy variables. The results show that the estimated 
coefficient for VQA certification is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This reveals that 
collectively there is a premium for VQA wines sold in Ontario. The result indicates that on average, 
the price of VQA wines sold in Ontario is 16.72 percent higher than non-VQA wines. 
 
The results further show that alcohol content and sweetness have positive and significant 
influences on the price of wine at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. The effect of percentage 
alcohol content represents an increase of 10.64 percent in the price of wine for a 1 percent increase 
in alcohol content. The result suggests that as wines get drier (moving up the 1 to 5 scale), the 
premium increases. Ice, red, sparkling and white wines have positive and significant effects on 
                                                          
69
 This is the reason why the number of observations in the pooled and individual regressions is less than the numbers 
in Table 3.6. 
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price relative to rose wines that have the lowest average price and number of sales in the data set. 
Further, Niagara wines are discounted relative to the base category (BC wines). The average price 
of BC wines in the dataset is $5.75 (20.14 percent) higher than Ontario wines (Table 3.5). A 
surprising observation during a casual survey of some wine stores in Ontario is that most BC wines 
sold in Ontario are high priced wines. A possible explanation for this is the inter-provincial 
restriction on wines and/or presumably it may be more economical to ship higher priced wines to 
Ontario given transportation costs. The results also show that most individual winery coefficients 
are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 3.7: Parameter estimates for hedonic function - type/colour of wine (pooled regression) 
Variable Level Coef (β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  3.6316***  0.4331 0.000 
VQA  0.1546*** 16.72 0.0839 0.000 
Ln(alcohol)  0.1064***  0.0213 0.002 
Sweetness  0.0492*  0.0222 0.027 
Colour/type Icewine 0.9799*** 98.01 0.1440 0.000 
 Red 0.2998*** 34.96 0.1057 0.000 
 Rose  base base base base 
 Sparkling 0.2350*** 26.49 0.1479 0.000 
 White 0.2905** 33..71 0.1035 0.005 
Region Niagara Peninsula -0.1552** -14.38 0.0489 0.002 
 Prince Edward county 0.0636 6.57 0.0741 0.391 
 Other Ontario -0.1871* -17.06 0.0777 0.016 
 Lake Erie North Shore -0.2361 -21.03 0.1367 0.085 
 British Columbia  base base base base 
Vol. supplieda >1000 cases (large) -0.1528 -14.17 0.0921 0.098 
 500 < X1 ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.0947 9.93 0.1225 0.419 
 500< X ≤ 200 (small) 0.1130** 11.96 0.0357 0.002 
 0< X ≤ 200 (very small)  base base base base 
Wineries Henry of Pelham  -0.2217 -19.88 0.1842 0.229 
 Jackson-Triggs -0.2165 -19.47 0.1598 0.176 
 Cave Springs -0.5019 -39.46 0.5083 0.324 
 Peller Estates 0.4168** 51.71 0.1412 0.003 
 Pelee Island 0.0025 0.25 0.2019 0.990 
 Inniskillin Wines 0.2174 24.28 0.1290 0.093 
 Othersb  base base base base 
vintage ≤ 2005  base base base base 
 2006 -0.5220*** -40.67 0.1023 0.000 
 2007 -0.4169*** -34.09 0.0887 0.000 
 2008 -0.5377*** -41.59 0.0858 0.000 
 2009 -0.4327*** -35.12 0.0853 0.000 
 2010 -0.5045*** -39.62 0.0854 0.000 
 2011 -0.6915*** -49.92 0.0931 0.000 
 2012 -0.6491*** -47.75 0.1242 0.000 
R-2 0.3329 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 18.82 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N 662 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 n/a = Not applicable 
 82 
 
 
aX = Number of cases 
 
bThese include individual wineries that supply less than 700 cases of wine. 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013.  
 
Further, small wineries (defined by volume of sales in the Ontario market) sell their wines at a 
price about 11.30 percent higher relative to very small wineries (the base category). The results 
also show that the year a wine is produced has a significant influence on its price. The intercept is 
positive and significant indicating that the mean value of wine price is statistically different from 
zero when the marginal values of all attributes are zero. The adjusted R-squared is reasonably high 
for a hedonic model, indicating that the variation in wine price is well explained by the attributes 
included in the model. 
 
To separate the effect of VQA from other forms of collective reputation (winery sub-region and 
province, and individual winery), three separate hedonic regressions were run including VQA at 
every stage while controlling for individual winery and collective reputation (regional) using the 
pooled data. The idea is that it is possible that winery and sub-region, sub-region and province, etc 
may be correlated. The models include:  
1) a model that includes province (Ontario and BC)70 but no winery region or winery; 
2)  a model that includes winery region (but not winery); and 
3) a model that includes winery (but not winery region) 
The results are shown in Appendices 3.III (a), 3.III (b) and 3.III (c) and show that the estimated 
coefficient for VQA is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in all the models. When region 
(province) was included and winery dropped (Appendix 3.III (a)), the goodness of fit reduced by 
18.68 percent compared to the R-2 reported in Table 3.7 (the model with VQA, region and winery). 
In addition, the R-2 for the second (Appendix 3.III (b)) and third (Appendix 3.III(c)) models are 
10.48 and 9.37 percent respectively less than that of Table 3.7. The estimated coefficients for the 
Niagara Peninsula and Lake Erie North Shore sub-regions in Ontario are negative but statistically 
significant at 5 and 10 percent respectively relative to BC. This suggests that regional (collective) 
reputation has an effect on the price of wine. Further, when region was dropped and winery 
included (Appendix 3.III(c)), the estimated coefficients of two wineries, Peller estates and 
                                                          
70
 In this regression, Ontario sub-regions were aggregated. 
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Inniskillin wines, are positive and significant at 10 and 5 percent respectively relative to other 
wineries (others) in the data set. This also indicates that individual wineries’ reputations have an 
effect on the price of wine, separate from the VQA reputational effect.  
 
The positive and significance of the VQA variable in all three regressions (models) implicitly 
shows the value of VQA as a collective reputation signal. The VQA result is robust across the 
three model formulations. This suggests that the collective reputation signal of VQA seems to be 
fairly consistent. Comparing the size of VQA coefficient across the models, the model that 
includes VQA and region (Appendix 3.III (b)) has the largest VQA coefficient, followed by the 
model with winery (Appendix 3.III(c)). This suggests that although collective reputation and 
individual winery reputation are important and have significant effects on wine price, collective 
reputation appears to have a larger effect on the price of wine relative to individual winery 
reputation, holding everything else constant. 
 
Red wines 
The hedonic regression result for red wines is shown in Table 3.8. The results show that the 
estimated coefficient for red wines with VQA certification is positive and statistically significant 
at 1 percent, indicating that VQA red wines command a price premium (21.42 percent higher than 
the non-VQA base red wines, holding all other factors constant). The results further show that the 
estimated coefficient for medium dry (level of sweetness) is positive and significantly affects the 
wine price. Medium dry red wines are about 4.16 percent higher in price relative to extra dry red 
wines. This suggests that consumers’ have a higher willingness to pay for medium dry red wines 
relative to extra dry red wines.  
 
Further, the coefficient on alcohol content is positive and has a significant effect on the price of 
red wines in Ontario. A closer look at the data set and survey of wine stores shows that the higher 
the percentage alcohol contents of a wine, the higher tends to be the price, therefore this result 
confirms a priori expectations. This is particularly the case for red dessert wines.71 Table 3.8 also 
                                                          
71
 For example, the price for a 750 ml bottle of “Sand Hill” red wine with 13% alcohol content is $30 while the price 
for 13.5% of another wine from the same winery ranges between $45 and $75. In addition, “Inkameep” red wines with 
14% alcohol sells for $20.35 while another wine from the same winery with 14.5% sells for $51.45. Percentage alcohol 
content may be one factor that explain this difference in price. 
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indicates that the coefficient for wineries with small volume of sales in the Ontario market is 
positive and significantly affects the price of red wines relative to wineries with very small sales 
volume.  
 
Table 3.8: Parameter estimates for hedonic function - red wines 
Variable Level Coef. (β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  -3.2275*  1.3247 0.015 
VQA  0.1941*** 21.42 0.0872 0.000 
Ln(alcohol)  0.0989***  0.0444 0.000 
Sweetness Dry -0.0510 -4.97 0.0538 0.344 
 Medium dry 0.0408*** 4.16 0.0152 0.000 
 Extra dry  base base base base 
Region Niagra Penninsula -0.0885 -8.47 0.0822 0.282 
 Prince Edward county 0.1456 15.67 0.1223 0.235 
 Other Ontario -0.1092 -10.34 0.1177 0.354 
 Lake Erie North Shore -0.0757 -7.29 0.1644 0.646 
 British Columbia base base base base 
Vol. supplieda >1000 cases (large) -0.2473 -21.91 0.1553 0.112 
 500 < X1 ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.1867 20.53 0.4746 0.694 
 500 < X ≤ 200 (small) 0.1394* 14.96 0.0565 0.014 
 0 < X ≤ 200 (very small)  base base base base 
Wineries Henry of Pelham -0.2793 -24.37 0.5177 0.590 
 Jackson-Triggs -0.3720 -31.06 0.4983 0.456 
 Cave Springs -0.3400 -28.82 0.4355 0.436 
 Peller Estate 0.5729* 77.34 0.2337 0.015 
 Pelee Island 0.0444 4.54 0.2705 0.870 
 Inniskillin Wines -0.1232 -11.59 0.2447 0.615 
 Others (base) base base base base 
Varietals Cabernet franc -0.1486 -13.81 0.0894 0.098 
 Cabernet sauvignon -0.2375* -21.14 0.0976 0.016 
 Gamay noir -0.1978 -17.95 0.1669 0.237 
 Merlot -0.2711** -23.75 0.0864 0.002 
 Pinot noir (base) base base base base 
 Syrah/shiraz -0.2848*** -24.78 0.1087 0.009 
 blend -0.1587* -14.67 0.0712 0.027 
 others -0.5870*** -44.40 0.1434 0.000 
Vintage ≤2005  base base base base 
 2006 -0.5469*** -42.13 0.1557 0.001 
 2007 -0.1925 -17.51 0.1195 0.108 
 2008 -0.4150*** -33.97 0.1243 0.001 
 2009 -0.2774* -24.22 0.1223 0.024 
 2010 -0.3741** -31.21 0.1213 0.002 
 2011 -0.5870*** -23.78 0.1434 0.000 
R-2 0.3180 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 15.53 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N 317 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
    Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 n/a = Not applicable 
 
aX = Number of cases 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013.  
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Taking pinot noir as a reference category for red wine grape varieties, cabernet sauvignon, merlot 
and blended red wines have about 21.14, 23.75 and 14.67 percent lower prices respectively relative 
to pinot noir red wines in the dataset. Comparing the results of this model with that of the pooled 
regression with respect to the measurement of individual and collective reputation, VQA is the 
only collective reputation signal that has a significant influence on the price of red wines. Regional 
reputation does not have significant influence, and only one individual winery reputation (Peller 
Estate) has a significant effect on the price of red wines. Nevertheless, comparing the size of the 
coefficients, the magnitude of the coefficient for the individual winery reputation is larger relative 
to collective reputation (VQA). The adjusted coefficient of multiple determination indicates that 
about 31.80 percent of total variation in the price of red wines is explained by the model.72 
 
White wines 
White wines constitute about 46 percent of the total wine in the sample, while about 87 percent 
received VQA certification. The result of the hedonic regression for white wine is shown in Table 
3.9. The estimated coefficient for VQA is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. This indicates that the price of VQA white wines is 13.58 percent higher than the non-VQA 
base white wines. In addition, coefficients for attributes such as alcohol content and vintage have 
a significant effect on the price of white wine, as is the case in the previous models. Of the three 
levels of sweetness, dry and medium dry attributes tend to have a negative price effect relative to 
extra dry wines, with medium dry having a significant negative effect. The estimated coefficients 
for the gewürztraminer and sauvignon blanc grape varieties are negative respectively and 
significantly affect the price of white wine relative to chardonnay.  
 
The results further indicate that only VQA (collective reputation signal) has a significant effect on 
the price of white wine, while individual winery reputation and other collective reputation 
measures (region) have no significant effect on the price of white wines. Vintage significantly 
                                                          
72 The coefficient of multiple determination (R2) for most hedonic models is usually below 50 percent. Some factors 
affect the magnitude of R2 including: sample size, range of values of the independent variables and replicated values 
of the dependent and independent variables (Cornell and Berger, 1987). Most hedonic models use non-linear 
functional forms with low values of independent variables (product attributes). For this study, the prices and alcoholic 
content of some wines in the dataset are the same and some of the attributes are dummy variables. This potentially 
may have resulted in a low R2. 
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affects the price of white wines. The coefficients for white wines produced after the year 2005 are 
negative and significant relative to white wines produced in or before 2005, suggesting that older 
white wines are at a premium relative to newer white wines. 
 
Table 3.9: Parameter estimates for hedonic function - white wines 
Variable Level Coef.(β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  2.6081**  0.8750 0.003 
VQA  0.1094* 13.58 0.0548 0.017 
Ln(alcohol)  0.2030***  0.5254 0.000 
Sweetness Dry -0.0155 -1.54 0.0439 0.723 
 Medium dry -0.1254* -11.79 0.12965 0.013 
 Extra dry  base base base base 
Region Niagara Peninsula -0.0051 -0.51 0.0697 0.941 
 Prince Edward county 0.1048 11.05 0.1010 0.300 
 Other Ontario 0.0136 1.37 0.1193 0.909 
 Lake Erie North Shore -0.2228 -19.97 0.3506 0.526 
 British Columbia (base) base base base base 
Vol. supplieda >1000 cases (large) -0.1235 -11.62 0.1355 0.363 
 500 < X1 ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.0635 6.56 0.0337 0.060 
 500 < X ≤ 200 (small) 0.0859 8.97 0.0470 0.069 
 0 < X ≤ 200 (very small) base base base base 
Winery Henry of Pelham -0.5080 -39.83 0.3404 0.137 
 Jackson-Triggs -0.6470 -47.64 0.3954 0.103 
 Cave Springs -0.4593 -36.83 0.3983 0.250 
 Peller Estate 0.1692 18.43 0.1860 0.364 
 Pellee Island 0.2674 30.66 0.4275 0.532 
 Inniskillin Wines -0.0091 -0.91 0.2034 0.964 
 Others (base) base base base base 
Varietals Chardonnay  base base base base 
 Gewürztraminer -0.2179** -19.58 0.0834 0.008 
 Riesling -0.0653 -6.32 0.0723 0.367 
 Sauvignon blanc -0.2759*** -24.11 0.0761 0.000 
 Pinot grigio -0.2454 -21.76 0.1766 0.166 
 Pinot gris -0.1311 -12.28 0.1049 0.212 
 blend -0.1023 -9.72 0.0962 0.281 
 others -0.1067 -10.12 0.0811 0.189 
Vintage ≤ 2005  base base base base 
 
2006 -0.7297*** -51.79 0.1712 0.000 
 
2007 -0.7795*** -54.13 0.1489 0.000 
 
2008 -0.7464*** -47.36 0.1435 0.000 
 
2009 -0.6417*** -49.55 0.1366 0.000 
 
2010 -0.6842*** -55.86 0.1370 0.000 
 
2011 -0.8179*** -55.86 0.1444 0.000 
 
2012 -0.8216*** -56.03 0.1447 0.000 
R-2 0.3201 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
F-statistics 12.16 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
N 291 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 n/a = Not applicable 
 
aX = Number of cases 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013.  
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Other wine types 
The regression results for ice, rose and sparkling wines (see appendices 3.IV, 3.V and 3.VI) show 
that the estimated coefficient for VQA is positive but not significant for the three wine types 
respectively. There are very few observations in the rose and sparkling wine regressions, hence 
there was not enough degrees of freedom in these models which may be affecting the results. Thus, 
these results should be treated with caution. VQA certification on icewine cannot be said to have 
a premium since all the icewines in the sample have VQA certification and there is nothing to 
compare with it. When the attribute VQA certification was dropped for icewine, the regression 
result gave virtually the same result (level of significance, R-2). 
 
Testing interaction effects 
Some interactions were included in the model. The idea is that the magnitude of the effect of an 
independent variable on the dependent variable may depend on another independent variable 
included in the model. To determine whether VQA is important for specific grape varieties, the 
variable VQA was interacted with red wine varietals and a null hypothesis that VQA coefficients 
are equal for all varietal was tested. The results are shown in Table 3.10. 
 
H0: VQA coefficients are equal for every red wine grape variety 
H1: VQA coefficients are not equal for every red wine grape variety 
JKL7.M30, 286
 = 15.71 
JQLR.M30, 286
 = 1.46 
 
Table 3.10 shows that although the coefficients of all the interaction variables are positive, none 
of them are statistically significant. The coefficients for the interaction variables differ relative to 
the base case. In addition, the hypothesis testing shows that at the 5% significance level, F-cal. > 
F-tab. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected. Hence, VQA coefficients are not equal for 
individual red wine grape varieties. The significance of the VQA variable suggests that jointly (i.e. 
for a particular type/colour of wine) VQA is important but does not depend on individual grape 
varieties. 
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Table 3.10: Parameter estimates for hedonic function (red wines) - interaction of varietals with VQA 
Variable Level Coef. (β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  -3.4531*  1.3382 0.010 
VQA  0.1078* 11.38 0.0438 0.014 
Ln(alcohol)  2.6958***  0.5075 0.000 
Sweetness Dry -0.0511 -4.98 0.0541 0.345 
 Medium dry -0.3602*** -30.25 0.0951 0.000 
 Extra dry (base category) base base base base 
Region Niagra Penninsula -0.0787 -7.57 0.0827 0.342 
 Prince Edward county 0.1724 18.82 0.1243 0.167 
 Other Ontario -0.0919 -8.78 0.1183 0.438 
 Lake Erie North Shore -0.0617 -5.98 0.1649 0.709 
 British Columbia(base) base base base base 
Vol. supplieda >1000 cases (large) -0.2489 -22.03 0.1554 0.111 
 500 < X1 ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.1669 18.16 0.4753 0.726 
 500 < X ≤ 200 (small) 0.1421* 15.27 0.0566 0.013 
 0 < X ≤ 200 (very small) base base base base base 
Wineries Henry of Pelham -0.2558 -22.57 0.5185 0.622 
 Jackson-Triggs -0.3558 -29.94 0.4990 0.476 
 Cave Springs -0.3317 -28.23 0.4361 0.448 
 Peller Estate 0.5793* 78.48 0.2339 0.014 
 Pelee Island 0.0480 4.92 0.2709 0.859 
 Inniskillin Wines -0.0969 -9.24 0.2457 0.694 
 Others (base) base base base base 
Varietals VQA*Cabernet franc 0.2289 25.72 0.1551 0.141 
 VQA*Cabernet sauvignon 0.1494 16.11 0.1604 0.353 
 VQA*Gamay noir 0.1793 19.64 0.2108 0.396 
 VQA*Merlot 0.1266 13.50 0.1513 0.403 
 VQA*Pinot noir (base) base base base base 
 VQA*Syrah/shiraz 0.1018 10.72 0.1639 0.535 
 VQA*blend 0.2149 23.97 0.1429 0.134 
 VQA*others 0.2278 25.58 0.1879 0.226 
Vintage ≤2005 (base) base base base base 
 2006 -0.5471*** -42.14 0.1560 0.001 
 2007 -0.2045 -18.49 0.1200 0.089 
 2008 -0.4147*** -33.95 0.1244 0.001 
 2009 -0.2974* -25.73 0.1232 0.016 
 2010 -0.3854** -31.98 0.1217 0.002 
 2011 -0.5929*** -44.73 0.1437 0.000 
 2012 -0.2786 -24.32 0.2288 0.224 
R-2 0.3189 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 15.71 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N 317 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
n/a = Not applicable 
aX = Number of cases 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013.  
 
The regressions (e.g. Appendices 3.III (a), 3.III (b) and 3.III(c)) in which individual and collective 
reputation signals are included as separate variables isolate the effect of the VQA quality signal. 
Therefore, to test the extent to which VQA and region might be complementary quality signals, 
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the attribute VQA certification was interacted with region of origin in the pooled regression. The 
results show that the coefficients for interaction variables, VQA*Niagara-Peninsula and 
VQA*Other-Ontario, are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This suggests 
that VQA and region could serve as complementary collective reputation signal in these regions. 
This also indicates that VQA could signal quality and origin. This is shown in Table 3.11.  
 
Table 3.11: Interaction of VQA with winery region in the pooled regression 
Variable Level Coef (β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  2.0047**  0.6692 0.003 
VQA  0.1607** 17.43 0.1346 0.006 
Ln(alcohol)  0.6764**  0.2132 0.002 
Sweetness  0.0262  0.0232 0.259 
Colour/type Icewine 1.0089*** 174.26 0.1433 0.000 
 Red 0.4589*** 58.23 0.1057 0.000 
 Rose  base base base base 
 Sparkling 0.5389*** 71.41 0.1468 0.000 
 White 0.2649* 30.33 0.1031 0.010 
Region VQA*Niagara Peninsula 0.1178* 12.50 0.0499 0.019 
 VQA*Prince Edward county 0.1168 13.39 0.0755 0.122 
 VQA*Other Ontario 0.1534* 16.58 0.0779 0.049 
 VQA*Lake Erie North 
Shore 
-0.2091 -18.87 0.1360 0.125 
 VQA*British Columbia  base base base base 
Vol. supplieda >1000 cases (large) -0.1433 -13.35 0.0915 0.118 
 500 < X ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.0947 9.93 0.1225 0.440 
 500< X ≤ 200 (small) 0.1130** 11.96 0.0357 0.002 
 0< X ≤ 200 (very small)  base base base base 
Wineries Henry of Pelham  -0.2234 -20.02 0.1829 0.222 
 Jackson-Triggs -0.2271 -20.31 0.1587 0.153 
 Cave Springs 0.1995 22.08 0.1119 0.075 
 Peller Estates 0.3619* 43.61 0.1413 0.011 
 Pelee Island -0.0073 -0.73 0.2005 0.971 
 Inniskillin Wines 0.2115 23.55 0.1281 0.099 
 Others base base base base 
Vintage ≤ 2005  base base base base 
 2006 -0.5166*** -40.35 0.1016 0.000 
 2007 -0.4095*** -33.60 0.0881 0.000 
 2008 -0.5230*** -40.73 0.0853 0.000 
 2009 -0.4265*** -34.72 0.0847 0.000 
 2010 -0.4977*** -39.21 0.0849 0.000 
 2011 -0.6723*** -48.95 0.0926 0.000 
 2012 -0.6089*** -45.61 0.1240 0.000 
R-2 0.3211 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 16.82 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N 662 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
n/a = Not applicable 
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aX = Number of cases 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013.  
 
Generally, the results of the series of hedonic models show that there is a premium for VQA 
certification, and the magnitude of the premium varies depending on the type of wine. In addition, 
attributes such as percentage alcohol content, sweetness and vintage have significant effects on the 
price of wine. Collective reputation and only one individual winery reputation significantly 
influence the price of wine but the magnitude of the effects are different for different types 
(colours) of wine.73 However, while VQA as a collective reputation signal has the largest effect 
on the price of wine relative to other collective reputation signals (e.g. region), results show that 
VQA and winery region can serve as complementary collective reputation signals. Presumably 
this is the case for only some regions.  
 
Comparing the magnitude of the coefficient of the VQA variable across the different models, the 
results show that the size of the coefficient for VQA fluctuates relative to the size of the 
coefficients of other variables in the model. This suggests that the magnitude of the effect of VQA 
certification on the price of wine is not larger than that of other variables across the models. For 
example, considering the models for red (Table 3.8) wines, the size of coefficient for wineries 
variable (Peller Estate) is 72 percent higher than that of the VQA coefficient. The implication of 
this result (for example to a winery) is that although VQA certification significantly influences the 
price of wine, for some wines individual winery reputation has a higher influence on the wine price 
relative to VQA certification. The next section examines a winery’s decision to seek VQA 
certification for a specific wine using a Probit model. 
 
3.4.2 Probit Model 
A Probit model is a type of regression analysis in which the dependent (response) variable is 
binomial, and is based on the assumption that the functional form follows a normal (cumulative) 
distribution (Kim, 2013). Probit models are used to evaluate the probability of an outcome given 
a change in an independent variable. In the context of this study, a winery’s decision to use or not 
to use VQA certification is based on a vector of factors74, X, including: price of VQA certified 
                                                          
73
 Only few wineries are used to represent individual reputation. 
74
 These factors could be described as benefits or utility to the winery 
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wine relative to non-VQA base wine, quality (rating by wine experts), a winery’s characteristics 
(volume of sales, region), wine type/colour, and the error term, which is normally distributed with 
zero mean.  
Applying the concept of utility and following Adamowicz et al. (1998), Olynk et al. (2010) and 
Ida (n.d); assume that the ith winery’s utility is given by: 
S
 =  +  , if it uses VQA; and 
S
 =  +  , if it does not use VQA 
Therefore, the decision by the ith winery to apply for VQA certification for a specific wine is such 
that 
T = U1	V	S > S0	V	S ≤ S 
Where T = 1 if the winery uses VQA certification for a specific wine and T = 0, otherwise. 
Therefore, the probability of using the VQA system for a specific wine is given by: 
																					"T = 1
 = "S1 > S0
 = "Y1 + 1 > 0 + 0Z																															3.6
 
Considering the assumption of normal distribution of the error term in Probit analysis (Green, 
2008, pp. 777), and following Gujarati and Porter (2009, p.566), equation (3.6) can be rewritten 
as 
																					"T = 1
 = " −  <  − 
 = " < 
																													3.7
 
 
																																																			"T = 1
 = \
																																																																					3.8
 
This implies that  
PrT = 1
 = \
6
3

 
and  
PrT = 0
 = 1 − \
_


 
Where, 
\ = Cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
 = Parameters estimated using Maximum Likelihood 
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` = Vector of independent variables influencing a winery’s decision to use the VQA certification 
for a specific wine 
 
Therefore, the probability of a winery to use VQA certification for a specific wine is given by 
																															T = 1 ⋮ 
 = b 1√2d
eG
fg
$fhi jk = \l
																																																3.9
	 
Where, 
l =  +  +⋯+ 33 
Thus, the Probit model for the use of VQA by a winery is explicitly stated as follows: 
oT
 =  + "#$ + %*"$8*+ +3
6
3
4$5, +7%,+1@$7
9
7
+	0,+,1"
>
	
											3.10
 
Where, 
T = Response (dependent) variable, VQA  = Constant = = Coefficients of explanatory variables 
 
Following Green (2008, p.778), the likelihood function used to estimate the parameters is given 
by 
 
																									 
 =pT
 =p\
q
>

>

\−
fq 																																											3.11
 
 
The predicted probability of an independent variable is calculated using the relation: 
 = 	\ + 
 
Where  = predicted probability and other parameters are as defined above. Stata calculates this 
using the command, .display normal ( + ) 
 
Many of the independent variables are qualitative in nature and therefore difficult to measure. 
These variables were quantified using dummy variables. According to Oczkowski (1994), dummy 
variables are preferred over single continuous variables in measuring some qualitative variables 
because they help to reduce the impact large measurement errors may have on the model.  
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The hedonic pricing model results show that there is a premium for VQA certification. 
Nevertheless, despite the existence of a premium, not every winery chooses VQA certification for 
every wine. In this sub-section, we analyze the determinants of a winery’s decision to seek VQA 
certification for a specific wine. Table 3.12 shows summary statistics for wineries in the data set 
that used the VQA system for all their wines, some of their wines, and none of their wines. 
 
Table 3.12: Classification of wineries based on use of VQA certification 
Classification Number of wineries % frequency 
Wineries with all wines certified by VQA 146 84.88 
Only some wines certified by VQA 11 6.40 
None of the wines certified by VQA 15 8.72 
Total 172 100.00 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
The data in Table 3.12 show that of the 172 wineries in the data set, 146 (84.88 percent) have all 
their wines certified by the VQA. About 8.72 percent of the wineries do not use the VQA system, 
and therefore, sell their wines uncertified, while only 6.40 percent use the VQA for some (but not 
all) of their wines. Based on the volume of wine (number of cases) supplied by wineries to the 
Ontario retail market and distributed through the LCBO within the period under consideration, the 
11 wineries that certify some of their wines comprise 1 large (Jackson-Triggs), 4 medium, 3 small, 
and 3 very small wineries.75 Jackson-Triggs (J-T) supplied a total of 49 varieties of wine of which 
33 received certification from the VQA and 16 were sold without certification. In addition, 
compared to other large wineries (Henry of Pelham, Cave spring) in the data set, wines supplied 
by J-T have the lowest average price of $19.22. Further, 3 out of the 15 wineries that did not certify 
any of their wines are small in size, while the remaining 12 are very small wineries. 
 
To identify the factors that influence a winery’s decision to apply for VQA certification for a 
specific wine, a Probit analysis was carried out. The results are shown in Table 3.13. The model 
has a good fit given the value of the McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared. The analysis (dependent 
                                                          
75
 Large (≥ 1000 cases); medium (between 500 and 999 cases); small (between 300 and 499 cases) and very small (< 
300 cases). 
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variable) is on the basis of a specific wine instead of at the winery level for two reasons. First, we 
do not have enough data on wineries to use the winery as the dependent variable. Second, there 
will be loss of degrees of freedom as only 6.40 percent (11 out of 172) of the wineries certify some 
of their wines, while 8.72 percent (15 out of 172) did not certify any of their wines. 
        
Results in Table 3.13 show that the coefficients for price, red and white wines are positive but do 
not significantly influence the decision to seek VQA certification for a specific wine. The 
estimated coefficient for each independent variable relates the variable to the predicted probability 
of VQA certification, and shows the magnitude of change in the predicted probability of using 
VQA for a unit change in the independent variable.  We can predict the probability of a winery 
seeking VQA certification for different values of the independent variables. The predicted 
probability for each variable is calculated based on the assumption that other variables are 
evaluated at zero.76  
 
            Table 3.13: Probit regression for the use of VQA certification by wineries 
Variable Coefficient Std. error z P > |z| Predicted Prob.1 
Constant 0.2352 0.2690 0.87 0.382 0.5930 
Price 0.0043 0.0028 1.53 0.125 0.5946 
Varietal2 0.5272*** 0.1022 5.16 0.000 0.7771 
Winery region:      
Niagara Pen. 0.7843*** 0.1418 5.53 0.000 0.8460 
PEC 0.7368** 0.2489 2.96 0.003 0.8345 
Lake Erie NS 0.9010*** 0.2244 4.02 0.000 0.8721 
Volume supplied      
Large 0.6799*** 0.1600 4.25 0.000 0.8199 
Medium 0.2312 0.1276 1.81 0.070 0.6795 
small -0.0788 0.1156 -0.68 0.495 0.5621 
Wine type:      
Icewine 0.2979*** 0.0922 3.23 0.001 0.7030 
Red 0.4027 0.2372 1.70 0.089 0.7382 
White 0.2141 0.2289 0.94 0.349 0.6734 
Sparkling -0.3559 0.2814 -1.26 0.206 0.4520 
Log likelihood = -492.7894 
LR chi2(12) = 153.94 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1351 
Number of obs. = 1444 
           P-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
            Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
                                                          
76
 Individual variables can also be evaluated at their means. 
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Note:   1Predicted probability of seeking VQA certification when X (independent variables) increase by 1-unit 
 2Varietal indicates whether a wine is blended (produced using two or more grape varieties) or not  (single 
 variety). Blended wines = 1; 0 = otherwise 
 Base (omitted) dummy categories include: other Ontario for winery region, very small for winery  size, and 
 rose for wine colour/type. 
 
3McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared shows the level of improvement of the full model relative to the intercept 
 model. A lower value is an indication that the full model has a better fit than the intercept model 
 (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm).  
 
4Predicted probabilities were calculated and reported for the Probit regression instead of the marginal effects. 
 This is because marginal effects for the Probit regression measure the likelihood of a winery to seek for 
 VQA certification. In other words how the predicted probabilities will change as the binary independent 
 variable changes  from ‘0’ to ‘1’. To show the magnitude of the likelihood, the predicted probability for each 
 independent variable is calculated. 
 
The result indicates that six explanatory variables including: varietal, Niagara Peninsula, Prince 
Edward County, Lake Erie North Shore, large wineries and icewine are positive and statistically 
significant. This indicates that volume of wine supplied (large), varietal (whether a wine is 
produced using single or blended grapes), winery region and icewine are key factors that 
significantly influence a winery’s decision to seek VQA certification for a specific wine. Only 
wines produced using single Canadian grown grapes qualify for VQA certification. The 
significance of the coefficients of winery region is not surprising. As mentioned earlier, there are 
172 wineries in Ontario as of March 2013 out of which 140 (81.4 percent) are registered with 
VQA. Therefore, the probability of a winery located in Ontario seeking VQA certification would 
be high. 
 
British Columbia (BC) is excluded from the Probit regression because there are some wineries that 
supply a large volume of wines in BC (e.g. Mission Hill) that are under-represented in this data 
set77 and therefore, may be erroneously regarded as small wineries. In addition, a variable, quality, 
measured as wine experts’ (third-party) ranking or product score was not included in the Probit 
model as product score was only available for 19.6 percent (302) of the total observations (1537) 
in the data set. Of these 302 observations, 98.7 percent (298) are VQA wines, while the remaining 
1.3 percent are non-VQA. These led to the decision to drop the attribute (product score) in hedonic 
regression, and in the Probit analysis where it was measured as quality. 
 
                                                          
77
 The data set contains primarily Ontario wines. Of the 1537 total observations, only 156 were from BC, with relative 
low volumes from the major BC winery, Mission Hill (see Table 3.5). 
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There are costs associated with VQA certification, including: monetary costs (testing and 
membership fees) and production restrictions (e.g. only 100 percent regionally grown grapes are 
used for VQA wines, which are monitored and harvested at a particular level of ripeness, no 
addition of artificial sugar). The membership fee is a flat rate irrespective of the volume of wine 
supplied by a winery. However, the value of some of these costs (e.g. cost of searching information 
about VQA) are difficult to ascertain. An attempt was made to control for fixed costs of seeking 
VQA certification (e.g. costs of learning about the VQA system, costs of documenting compliance 
with VQA certification). We defined this (dummy) variable as “experience with VQA.” Wineries 
in the data set that have all or some of their wines certified by VQA take a value of ‘1’ and wineries 
with no experience with VQA (have none of their wines certified) take a value of ‘0’. The variable 
was included in an earlier version of the Probit model (not the model presented in Table 3.13) as 
a check and the coefficient was insignificant. 
 
Icewines in the dataset are all VQA presumably because it is a high priced wine and wineries 
potentially see VQA certification as being important to signal quality and earn collective 
reputation, both in the domestic and international markets. In addition, there is the possibility that 
some grape varieties used for blended Canadian wines might be cheap in terms of price and sourced 
from outside Canada (International Canadian Blends). Given VQA requirements, wines produced 
using such grapes do not meet one of the VQA requirements and, therefore, would not pass through 
the VQA system. Considering each independent variable at a time and evaluating other variables 
at zero, the results show that wineries located in Ontario, relative to BC (base category), have the 
highest predicted probability of seeking VQA status in order to signal authenticity and origin; and 
also earn collective reputation. This is followed by large wineries, wineries producing wines using 
single grapes potentially grown domestically and wineries producing icewine.  
 
Although there is a premium for VQA, the probit results show that wine price is not a significant 
factor that drives a winery’s decision to seek VQA for a specific wine. To resolve the issue of 
whether high priced wines seek VQA certification or whether VQA certification leads to higher 
wine prices, an attempt was made to estimate the model using an instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation approach. To use the IV approach, there has to be a valid instrument (z) for the 
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endogenous independent variable (x) which must meet two conditions (Green, 2008, p.316), 
including:  
a) Instrument exogeneity. This implies that the instrument must be uncorrelated with the error 
term. That is 0,rk, 
 = 0, and 
b) Instrument relevance. This means that the instrument must be highly correlated with the 
endogenous independent variable. That is 0,rk, s
 ≠ 0 
 
However, IV estimation was not feasible as none of the independent variables in the model were 
highly correlated with price to serve as a strong/valid instrument (See Appendix 3.VII for the 
correlation result). Based on the correlation analysis results, the included independent variables 
are weak instruments. A weak instrument often results in coefficients that are biased and thus may 
lead to misleading inferences (Stock, 2002). 
 
To determine whether price and VQA are endogenous, a test of endogeneity (Hausman 
specification or t-test) was carried out following the method used by Gujarati and Porter (2009, 
p.703) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1990, p.304).  Following equation (3.10), assume the following 
models: 
																							%AL =  +  + %QL7 + u4v + w%x + M07 +  																												3.12
 
																																																			%AL =  +  +  																																																										3.13
 
Where, 
 = wine price %QL7 = varietal (as defined in Table 3.12) 4v = winery region %x = Volume of wine supplied by a winery to the Ontario retail market 07 = wine colour/type  = error term 
 
Assume  and %AL are endogenous (i.e.  is correlated with 
 , and %QL7 , 4v , %y and 07 are 
exogenous (uncorrelated with ) 
 
To verify if there is endogeneity between price and VQA, a Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) 
regression was run and a Hausman’s or t-test for endogeneity was carried out. First we rewrite 
equation (3.12) in a reduced form as follows: 
																																													 =  + %QL7 + 4v + u%x + w07 + z 																													3.14
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Where z 	is the reduced form of the error term. Equation (3.14) was estimated using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) and the regression residuals (z{|
and predicted values of price ({}) calculated. 
The results of the OLS regression is shown in Table 3.14. 
 
                 Table 3.14: OLS regression results of wine price against other independent variables 
 
      P-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
       Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 Note: Omitted (base) categories include: rose for wine colour/type, very small for 
 volume supplied to the Ontario market and other Ontario for winery region. 
 
 = {} + z{|  , where {} represents the estimated price and z{|  is the residual from the OLS 
regression. Substituting this for  in equation (3.13), we have: 
 
																																																							%AL =  + {} + z{| +  																																										3.15
 
The second stage involves estimation of equation (3.15) using OLS and performing a test on the 
coefficient of z{| . The result of the estimation is shown in Table 3.15. 
 
  
Variable Coefficient Std. error P>|t| 
Constant   2.6213*** 0.0834 0.000 
Varietal  -0.1241*** 0.0286 0.000 
Colour/type Red 0.4060*** 0.0679 0.000 
 White 0.2247*** 0.0667 0.001 
 Icewine 0.9217*** 0.0808 0.000 
 Sparkling 0.3412*** 0.0863 0.000 
Vol. supplied Large -0.0763 0.0534 0.153 
 Medium 0.1084** 0.0394 0.006 
 Small 0.1861*** 0.0387 0.000 
Winery region Niagara -0.2754*** 0.0412 0.000 
 PEC -0.1307* 0.0607 0.032 
 LENS -0.4639*** 0.0670 0.000 
R-2 = 0.6374 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-stat = 33.79 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N = 1444 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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                      Table 3.15: Regression of VQA against estimated values of price and residuals of the error term 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Constant     0.1125** 0.0435 0.010 
Phat (~) 0.0528 0.0355 0.137 
Residual (| ) 0.0969 0.0591 0.073 
R-2 = 0.5724 n/a n/a n/a 
F-stat = 43.65 n/a n/a 0.000 
N = 1444 n/a n/a n/a 
     P-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
      Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
Test of hypothesis 
 
H0 = there is endogeneity between VQA and wine price 
H1 = there is no endogeneity between VQA and wine price 
 
Table 3.15 shows that at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, the coefficient of the residual (| ) is not 
significant based on the p-value. We therefore reject the null hypothesis that there is endogeneity 
between VQA and the price of wine. This therefore suggests that VQA certification only leads to 
higher wine prices and not the other way round. 
 
3.5 Implication of results  
 
Food product authenticity and credible quality signals by producers in agri-food markets are 
important to reduce the negative externalities and/or spillovers arising from food fraud that affect 
other firms in the industry. The paper seeks to answer two key questions - does VQA certification 
bring a price premium and enhance the collective reputation of Canadian wines? What factors 
determine a winery’s decision to seek VQA certification for a specific wine? The empirical results 
of the hedonic price analysis show that there exists a price premium for VQA certified Canadian 
wines, while the Probit regression results identify variables (factors) that shape a winery’s decision 
to seek quality assurance certification. These results have some market and policy implications. 
 
The results implicitly suggest that Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) has established and signalled 
authenticity assurances and origin in the Canadian wine industry. VQA signals authenticity by 
verifying and certifying claims made on the wine labels by wineries. These appear to be valued by 
consumers, increasing their willingness to pay for quality, and earning a collective reputation for 
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the Canadian wine industry. A premium for authenticity, quality and origin in the wine industry 
could serve as an incentive for other agri-food sectors in Canada to establish similar quality 
assurance system to gain or boost collective reputation.  
 
Controlling for individual winery reputation with the winery variable, and controlling for other 
collective reputation signals (e.g. region, Province), the individual winery and region variables 
were included in the hedonic regression at different stages alongside the VQA variable. The idea 
is to separate VQA from other collective reputation signals. The results show that the estimated 
coefficient for VQA is positive and significant at every stage of the regression, suggesting that the 
VQA signal adds value beyond other signals of individual and collective reputation. This 
potentially shows the value of VQA as a collective reputation signal, and implies that VQA could 
be used as a shorthand for quality, which may enable consumers to make informed purchase 
decisions and may reduce their transaction (search) costs. Interacting the VQA variable with region 
to determine the extent to which the two can be used as complementary quality signals, the 
estimated coefficients are positive and significant for two sub-regions in Ontario, suggesting that 
VQA and region can be used as complementary collective reputation signal, at least for some 
regions. In addition, the results of the interaction of the VQA variable with red grape varieties 
suggest that the importance of VQA certification is independent of individual wine grape varieties. 
Comparing the magnitude of the effect of the VQA variable relative to the size of the coefficient 
of other variables included in the hedonic model, the results show that the size of the effect of the 
variable vary. Further, results of the Probit analysis indicate that large wineries (supplying more 
than one thousand cases to the Ontario retail market) located in Ontario, and producing icewine 
and single grape wines have a higher tendency of seeking VQA certification for a specific wine. 
 
On the part of the wineries, the magnitude of the estimated premium for VQA wines could serve 
as a guide for wineries’ investment decisions in quality assurance systems. New and non-
participating VQA wineries could use the estimated premium in making a comparative analysis of 
the costs and benefits of getting their wines certified by VQA, and determine the expected return 
associated with investment in quality assurance. Information on attributes that significantly 
influence wine price could enable individual wineries to redirect resources in order to increase 
their marginal values, earn a higher price and protect their reputations.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
Consumers’ increasing demand for quality reassurance resulting from the recent spate of 
publicized cases of food fraud has spurred investments in quality, authenticity and reputation-
enhancing programs by agri-food firms and industries. This paradigm shift is contingent on 
reputation externalities faced by food firms as a result of increased cases of food fraud in 
agricultural markets, resulting in the classic Akerlof’s ‘lemons’ problem. The paper examines the 
mechanism of building and/or protecting industry-wide collective reputation using the Vintners 
Quality Alliance (VQA) certification system in the Canadian wine industry. Fundamentally, 
although it takes quite some time to build reputation, an industry can easily lose its reputation in a 
short time period. Reputation is therefore very important for a firm or an industry especially in 
competitive markets where producers strive to gain a first-mover advantage, market share and 
premiums. 
 
A series of hedonic pricing models for Canadian wines and a Probit model are estimated to 
determine respectively whether there is a premium for VQA Canadian wines and to identify factors 
that determine a winery’s decision to seek VQA certification for a specific wine. The results of the 
hedonic analysis show that there exists a premium for VQA red and white wines sold in Ontario, 
suggesting that authenticity assurances and origin signalled by the VQA system appear to be 
valued by consumers. Controlling for winery and regional characteristics (collective reputation 
attributes), the coefficient of VQA certification was positive and significant, indicating the value 
of VQA certification as a collective reputation building strategy. While the results of the hedonic 
analysis show that a number of attributes including: percentage alcohol content, sweetness, volume 
of wine supplied by a winery (large) and vintage have a significant influence on the price of wine; 
the Probit analysis results show that large wineries in Ontario that produce icewine and non-
blended wines have a higher tendency of seeking VQA status.  
 
Results of the analysis show that there is a premium for authenticity, and VQA adds a premium 
beyond the other signals of reputation (e.g. winery, region). A possible explanation of the 
uniqueness of VQA as a signal for quality and reputation is that, perhaps unlike other reputation 
signals (e.g. region), VQA is a third party certified quality signal. This potentially makes VQA a 
stronger assurance of quality and authenticity. Third party certification of quality seems to be a 
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more reliable and transparent method of showing compliance and/or conformity with set standards, 
and could inspire consumer confidence in quality reassurance as the product has been evaluated 
and certified by an independent organization. It also has the potential of enhancing market access. 
Therefore, enforcing authenticity and credible quality signals in agri-food markets, complemented 
with verification of quality claims, could ease food fraud and quality uncertainty in agri-food 
markets, and ultimately boost industry-wide collective reputation. 
 
3.7 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research 
Certain limitations were encountered in the course of this study. First is the timely availability of 
data. Although data were available from the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, important 
information such the aggregate quantity of wines sold annually and in various periods of the year 
by specific wineries could not be accessed. Such information is needed to control for seasonality 
effects in the analysis. In addition, product score (third party ranking of wines) was dropped from 
the analysis as only about 19.6 percent of the observations in the data set have product score, and 
about 98 percent of such observations are VQA wines. A data set with a fair balance of VQA and 
non-VQA wines with product scores would have enabled the researcher to interact VQA and 
product score, and use the result to tease apart the authenticity assurance from the quality assurance 
signalled by the VQA system in the analysis.  
 
The hedonic model separates individual and collective reputation effects on wine price, while the 
results show that the magnitude of the effects are not the same for different types of wine. Although 
some consumers may have strong preferences for wine produced by specific wineries in different 
regions, it would be interesting to use another analytical technique (e.g. choice experiment) to 
compare consumers’ willingness to pay for wines based on individual and collective reputation, 
and other wine attributes. The results of such an experiment would give wineries and researchers 
a better understanding of the attributes that drive consumers’ wine purchase decisions. In addition, 
future studies should consider both Canadian and imported wines in order to examine how the 
VQA quality assurance system affects price competition for regional and imported wines. 
 
Further, the researcher only had access to data from Ontario. It would be interesting to include 
sales from British Columbia (BC) as this may affect the type of BC wines that showed up in the 
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dataset and provide more generalizable results and conclusions concerning the VQA system. For 
example, using data from Ontario and BC retail wine sales would give a better sense of whether 
price significantly influences a winery’s decision to seek VQA. This potentially may provide the 
opportunity of applying the instrumental variable estimation approach, which was not feasible in 
the analysis. 
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Appendix 3.I 
 
A3.1: LCBO pricing formula for wines (750ml bottle) 
 US 
imported 
wine 
Other 
imported 
wine 
100% 
Canadian 
Ontario wine 
< 100% 
Canadian 
Ontario wine 
Price Components 
Payment to supplier  3.5376 3.4867 4.3207 3.8557 
Federal Excise Tax1 $0.62/litre 0.4650 0.4650 - 0.4650 
Federal Import Duty $0.0187/ litre - 0.0140 - - 
Total Landed Cost 4.1695 4.1695 4.3207 4.3207 
LCBO Mark-up2  2.9812 2.9812 2.8301 2.8301 
LCBO Wine Levy $1.62/litre 1.2150 1.2150 1.2150 1.2150 
LCBO Bottle Levy $0.29/ litre 0.2175 0.2175 0.2175 0.2175 
LCBO Environment 
Fee3 
$0.0893/ 
container 
0.0893 0.0893 0.0893 0.0893 
LCBO Rounding 
Revenue4 
 - - - - 
Basic Price 8.67 8.67 8.67 8.67 
H.S.T 13% basic 
price 
1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 
Container Deposit5  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Consumer Price $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 
Revenue Distribution 
Supplier (including 
freight) 
 3.70 3.69 4.32 3.86 
Government of 
Ontario 
 5.20 5.20 5.05 5.05 
Government of 
Canada 
 0.90 0.91 0.43 0.90 
Container Deposit  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Consumer Price  $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 
Notes: 
1. There is no federal excise tax on domestic wine made from 100% Canadian-grown agricultural products. 
2. LCBO mark-up as a share of landed cost is 71.5% for U.S. imports, 71.5% for other imports and 65.5% for 
Ontario wines. 
3. Environmental fee applies to containers that cannot be returned for refilling by manufacturer. 
4. Consumer price rounded up to the next nickel. 
5. Container deposit rates are as follows: $0.10 for a container greater than 100 ml and less than or equal to 630 ml; 
$0.20 for a container greater than 630 ml; and $0.00 for a container less than or equal to 100 ml 
Source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 3.II 
 
A3.2: Correlation matrix for independent variables (hedonic regression) 
 vqa Alcohol Sweetn
ess 
Niagara PEC Other 
Ont. 
LENS BC Large Medium Small Very 
small 
HOP JT Cave 
spring 
Peller Pelee Inniskil
lin 
Vqa 1.0000                  
Alcohol 0.1583 1.0000                 
Sweetness 0.0588 0.5618 1.0000                
Niagara 0.0263 -0.0194 0.0151 1.0000               
PEC -0.0014 0.0217 -0.0045 -0.4172 1.0000              
Other Ont. 0.0097 -0.0107 -0.1124 0.0644 -0.0659 1.0000             
LENS -0.0308 -0.0582 -0.0466 -0.3717 -0.0641 0.0669 1.0000            
BC -0.0413 0.0755 0.0624 -0.5345 -0.0911 0.0483 -0.0814 1.0000           
Large 0.0096 -0.0320 0.0095 0.0373 0.0094 -0.0278 -0.0064 0.0131 1.0000          
Medium 0.0480 0.1596 0.1284 -0.0888 0.0366 -0.0761 0.0007 0.1145 -0.1550 1.0000         
Small -0.0468 -0.1244 -0.1280 0.0529 -0.0390 0.0947 0.0026 -0.1094 -0.5039 -0.7711 1.0000        
Very small -0.0206 -0.0986 -0.0843 -0.0282 -0.0280 -0.0419 0.0158 -0.0029 -0.0223 -0.3354 0.4371 1.0000       
HOP 0.0316 0.0653 0.0887 0.0167 0.0096 -0.0277 -0.0001 -0.0276 0.5347 -0.0828 -0.2695 -0.1187 1.0000      
J-T -0.0338 -0.1171 -0.0851 0.0889 0.0018 -0.0368 -0.0023 -0.0727 0.6494 -0.0952 -0.3238 -0.1342 -0.0361 1.0000     
Cavespring 0.0374 0.0239 0.0091 -0.0853 0.0026 0.0177 -0.0119 0.1562 0.4635 -0.0718 -0.2336 -0.1029 -0.0248 -0.0313 1.0000    
Peller -0.0220 0.0343 0.0154 -0.0788 0.1018 -0.0354 -0.0254 0.0889 -0.0735 0.4743 -0.3697 -0.1629 -0.0393 -0.0393 -0.0496 1.0000   
Pelee 0.0620 0.0935 0.0794 -0.0328 0.0264 -0.0259 0.0101 0.0534 -0.0700 0.4518 -0.3522 -0.1552 -0.0374 -0.0472 -0.0324 -0.0513 1.0000  
Inniskillin -0.0612 0.0571 0.0140 -0.0886 0.0110 -0.0394 -0.0399 0.1863 -0.0528 0.3408 -0.2657 -0.1171 -0.0282 -0.0356 -0.0245 -0.0387 -0.0369 1.0000 
Others -0.0038 -0.0651 -0.0576 0.0715 -0.0784 0.0644 0.0209 -0.1563 -0.6017 -0.5102 0.8334 0.3690 -0.3218 -0.3883 -0.2789 -0.4415 -0.4206 -0.3173 
Icewine 0.0434 -0.4138 -0.6183 -0.0283 -0.0342 -0.0179 0.0968 -0.0445 -0.0729 -0.0953 0.1446 0.1015 -0.0390 -0.0155 -0.0338 -0.0535 -0.0509 -0.0384 
Red 0.0045 0.3365 0.2899 -0.0828 -0.0005 0.0498 0.0148 0.0397 0.0702 0.0271 -0.0713 -0.0899 0.1956 -0.1772 0.1696 -0.2007 -0.1912 0.1180 
Rose -0.0360 -0.1210 -0.1263 0.0362 -0.0121 -0.0046 0.0150 0.0010 0.5139 -0.0095 -0.3123 -0.1327 -0.0358 0.7910 -0.0310 -0.0491 -0.0468 0.1706 
Sparkling -0.0039 -0.0294 0.0145 0.0209 0.0468 0.0970 -0.0109 -0.0490 0.1584 -0.0704 -0.0399 0.0690 -0.0244 0.2564 -0.0211 -0.0334 -0.0318 -0.0240 
White -0.0037 -0.1048 -0.0072 0.0573 0.0031 -0.0672 -0.0570 -0.0016 -0.2960 0.0427 0.1515 0.0909 -0.1581 -0.1922 -0.1370 0.2484 0.2366 -0.1559 
≤ 2005 0.0621 -0.0031 -0.0893 0.0527 -0.0440 -0.0018 0.0022 -0.0405 0.0133 -0.0448 0.0302 -0.0155 -0.0278 0.0569 -0.0241 -0.0382 -0.0364 0.0305 
2006 0.0372 -0.0718 -0.1326 0.0245 -0.0119 -0.0208 -0.0032 0.0123 0.0208 -0.0750 0.0519 0.0355 0.0237 0.0271 -0.0258 -0.0409 -0.0389 -0.0022 
2007 0.0769 0.0976 0.0621 0.0031 0.0210 0.0883 0.0386 -0.0546 0.0362 -0.0296 0.0085 0.0144 0.0612 0.0136 -0.0197 -0.0369 -0.0187 -0.0094 
2008 0.0376 0.0451 0.0016 0.0117 -0.0162 -0.1002 0.0351 -0.0499 0.0358 -0.0250 -0.0020 0.0059 0.1133 0.0015 -0.0445 -0.0335 0.0357 -0.0172 
2009 0.0414 0.0812 0.0431 0.0437 -0.0374 -0.0862 -0.0322 0.0150 0.0230 -0.0111 -0.0060 -0.0245 -0.0290 0.0844 -0.0439 -0.0371 0.0606 0.0269 
2010 0.0769 0.1305 0.0615 0.0001 0.0166 0.0948 -0.0134 -0.0145 -0.0650 0.0742 -0.0248 -0.0526 -0.0610 -0.0193 -0.0365 0.0768 0.0544 -0.0311 
2011 0.0613 0.0008 -0.0195 -0.0438 0.0006 -0.0173 0.0289 0.0572 -0.0084 0.0474 -0.0297 -0.0169 -0.0211 -0.0036 0.0101 0.1373 -0.0537 0.0202 
Note: 
PEI = Prince Edward County (Prince Edward Island) 
LENS = Lake Erie Northshore 
BC = British Columbia 
HOP = Henry of Pelham 
J-T = Jackson-Triggs 
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Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables Cont’d 
 Others icewine Red Rose Sparkling White ≤ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Others 1.0000             
Icewine 0.1211 1.0000            
Red 0.1115 -0.1783 1.0000           
Rose -0.3845 -0.0148 -0.1755 1.0000          
Sparkling -0.0667 0.0156 -0.0245 -0.0305 1.0000         
White 0.0156 -0.2014 -0.8080 -0.1903 -0.1345 1.0000        
≤ 2005 0.0180 0.1769 -0.0377 0.0812 0.0429 -0.0877 1.0000       
2006 0.0284 0.2010 -0.0277 0.0497 0.0683 -0.0763 0.0536 1.0000      
2007 0.0081 0.0312 0.1264 0.0002 -0.0186 -0.1380 -0.0082 -0.0310 1.0000     
2008 -0.0181 0.0911 0.0333 -0.0508 0.0715 -0.0717 -0.0499 -0.0534 0.0725 1.0000    
2009 -0.0373 -0.0364 -0.0500 0.1038 -0.0178 0.0239 -0.0492 0.0621 -0.0821 -0.0908 1.000   
2010 -0.0107 -0.0399 0.0359 -0.0298 -0.0185 -0.0015 -0.0446 -0.0359 -0.0896 -0.1093 -0.1079 1.000  
2011 -0.0476 -0.0109 -0.1038 0.0620 -0.0349 0.0954 -0.0339 -0.0427 -0.0537 -0.0736 -0.0649 -0.0875 1.0000 
 
A correlation coefficient indicates the degree and direction of linear relationship between two variables (Rumsey, 2011, p.116). A high 
correlation between independent variable results in multicollinearity. The results on the correlation matrix table suggest that there is no 
multicollinearity among the independent variables in the hedonic model. Many of the variables in the model are dummies derived from 
categorical variables. Inclusion of all the dummy variables in a category in the regression would result in the dummy variable trap 
(perfect linear relationship between the set of dummies within a category (Andren, 2007, p.121). To avoid this problem, a reference 
(base) category is dropped for each set of dummy variables in the same category.
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Appendix 3.III (a) 
 
A3.3: Hedonic pricing result (pooled regression) with VQA and province 
Variable Level Coef.(β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  2.0412**  0.6743 0.003 
VQA  0.1038*** 10.94 0.0317 0.001 
Ln(alcohol)  0.6608**  0.2140 0.002 
Sweetness  0.0321 3.26 0.0235 0.173 
Colour/type Icewine 0.9844*** 167.62 0.1453 0.000 
 Red 0.4232*** 52.68 0.1067 0.000 
 Rose base base base base 
 Sparkling 0.5326*** 70.34 0.1483 0.000 
 White 0.2397* 27.09 0.1042 0.022 
Province Ontario -0.1029* -9.78 0.0496 0.039 
 British Columbia base base base base 
Vol. supplied >1000 cases (large) -0.0762 -7.34 0.0756 0.314 
 500 < X ≤ 1000 (medium) -0.0346 -3.40 0.0604 0.567 
 500< X ≤ 200 (small) 0.1073** 11.33 0.0359 0.003 
 0< X ≤ 200 (very small) base base base base 
Vintage ≤ 2005 (base) base base base base 
 2006 -0.5264*** 40.93 0.1024 0.000 
 2007 -0.3908*** -32.35 0.0889 0.000 
 2008 -0.5221*** -40.67 0.0859 0.000 
 2009 -0.4155*** -33.99 0.0853 0.000 
 2010 -0.4976*** -39.20 0.0854 0.000 
 2011 -0.6685*** -48.75 0.0926 0.000 
 2012 -0.6217** -46.30 0.1254 0.002 
R-2 0.2707 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 14.63 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N 662 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 114 
 
Appendix 3.III (b) 
 
A3.4: Hedonic pricing result (pooled regression) with VQA and region 
Variable Level Coef.(β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  1.8779**  0.6675 0.005 
VQA  0.1630*** 17.70 0.0425 0.000 
Ln(alcohol)  0.7328***  0.2122 0.001 
Sweetness  0.0257 2.60 0.0233 0.270 
Colour/type Icewine 0.9946*** 170.36 0.1437 0.000 
 Red 0.1436*** 15.44 0.1056 0.000 
 Rose base base base base 
 Sparkling 0.5381*** 71.27 0.1470 0.000 
 White 0.2511* 28.54 0.1030 0.015 
Region Niagara Peninsula -0.1122* -10.61 0.0499 0.025 
 Prince Edward county 0.1222 12.99 0.0757 0.107 
 Other Ontario -0.1456 -13.55 0.0780 0.063 
 Lake Erie North Shore -0.3151** -27.03 0.1110 0.005 
 British Columbia base base base base 
Vol. supplied >1000 cases (large) -0.0596 -5.79 0.0752 0.428 
 500 < X ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.0159 1.60 0.0624 0.799 
 500< X ≤ 200 (small) 0.1108** 11.71 0.0357 0.002 
 0< X ≤ 200 (very small) base base base base 
Vintage ≤ 2005 (base) base base base base 
 2006 -0.5249*** -40.84 0.1014 0.000 
 2007 -0.4068*** -33.42 0.0880 0.000 
 2008 -0.5235*** -40.76 0.0852 0.000 
 2009 -0.4287*** -33.86 0.0846 0.000 
 2010 -0.5012*** -39.42 0.0845 0.000 
 2011 -0.6615*** -48.39 0.0920 0.000 
 2012 -0.6256*** -46.51 0.1241 0.000 
R-2 0.2980 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 15.73 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N 662 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
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Appendix 3.III (c) 
 
A3.5: Hedonic pricing result (pooled regression) with VQA and winery 
Variable Level Coef (β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  1.9147**  0.6652 0.004 
VQA  0.1487*** 16.03 0.0345 0.000 
Ln(alcohol)  0.7147***  0.2083 0.001 
Sweetness  0.0300 3.05 0.0235 0.201 
Colour/type Icewine 0.9762*** 165.44 0.1446 0.000 
 Red 0.4330*** 54.19 0.1067 0.000 
 Rose  base base base base 
 Sparkling 0.5078*** 66.16 0.1475 0.001 
 White 0.2384* 26.92 0.1039 0.022 
Vol. supplied >1000 cases (large) -0.2018* -18.27 0.0892 0.024 
 500 < X ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.0408 4.16 0.1229 0.740 
 500< X ≤ 200 (small) 0.0844* 8.81 0.0343 0.014 
 0< X ≤ 200 (very small)  base base base base 
Wineries Henry of Pelham  -0.2141 -19.27 0.1850 0.248 
 Jackson-Triggs -0.2233 -20.01 0.1605 0.165 
 Cave Springs 0.1311 14.01 0.2123 0.537 
 Peller Estates 0.3704** 44.83 0.1404 0.009 
 Pelee Island -0.0903 -8.63 0.1725 0.601 
 Inniskillin Wines 0.2509* 28.52 0.1277 0.050 
 Others base base base base 
Vintage ≤ 2005  base base base base 
 2006 -0.5157*** -40.29 0.1025 0.000 
 2007 -0.4103*** -33.65 0.0887 0.000 
 2008 -0.5122*** -40.08 0.0860 0.000 
 2009 -0.4110*** -33.70 0.0854 0.000 
 2010 -0.4998*** -39.33 0.0856 0.000 
 2011 -0.6743*** -49.05 0.0932 0.000 
 2012 -0.6150*** -45.94 0.1252 0.000 
R-2 0.3017 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 15.46 n/a n/a n/a 0.000 
N 662 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013.  
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Appendix 3.IV 
 
 A3.6: Hedonic pricing result for icewine 
Variable Level Coef.(β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  5.0302***  1.3006 0.001 
VQA  0.1635 17.76 0.3537 0.648 
Ln(alcohol)  -0.3208  0.5588 0.571 
Sweetness  0.1432  0.2113 0.504 
Region Niagara Peninsula -0.6219 -46.30 0.4111 0.143 
 Prince Edward County -0.6871 -49.70 0.5899 0.256 
 Other Ontario -0.3420 -28.97 0.5293 0.524 
 Lake Erie North Shore -0.0904 -8.64 0.5495 0.871 
 British Columbia base base base base 
Vol. supplied >1000 cases (large) -0.0281 -2.77 0.3732 0.941 
 500 < X1 ≤ 1000 (medium) 0.0008 0.08 0.1385 0.996 
 500 < X ≤ 200 (small) 0.0075 0.75 0.6720 0.991 
 0 < X ≤ 200 (very small)  base base base base 
Winery Henry of Pelham -0.2834 -24.68 0.3099 0.370 
 Jackson-Triggs -0.2488 -22.03 0.5068 0.628 
 Cavespring 0.6786 97.11 0.5723 0.247 
 Peller Estate -0.3794 -31.57 0.4991 0.457 
 Inniskillin Wines 0.6095 83.95 0.3916 0.133 
 Others (base category) base base base base 
Varietal Cabernet franc  0.0216 2.18 0.1178 0.855 
 Riesling 0.0859 8.97 0.1296 0.511 
 Vidal -0.2455* -21.77 0.1190 0.045 
 Others  base base base base 
Vintage ≤ 2005  base base base base 
 2006 -0.0939 -8.96 0.2113 0.627 
 
2007 -0.3547 -29.86 0.2103 0.108 
 
2008 -0.1883 -17.16 0.1636 0.261 
 
2009 -0.4204 -34.32 0.2710 0.134 
 
2011 -0.2594 -22.85 0.2364 0.283 
 
2012 -0.3564 -29.98 0.2677 0.196 
R-2 0.2735 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 1.62 n/a n/a n/a 0.128 
N 46 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
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Appendix 3.V 
 
A3.7: Hedonic pricing result for rose wine 
Variable Level Coef.(β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  1.8399  1.6034 0.281 
VQA  0.0993 10.44 0.1182 0.423 
Ln(alcohol)  0.3872  0.6204 0.548 
Sweetness Dry -0.0790 -7.60 0.0851 0.378 
 Extra dry  base base base base 
Region Niagara Peninsula -0.1209 -11.39 0.0990 0.253 
 Prince Edward County -0.3046 -26.26 0.1839 0.132 
 British Columbia  base base base base 
Winery Inniskillin Wines 0.0501 5.14 0.1389 0.727 
 Others  base base base base 
Vintage 2008  base base base base 
 2010 -0.0664 -6.42 0.1155 0.579 
 2011 0.0981** 10.31 0.2510 0.004 
 2012 -0.0585 -5.68 0.1191 0.635 
R-2 0.1623 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 3.80 n/a n/a n/a 0.0273 
N 21 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
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Appendix 3.VI 
 
A3.8: Hedonic pricing result for sparkling wine 
Variable Level Coef.(β) (eβi -1)100% Std. error Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  4.5111  11.1868 0.699 
VQA  0.0969 10.17 1.3340 0.949 
Ln(alcohol)  -1.2697  4.1985 0.771 
Sweetness Dry 0.3879 47.39 0.6342 0.603 
 Extra dry  base base base base 
Region Niagara Peninsula -0.5706 -43.48 1.0583 0.644 
 Prince Edward County -0.5134 -40.15 1.0160 0.664 
 Other Ontario base base base base 
Vol. supplied >1000 cases (large) -0.3850 -31.95 1.4386 0.814 
 500 < X ≤ 200 (small) -0.8059 -55.33 1.0937 0.538 
 0 < X ≤ 200 (very small)  base base base base 
Winery Cave Springs 0.4285 53.50 0.4708 0.774 
 Others  base base base base 
Vintage ≤ 2005  base base base base 
 2006 -0.2382 -21.20 0.6869 0.752 
 2007 0.0664 6.87 0.9142 0.467 
 2008 0.2103 23.40 0.6698 0.774 
 2009 -0.3509 -29.59 0.6735 0.638 
 2011 -0.3751 -31.28 0.8469 0.688 
 2012 -0.4104 -33.66 0.9461 0.699 
R-2 0.0304 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-statistics 1.02 n/a n/a n/a 0.509 
N 17 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Significance level and codes of p-values: *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
Data source: Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  Appendix 3.VII  
  
A3.9: Correlation matrix for independent variables (Probit regression) 
 
Price  Varietal Red White Icewine Sparkling Large Medium Small Niagara PEC LENS 
Price 1.0000            
Varietal -0.0846 1.0000           
Red 0.0783 0.3010 1.0000          
White -0.1664 -0.1550 -0.0760 1.0000         
Icewine 0.2614 -0.1153 -0.2078 -0.2308 1.0000        
Sparkling -0.0113 -0.1278 -0.1740 -0.1933 -0.0528 1.0000       
Large  -0.0397 -0.0658 -0.0049 0.0080 -0.0233 0.0333 1.0000      
Medium  -0.1211 0.0426 -0.0066 -0.0136 0.0011 0.0374 -0.1311 1.0000     
Small 0.0510 -0.0157 -0.0084 0.0270 -0.0372 -0.0255 -0.2479 -0.3731 1.0000    
Niagara  -0.0388 -0.0370 -0.1141 0.0422 0.1133 0.0156 0.1571 -0.0520 0.0928 1.000   
PEC 0.0783 -0.0450 0.0210 0.0052 -0.0411 -0.0132 -0.0754 -0.0476 0.0227 -0.0410 1.0000  
LENS -0.1113 0.0170 0.0419 -0.0123 -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0737 0.0405 -0.2040 -0.0407 -0.0637 1.0000 
Data source: LCBO (2013) 
Note: PEC = Prince Edward County 
          LENS = Lake Erie North Shore 119
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
Private Incentives to Adopt the International Barcode of Life Technology for 
Fish Species Authentication 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The paper examines an emerging authenticity technology, the International Barcode of Life 
(IBOL) and the incentives for its adoption in fish (seafood) supply chains in Canada by the private 
sector. The focus on fish is a strategic choice. Fish is an important source of protein and consumed 
in large quantities globally. Results of some studies (e.g. Pepe et al., 2007; Schwartz, 2008; Bertoja 
et al., 2009; Miller and Mariani, 2010), in different countries show that mislabelling and 
substitution in fish supply chains have been on the increase relative to other products, therefore 
leading to calls for assurances of authenticity and quality verification. In Canada and other 
developed economies, seafood fraud has become a significant problem (Hanner et al., 2011).  
According to the Canadian Centre for DNA Barcoding (n.d),78 Canada has about a $3.9 billion 
seafood export market while Canadian fisheries contributed about $1.7 billion to Canadian GDP 
in 2009.  
 
According to DFO (2011), Canada is the 8th largest exporter of fish and seafood products in the 
world, and it exports about 85 percent of its fish and seafood production to more than 130 countries 
(AAFC, 2011). In the last three years, Canada imported on average 517.1 million kilograms of fish 
products worth about $2.79 billion (DFO, 2013). Canada therefore makes a significant contribution 
to global fish and seafood markets, and with the increase in Canadian seafood imports and 
domestic consumption, there is the potential for increased fraud for economic gain.  
 
The economic gains accruing to sellers of genuine products have given some producers and other 
members of agri-food supply chains an economic incentive to cheat consumers by misrepresenting 
their own products and substituting substandard products for legitimate items. Producers and 
sellers of legitimate (quality) products incur losses while consumers pay a premium for low quality 
                                                          
78www.ccdb.ca 
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products as they cannot ascertain quality ex ante to purchases or presumably even ex post in some 
cases (e.g. fish species). Alternatively, they incur transaction (search) costs in the process of 
seeking information about a product’s true quality.  
 
The increasing spate of publicized cases of substitution and mislabelling in fish markets implicitly 
suggests that the existing testing system has not been credible. For example, survey results from 
Wong and Hanner (2008) show that 25 percent (23 out of 91) of fish species sampled domestically 
in Canada and U.S. were mislabelled. In addition, a CBC market place report (2010) indicated that 
23 percent of 153 fish species sampled across Canada were mislabelled.79 These problems have 
prompted firms to invest in developing traceability and authenticity technologies to create and 
exploit market niches for verifiable authenticity assurances (Kemp, 1994) as well as protect their 
reputations, while some consumers and the organizations that represent them are seeking some 
form of authenticity assurances for products traded in local markets, including those that arrive as 
a result of international trade.  
 
Authenticity in the context of this paper relates to the capacity to verify and certify the genuineness 
of a food product and all the claims made by the producer and/or seller concerning the product. In 
other words, verifying the authenticity of a food product involves uncovering fraudulent activities, 
including: substitution, mislabelling, adulteration, etc. Food fraud according to Spink and Moyer 
(2011, p. 158) refers to “the deliberate and  intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or 
misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging; or false or misleading statements 
made about a product, for economic gain.” These illicit activities introduce a market failure and 
create a lemons problem but sometimes the cost of regulatory intervention to address the problem 
may outweigh the benefits, especially when it does not result in any food safety concern.  
 
Although it is not always the case, substitution and mislabelling in fish markets can create a food 
safety risk. An example is the consumption of toxic “puffer fish” mislabelled as “monk fish” in 
the United States in which many people became sick after consuming the product in 2007 
(Leschin-Hoar, 2011). A consumer who is allergic to salmon and eats a fish labelled as trout when 
                                                          
79 http://www.cbc.ca/news/mislabelling-means-rare-fish-sold-marketplace-1.919822 
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it is actually salmon will potentially have health problems. In seafood markets, a species may be 
correctly labelled but the seller may intentionally fail to provide information on the credence 
attribute (wild or farmed). Fish authentication processes may assist in reducing market failures, 
fraud, health risks and unfair market competition between genuine and fraudulent producer/sellers. 
These challenges, therefore, may motivate the uptake of authenticity technologies, such as the 
International Barcode of Life (IBOL) by some retailers, firms or an industry to authenticate their 
fish supplies in order to gain consumers’ confidence and protect their individual and collective 
reputations; or alternatively by a third party such as an environmental or consumer group as a 
means to verify quality claims and authenticity at either the point of sale (e.g. retail level) or at 
other stages along fish supply chains. Third party verification of quality claims using the 
technology potentially would affect the retailer’s incentive to adopt the technology to avoid being 
caught, and also could serve as a disincentive to cheat and mislabel. This potentially would address 
any lemons problems that exist and which would result in low quality products chasing out quality 
products from the market (adverse selection).  
 
IBOL technology is an emerging molecular-based authenticity technology that uses genetic 
markers to identify plants and animal species through DNA sequencing (Hebert et al. 2003). In 
the IBOL system, DNA is extracted from the standard part of the genome of a tissue sample taken 
from a specimen to be identified. The barcode region of the DNA is amplified to generate a 
barcode, which is used to match and/or compare with sequenced reference barcodes in the database 
for correct identification (Floyd et al. 2010).  
 
The key research questions examined in this paper are as follows: what are the potential incentives 
for private sector firms (e.g. retailers) or third parties to adopt IBOL technology for fish 
authentication in Canada? Is IBOL technology feasible for a typical fish retail store? IBOL could 
be a more effective alternative in fish species authentication than simple visual (morphological) 
inspection, and could potentially help in protecting the reputation and integrity of fish supply 
chains while leading to market prices being a closer reflection of a product’s quality attributes with 
respect to origin or species. Some key players along the fish supply chain (suppliers, processors 
and retailers) have an incentive to cheat through mislabelling of fish species if price premiums 
exist. In this situation some third parties and “honest” retailers may have an incentive to adopt the 
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technology for supply chain monitoring and for the protection of their individual reputation, 
respectively. The paper therefore, models fraud in fish markets within a domestic supply chain 
context and focuses on adoption of the technology by a third party and potentially by some fish 
retailers. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines the existing systems of food product 
authentication with examples of authenticity issues in Canada. Sections 3 looks at the incidence of 
fish species substitution in fish markets and examines the potential incentives for IBOL technology 
adoption along the fish supply chain using a vertical market structure model. Incentives to adopt 
IBOL technology are modelled formally in section 4. Section 5 discusses the potential for the 
IBOL technology to be commercialized, while section 6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Existing Systems of Authentication and Problems Arising from Authenticity Issues in       
Canada 
Ensuring the authenticity and safety of food in Canada is the shared responsibility of Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada and Health Canada. The department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is 
responsible for fisheries management. While the establishment of policies and standards for food 
safety and quality is the responsibility of Health Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
(CFIA) implements federal legislation concerning food inspection. The legislation covering fish 
products includes: the Fish Inspection Act, Fish Inspection Regulations, and the Consumer 
Packaging and Labelling Act.80 In Canada, only licensed importers are allowed to import fish and 
fish products, which must meet the set national standards and requirements.  
 
A portion of the fish consumed in Canada is imported by wholesalers while the remainder comes 
from domestic supplies (both wild caught and farmed). The CFIA grants fish importers the 
opportunity of taking part in the inspection of their imported products through a programme known 
as “Quality Management Programme for Importers (QMPI)”. An importer operating under this 
programme is allowed to establish his quality management system with a well-functioning 
                                                          
80http://inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/acts-and-regulations/eng/1299846777345/1299847442232 
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laboratory, which must be inspected and accredited by the CFIA to ensure that all microbiological 
and chemical analyses conducted by the CFIA can be done in the laboratory. At the point of entry, 
the CFIA takes samples of fish products for inspection from different consignments. The 
inspection rate varies from 2 to 100 percent, and this depends on a number of factors, including: 
perceived risk associated with the product, existence of prior inspection and control for the product 
in the exporting country, compliance history of the product and the exporter,81 and the existence 
of a quality management system used by the importer (Ababouch et al. 2005).  
 
Aside from other tests, specific authenticity tests carried out on randomly sampled fish products 
include: bacteriological tests, species identification, composition and chemical analyses. However, 
as of a decade ago, the results of a study carried out by the Fisheries and Aquaculture Department 
of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Ababouch et al. 2005) suggest that potentially 
proper identification of substituted fish species at the Canadian borders (based on table 4.1) has 
not been achieved using the existing system. Presumably, this may be the case for fish fillets and 
fish products without the head as the public testing system for identification was mainly done using 
physical morphological features.  
 
Table 4.1 shows the number of rejections for all fish imports (shipments) at the Canadian border 
between 1999 and 2002. It also shows the tests carried out for fish products imported from different 
countries at the border. Of the entire tests, authenticity issues in the context of this study are mainly 
concerned with “safety parameters” and “species identification”. Comparing this data (Table 4.1) 
with the total volume of fish imported to Canada from different countries within the period, the 
total border rejection rate was about 0.06% (430 out of 745,383 number of shipments82) of total 
fish imports.  
 
                                                          
81Exporters and/or processors with a good history of compliance receive less inspection. Products that do not meet the 
Canadian requirements will be refused and in some cases destroyed. Acceptance of inspection and control carried out 
in the exporting country by the CFIA depends on whether the control authority is recognized by CFIA under a special 
agreement (CFIA, 2009). 
 
82Total fish imports was calculated using data on page 46 (table 43) in Ababouch et al. (2005). 
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Table 4.1: Border cases involving fish in Canada from exporting regions (1999 - 2002) 
Risk/Test Africa Asia EU1 Europe 
(Non EU) 
North 
America 
C and S2 
America 
Oceania 
Sensory evaluation83 16 74 12 35 3 53 7 
Net weight 7 48 33 11 2 14 4 
Can integrity 13 11 25 24 2 5 3 
Moisture 0 3 1 0 4 4 0 
Safety parameters 0 8 2 0 0 0 0 
Missing Canadian code 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Commercial sterility 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Species identification 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Source: Ababouch, Gandini and Ryder (2005). 
1European Union 
2Central and South 
 
The data shows that some consignments from Asia failed the safety parameters test while only a 
single case was identified for specie substitution and mislabelling in a consignment from central 
and South America. This leaves an open question: is species substitution in fish imports relatively 
rare or were testing and inspection protocols insufficient to detect most cases during the time 
period presented in table 4.1? 
 
In Canada, a study shows that out of 450 border rejections involving fish and seafood products 
between 1999 and 2002, 298 or 66.2 percent of cases involve fish (Ababouch et al. 2005). The 
distribution of those border cases by species is shown in figure 4.1. Comparing the number of 
border cases and total annual imports for each specie group, data (Ababouch et al. 2005, p.51) 
show that about 0.03 percent (i.e. 69 out 243,415; 61 out of 245,765; and 66 out of 256,203 for 
1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively) of total number of shipments had border cases related to 
authenticity issues. 
  
 
 
                                                          
83 This involves determining the freshness of the fish. This is usually carried out on the whole fish. 
 
 126 
 
      
Figure 4.1: Border cases in Canada by seafood species groups 
Source: Data from CFIA in Ababouch et al.  (2005, p.49) 
 
For shrimp, 0.03, 0.009 and 0.02 percent of total imports for each of the years had border rejections 
related to authenticity; while 0.13, 0.06, and 0.06 percent of total bivalves imports had issues at 
the border. Other specie groups, on average, had about 0.02 percent of total annual imports 
withheld at the border. The result further shows that border rejections for seafood products during 
the period are relatively small, suggesting that most imports are presumably good. Potentially, it 
could be that the tests fail to catch or identify incidences of substitutions and mislabelling.  
 
Looking at authenticity within the domestic fish supply chain in Canada, apparently there is no 
official data presently showing the number of cases of authenticity issues in fish markets. 
Domestically, authenticity issues concerning fish products are detected mainly at the borders, 
particularly for imported fish.  However, fish sourced locally are not free from substitution and 
mislabelling. Hence, detection of fraudulent activities requires proper monitoring of both imported 
and locally sourced fish products.  
 
The inability to detect fraudulent activities at the Canadian borders in previous years could be as 
a result of the use of the “traditional morphology-based identification” method (Wong and Hanner, 
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2008; p. 1) by the regulatory agencies, such as CFIA. This identification method cannot be used 
for processed fish products or different species with similar morphological features. However, 
recent application of emerging technologies in fish product authentication within  domestic 
markets has helped to uncover some unethical activities (species substitution and mislabelling) as 
evidenced in several survey results (e.g. Wong and Hanner, 2008; Hanner et al. 2011). For 
example, the survey results of Wong and Hanner (2008) show that of the 91 fish and seafood 
muscle tissue samples obtained from “commercial markets and restaurants” in Canada and the 
U.S. and sequenced, 25 percent (23) were mislabelled. In addition, the results of a survey by 
Hanner et al. (2011) indicate that 41 percent (97) of the 236 seafood samples procured by five 
media establishments from retail stores in “five metropolitan areas” in Canada were mislabelled. 
These tests were carried out at the IBOL laboratory of the University of Guelph. 
 
Further discussion of incidence analysis of fish species substation is provided in the next section. 
Complementing the traditional physical identification method with technological techniques 
would make fish species identification easier, both within the domestic supply chain and at the 
borders. The occurrence of these illegitimate activities in fish markets is shown in the next section. 
 
4.3. Incidence Analysis and Incentives to Adopt IBOL Technology 
In this section, incidence (fraud) analysis in fish markets is examined using insights from Akerlof’s 
Market for Lemons contribution, and the potential private incentives to adopt IBOL technology 
are modelled. The Akerlof lemons problem is described in figure 4.3 in the context of fish 
substitution and mislabelling. 
 
There is no comprehensive assessment study for all fish species so far in the literature that 
examines the levels of fish species substitution and mislabelling in the market. Most studies  
(e.g. Wong and Hanner, 2008; Hanner et al. 2011) involve sampling of species in retail outlets. 
With the increasing complexity of seafood supply chains globally, it has been difficult to precisely 
identify the stage along the supply chain where mislabelling and substitution occurs (Warner et al. 
2013). One of the surveys involving fish species substitution and mislabelling with wide coverage 
is that of Warner et al. (2013). In this study, 1247 seafood samples were purchased by staff and 
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supporters of OCEANA84 between 2010 and 2012 from 674 retail outlets comprising “restaurants, 
Sushi venues, grocery stores and seafood markets” (p.4) in selected cities of 21 states in the United 
States. Fish samples purchased include mostly species that have been found to be mislabelled in 
previous studies by different scholars, as well of species with a high market value. The DNA test 
results show that snapper and tuna are frequently mislabelled (see Figure 4.2) (Warner et al. 2013).  
 
         
 
 
The result of the study by Warner et al. (2013) shows that out of 120 samples of “red snapper” 
collected and tested, about 93 percent were mislabelled. Different species of snapper were 
substituted for higher valued red-snapper for economic reasons. The results of Warner et al. (2013) 
further show that about 20 percent of mislabelled cases involve substitution of different species of 
snapper for red snapper, while more than 75 percent involve other species outside the snapper 
family, especially tilapia and rocket fish.  
 
For tuna, 53 percent (67 out of 114 samples) of the samples were mislabelled. The highest number 
of mislabelling cases was found in samples purchased from Sushi restaurants while those from 
grocery stores were somewhat lower (Warner et al. 2013).  
 
                                                          
84
 Oceana is an international organization engaged in ocean conservation with offices in the U.S., Europe, Chile and 
Belize (http://oceana.org/en/canada/about-us/what-we-do)  
Source: Warner et al. (2013, p.7) 
Figure 4. 2: Mislabelling of fish species in the United States 
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Cline (2012), in a recent study on marketplace fish species substitution in Washington State, found 
that farmed Atlantic salmon are being mislabelled as wild Pacific salmon. The result of the study 
shows that out of 99 samples of salmon collected at retail outlets (grocery stores and restaurants) 
in Western Washington of United States, 11 percent were Atlantic salmon mislabelled and sold as 
Pacific salmon, which have a higher market value. Atlantic and Pacific salmon are two different 
species. However, there are six closely related species of wild Pacific salmon including: coho, 
Chinook, pink, sockeye, chum and Japanese cherry (Cline, 2012). According to FAO (2004), more 
than 90 percent of Atlantic salmon is farmed while only two species of Pacific salmon (coho and 
chinook) are farmed, usually on a small scale (Cline, 2012). 
 
Canada is the 4th largest producer of farmed salmon and contributes 8.2% in global production 
(CAIA, 2012). Figure 4.3 illustrates the effect of mislabelled farmed salmon entering the market 
for wild salmon. This creates a market failure due to Akerlof’s lemons problem, which could 
motivate the adoption of authenticity technologies. 
 
Salmon could be wild-caught or farm-raised. As mentioned earlier, most farmed salmon are 
Atlantic while wild-caught is mainly Pacific. These are two different species with similar 
morphological features but which differ in quality. Quality in this context is reflected in a 
difference in market prices for wild-caught Pacific and farm-raised Atlantic salmon. The wild-
caught salmon is assumed to be of high quality and commands a higher price due to the following 
reasons: some consumers prefer the taste of wild-caught salmon, it is relatively scarce (fresh caught 
is usually available between the months of May and September after which all supplies are frozen); 
while farm-raised salmon are readily available and some consumers are concerned about the issues 
of chemical contaminants and antibiotics (Beattie and Barnes, n.d). 
 
Assume there are two suppliers of wild-caught Pacific salmon in a fish market, one supplies 
correctly labelled wild-caught Pacific salmon and the other supplies farm-raised Atlantic salmon 
mislabelled as wild-caught Pacific salmon. Also assume that consumers cannot differentiate 
between wild-caught and farm-raised salmon prior to purchase. Two scenarios from a supply and 
demand perspective could be used to illustrate what is going on in this market and are presented 
in Figure 4.3. 
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SH and SLM show supply curves for wild-caught and farm-raised but mislabelled Atlantic salmon 
products respectively, while SM and DM are the total market supply (horizontal summation of SH 
and SLM) and demand curves. Implicit in this model is the assumption that wild-caught Pacific 
salmon is superior to farm-raised salmon. 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At price (PM), there is no form of substitution or mislabelling and therefore, only wild-caught 
Pacific salmon is supplied and sold in the market. The intersection of the market supply (SH) and 
demand (DM) curves at ‘E1’ gives the market equilibrium price (PM) and quantity (QM). At this 
price, the supplier’s surplus is area ‘a+b+c+d’. The high price for wild-caught Pacific salmon 
serves as an economic incentive to introduce mislabelled farmed Atlantic salmon by a supplier in 
order to make more profit. This increases total market supply of wild and farmed salmon to QM’ at 
the intersection of the total market supply and demand curves, SM, DM, and all other things being 
equal reduces the market price to PM’. At this price (PM’) it is assumed that consumers cannot 
differentiate both products and hence pay the same price for wild and farm-raised salmon 
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Figure 4.3: Effect of mislabelled farmed salmon entering the market for wild salmon 
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respectively. With the decrease in price, the wild salmon supplier loses area ‘a+b’ while his 
counterpart gains area ‘c+d+e+f+g+h+i+j’ given their different cost structures.  
 
If for any reason consumers are being alerted (possibly through the media) about the existence of 
farm-raised Atlantic salmon in the market, which are sold at the same price per kilogram as wild 
Pacific salmon, market demand by consumers would potentially reduce from DM to DM’ and 
quantity falls from QM’ to QM’’ as quality is no longer guaranteed. This, all other things being equal, 
would further lower market price to PM’’ and, thereby, reduce quantities sold and profits for both 
sellers. In addition, this creates a loss in consumer surplus (CS) due to an “adverse quality effect”, 
as shown in Figure 4.3, and the suppliers’ surpluses reduce to areas ‘d’ and ‘d+e+f+h’ 
respectively. If demand continues to decline and market price drops to point ‘A’, the honest wild 
Pacific salmon supplier would exit the market leaving only the lemons. These price effects 
demonstrate Akerlof’s lemons problem and shows the incidence of cost on wild salmon suppliers. 
The cost effect serves as an incentive for the wild salmon supplier to pay for third party 
certification of authenticity, for example through the use of a fish species identification technology. 
The amount to spend in adopting the technology would depend on the net effects of market fraud 
on the entire supply chain and gains from the technology. 
 
The increasing reports of fraud in fish supply chains have posed several challenges to genuine fish 
sellers including: reputation building and protection, gain in consumers’ confidence, and trust. 
Fear of reputation loss, avoidance of downward (leftward) shift in a product’s demand curve 
(Ropicki et al. 2010) and loss in consumers’ confidence are potential incentives for some retailers, 
firms or industries to adopt authenticity technologies. For example, the 2013 incidents involving 
substitution of horse, pork, donkey, water buffalo and goat meat for beef in Europe and South 
Africa have prompted many retailers to engage in the use of DNA-based techniques to ascertain 
the authenticity of meat products supplied to them by distributors. Some food distributors (e.g. 
Findus and Comigel in France, and H.J. Schypke based in Germany) whose products tested 
positive for horse meat, and retail outlets supplied with these products, suffered damaged 
reputations as a result of a loss in consumers’ confidence and reduced trust for their products, at 
least in the short run (Durden, 2013).  
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In principle, a retailer’s decision (e.g. in Canada) to adopt a fish authentication technology such as 
IBOL (explained below) would lie mainly on private (internal to the retailer) market-based 
incentives (e.g. price premium, bolstered consumer confidence and reputation), while a third 
party’s adoption decision may be driven by broader public (including regulatory) motivations. For 
the retailer, according to Jayasinghe-Mudalige and Henson (2007), the potential impacts these 
incentives would have on an adopting retailer will depend on the retailer’s scale of operation. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that a retailer would voluntarily adopt an authenticity technology for 
fish authentication under the following conditions: 
• if the retailer would use the technology to check the authenticity of fish supplied by 
upstream suppliers and therefore as a deterrent against cheating by suppliers (Segerson, 
1999); 
• the difference between the perceived market benefits (e.g. premium, market share) and the 
associated costs of adopting the technology is high enough to warrant such investment 
(Henson and Heasman, 1998).  For example, if the cost of adopting the technology is very 
high, retailers (especially small scale retailers) might not go for the technology;  
• if it is easy to trace the origin/source of the fraud and the defaulting retailer is strictly 
responsible for any costs imposed (spillover) on other retailers in the fish industry for 
damaging their reputation (Segerson, 1999). In this case, individual retailers would 
consider adopting the technology to protect their reputations and that of the industry; and 
• compliance with existing government regulation to access international markets. For 
example, a large Canadian fish distributing firm that supplies fish to a processing firm in 
the U.S. where DNA barcoding technology is already in use for fish authentication. If the 
supply contract strictly indicates that every fish supplied must undergo an authenticity test, 
this could be an incentive for the distributor to adopt the technology and use it to test the 
fish supplied to him by fishermen or wholesalers in Canada. 
 
A description of the IBOL technology and the trend in the cost of DNA sequencing are presented 
in the next section. 
  
 133 
 
4.3.1 The IBOL technology  
The application of DNA barcoding in species identification started in 2003 by a group of scientists 
led by Paul Hebert of the Biodiversity Institute of Ontario, University of Guelph.85 The specimens 
of the first set of species identified by the research group were collected from the zoo, museums, 
field, seed banks, among others.86 The project has expanded and involves many scientists across 
the world. 
 
The IBOL technology uses DNA sequencing and barcode in species identification. DNA barcode 
is “a short gene sequence used to identify species taken from a standard position in the genome” 
(Yancy, 2007, slide no.4). The first step in the IBOL process involves extraction of a tissue sample 
from the specimen of a specie to be identified. A high resolution photograph of the specimen is 
taken for record keeping in the reference library (database) followed by recording of the 
specimen’s taxonomy information. The DNA is extracted from the gene region of the tissue sample 
and the barcode region (COI) amplified using the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). The DNA 
sequencer is then used to generate a barcode, which is used to compare the barcodes of species 
already identified and stored in the reference library for appropriate identification (Floyd et al. 
2010). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the cost of DNA-based technologies relative to existing methods of 
establishing authenticity is an important factor that affects adoption of the IBOL technology. 
However, statistics have shown that the cost of DNA sequencing is rapidly reducing overtime. 
Figures 4.4 (a) and (b) show the trend in the cost of DNA sequencing from 2001 to 2014 (see 
appendix 4.I for a summary table). 
  
                                                          
85
 http://ibol.org/about-us/what-is-dna-barcoding/ 
86
 ibid 
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(a)  
                
 
(b) 
               
Figure 4.4: Trend in the cost of DNA sequencing 
Data Source: Wetterstrand (2014) 
 
The “cost per megabase” (million base pairs) shows all costs that are associated with generating 
one megabase of quality raw DNA sequence, while “cost per genome” is the cost of sequencing a 
“human-sized genome” (Wetterstrand, 2014). Figures 4.4 (a) and (b) show a sharp decline in the 
cost of DNA sequencing starting in 2007 with the inception of second generation sequencing 
technologies (i.e. from $800 per raw megabase in 2007 to about 4 cents in January 2014, and from 
$10m per genome to about $4,008 during the same period). The trend suggests that the cost of 
DNA sequencing would continually decrease as years go by. According to Wetterstrand (2014), 
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these technologies are faster, automated, more precise with a high degree of accuracy, and can 
concurrently undertake thousands/millions of genes sequencing. 
 
In the case of fish products, usually samples for authentication can be selected from commercial 
markets (e.g. retail stores) or from consignments at the borders for imports. The trends in figures 
4.4 (a) and (b) show that costs of testing are relatively low. If for example, a retailer who wants to 
protect his reputation adopts the technology along the fish supply chain, how would the benefits 
from the technology be distributed given the cost of adoption? Obviously, participants that benefit 
from the status quo would lose. This is shown in the next section. 
 
4.3.2 Distribution of Potential Welfare Benefits from Adoption of International Barcode of 
Life (IBOL) Technology in Fish and Seafood Authentication 
Consumers’ increasing demand for authenticity implicitly suggests an increased willingness to pay 
for genuine quality products. Some studies have shown that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for wild-caught fish (e.g. O’Dierno et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2012).  
 
A fish supply chain refers to a network of interdependent fish producers (suppliers), processors, 
distributors, transporters, wholesalers, retailers and food services who are involved in the 
production, processing and delivering of fish products to consumers (UNEP, 2009). For the 
purposes of this analysis, in Canada the domestic fish supply chain comprises fishermen/fish 
farmers (producers), processors, wholesalers and retailers. Fishermen supply their captured fish to 
processors who sell their processed fish products to wholesalers (distributors). The wholesalers 
store and transport the fish and sell to retailers, food service establishments and restaurants. The 
retailers through their outlets (supermarkets) finally sell to consumers, as do restaurants. 
Sometimes, the processors sell directly to retailers, restaurants and food service establishments. 
 
In this section, the potential stage along the fish supply chain at which the IBOL technology could 
be adopted and the incentives to adopt the technology are modelled under an autarky situation. 
Assume that Canada is in autarky for fish products. Here, we look at the vertical fish supply chain 
comprised of the fish producers/sellers/suppliers, the processors and the retailers.  
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The idea is to examine the incentives for technology adoption and determine at what point along 
the fish supply chain in Canada the IBOL technology may be adopted and how the potential 
welfare benefits are distributed. To determine the size and distribution of potential social benefits 
associated with IBOL technology adoption, the following assumptions are made: 
a) IBOL technology provides benefits to consumers by verifying the authenticity of the food 
products they consume; 
b) Since the functional forms are not known, we assume linear supply and demand curves and 
a parallel shift (upwards due to increased cost) in a Canadian retailer’s supply curve 
resulting from technology adoption;87 
c) The price change at each level of the supply chain reflects costs of technology adoption 
and other associated costs; and 
d) The nature of the stylized fish supply chain examined potentially determines the level of 
transparency within the supply chain. For example, it is assumed that a supply chain that 
has a short distance between the fish producers and consumers presumably would be more 
transparent or easier to monitor by a third party (UNEP, 2009) 
 
Looking at the incidence analysis from the perspective of substitution and mislabelling, the costs 
of these fraudulent activities are not equally distributed among the key players along the fish 
supply chain. While some fish producers/suppliers may benefit from the status quo (e.g. 
substitution of low for high valued species, particularly when fish are supplied without the head, 
(which is the major part of the body used for physical identification), the processors and 
particularly retailers may lose through damage to their reputation, loss of consumers’ trust and/or 
confidence if such activities are identified by enforcement authorities or third parties.   
 
On the other hand, mislabelling may also occur at the processor and retailer levels, although there 
may be some honest processors and retailers who would be willing to adopt authenticity 
                                                          
87Alston and Wohlgenant (1990) show that when there is a parallel shift in a supply curve due to technology adoption, 
the choice of functional form basically has little or no effect on the magnitude and distribution of social welfare 
benefits. In addition, studies (e.g. Voon and Edwards, 1991; Mills, 1998) contend that when the functional forms of 
demand and supply are not known, linear functions can be used as approximations. 
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technologies to prove that their fish are not mislabelled, protect their reputations against cheating 
elsewhere in the supply chain by other retailers (causing damage to collective reputation).  
 
Drawing from the horse meat scandal in Europe that led to questions concerning the integrity and 
credibility of meat supply chains, the incentive to adopt authenticity technologies along the fish 
supply chain presumably would be high at the retail level. This is because retailers deal directly 
with consumers and most retailers would want to protect their reputations, and gain consumers’ 
trust and confidence by ensuring that the quality claims of all the products supplied to them are 
verified. 
 
Third parties (e.g. consumer or environmental associations or the regulator) may also have an 
incentive to adopt IBOL technology for monitoring to guard against cheating at various stages 
within the supply chain (including at the retail level). It is usually difficult to physically distinguish 
fish products in processed (e.g. fillets) forms. Therefore, who gains and/or loses would inform who 
might have an interest in seeing IBOL technology adopted.  
 
Figure 4.5 shows the model for IBOL technology adoption in the stylized fish supply chain in an 
autarky condition in Canada. At every stage of the supply chain, D and S (without IBOL) represent 
the demand and supply curves prior to technology adoption; while D’ and S’ (with IBOL) 
respectively represent post technology adoption demand and supply curves. Although species 
substitution is a possibility at all stages of the supply chain, the probability of its occurrence would 
be highest at the producer/supplier level. This would particularly be the case for beheaded fish 
species with the same morphological structure. Therefore, the size and direction of the demand 
shift at each level is contingent on the probability of detecting cheating (use of authenticity 
technology). 
 
Given the increasing spate of widely publicized cases of fraud in fish markets and other food 
supply chains; and the challenge of reputation building, protection, and gaining consumers’ trust, 
a fish retailer potentially would adopt the IBOL technology to test the authenticity of fish provided 
by the fish supplier and/or distributor in order to ensure quality and protect his reputation. If the 
test result shows a high level of misrepresentation or species substitution, the retailer may cease 
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sourcing products from the fish supplier. Thus, the fish supplier will lose market share and incur 
costs, especially if there exist penalties for cheating, such as withdrawal of licenses; high storage  
and inventory costs, and search and negotiation costs to establish a new business relationship with 
another retailer. 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that there is potential for cheating at every stage along the fish 
supply chain. At the processor and retailer levels, the market equilibrium price and quantity are q0 
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and P0 respectively resulting from the intersection of demand and supply curves in the absence of 
IBOL.88 Adoption of IBOL would raise retailer’s costs and increases consumers’ confidence, 
reduce quality uncertainty and will potentially increase demand for fish and therefore, revenues. 
The increase in demand, combined with the increase in costs, all other things being equal, will lead 
to a price increase (from P0 to P1). The intersection of the new demand and supply curves results 
in new equilibrium price (P1) and quantity (q1). Holding other factors constant, an increase in price 
would result in a loss in consumer surplus and a gain to fish processors and retailers. The size of 
the gains and losses depend on the sizes of the demand and supply shifts and the elasticities. 
However, it is assumed that the retailer would have the incentive to adopt the technology only if 
the size of the demand shift is bigger than the change in marginal costs. It would be a disincentive 
to adopt the technology by a retailer if the change in marginal costs driven by technology adoption 
outweighs the change in demand resulting from fish authentication. The adoption cost at the retail 
level would be built into the retail price. 
 
Considering the processor level, the retailer would adopt an authenticity technology to test the fish 
supplied by the processor as cheating could occur at both the processor and supplier levels of the 
supply chain. Thus, adoption of an authenticity technology by the retailer to test the fish supplied 
by the processor would serve as an incentive for the processor to avoid cheating (substitution and 
mislabelling), and possibly drive his decision to pay for the technology and use it to test fish 
supplied by the producer in order to protect his reputation, gain confidence and maintain a good 
business relationship with the retailer. In addition, if the processor, through testing, discovers some 
form of misrepresentation (species substitution) by the fish producer/supplier, the processor would 
lose confidence in the supplier and may cease sourcing fish from him. 
 
At the producer level, D and S respectively represents demand and supply curves prior to 
technology adoption.  While D’ shows an increase in demand for fish by the processor when fish 
supplied by the producer are truthfully declared, D’’ represents a fall in demand for fish by the 
processor if he discovers that fish (or some) supplied by the producer are misrepresented, assuming 
                                                          
88The demand curve D shows the demand for non-tested (unauthenticated) fish while D’ (after IBOL)” is the demand 
curve for confirmed (authenticated) fish. 
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the technology is effective in detecting cheating. Authenticity technology adoption may not be 
feasible at the fish producer level, and therefore, the fish producer will not incur any adoption 
costs. This is because the fish supplier is at the upstream of the supply chain. However, at every 
level of the supply chain, the key player’s individual reputation is considered very important. 
Hence, every player is always careful in order not to lose his reputation and consumer confidence. 
 
Overall, a threat of third party testing/monitoring of the fish supply chain with the IBOL 
technology would be an additional motivation for retailers and processors to adopt the technology. 
Potentially, this would enhance the credibility and integrity of the fish supply chain.  
 
It is assumed that authentication creates confidence and quality assurance and, therefore, 
potentially increases demand and market price. Although an increase in price reduces consumer 
surplus, quality assurance from authenticity would potentially increase demand for fish. However, 
a gain in consumer surplus would depend on which effect is larger, the loss in surplus from the 
price increase or the gain in surplus from the quality effect. In other words, it introduces an adverse 
price effect but at the gain of reducing/eliminating the adverse quality effect. If the size of the 
demand shift outweighs adoption costs, the retailers would benefit. However, the actual size of the 
net benefits (consumer and producer surpluses) depend on the relative sizes of supply and demand 
shifts as well as elasticities. Thus, it is more of a computable problem than a theoretically derived 
result. The fish supply chain model (figure 4.5) will be used in developing a framework for 
modelling private incentives to adopt the technology in the next section if IBOL can easily detect 
fraud with a high level of accuracy. 
 
4.4 Modelling Incentives to Adopt IBOL Technology for Fish Authentication 
At every stage of the fish supply chain, participants are assumed to strive to maximize economic 
profits. As mentioned earlier, a processor or retailer would be incentivized to adopt the IBOL 
authentication technology if the private market benefits are greater than the associated costs, and 
also to protect their reputations given the expectation of illegitimate activities going on in fish 
markets. This implies that a retailer would be willing to adopt the technology if it will generate 
higher profits (i.e. the cost of adoption has to be compensated by a higher price and revenue). 
Alternatively, the expected net payoff has to be larger than the alternative of not adopting the 
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technology. It is therefore expected that the retailer would set a price mark-up which reflects the 
cost of adoption. Fish authentication could be seen as a form of value addition and product 
differentiation, which is expected to yield economic rent, at least in the short run. 
 
Assume the retailer is in a competitive market; his total revenue (TR) after selling a particular 
quantity (q) of fish at a market price (P) is given by 
																																																												4A
 = A
. &																																																																										4.1
				 
Assume also that the total economic cost incurred by the retailer is represented by TC, and is 
comprised of variable (C) and fixed costs (F). i.e. 
																																																											0 = 0 + J																																																																														4.2
 
We look at the adoption decision from two perspectives, with and without IBOL. 
The profit maximizing functions of the fish retailer, with and without IBOL are specified as 
follows: 
																																									maxD 	d_ = .& − 0& − J																																																																					4.3
 
																																					maxD, 	d_ =  + 
& − 0 + 
& − J − l																																4.4
 
Where superscripts WI and I represent without and with IBOL respectively. 
 = 1, V	  
 = 0, V	,	  
k = Price premium for IBOL authenticated fish 
 = Variable costs associated with IBOL 
, & =Market price and quantity of fish sold 
J =Fixed costs89 without the IBOL system 
0 =Variable costs without IBOL system 
l =Fixed costs of IBOL independent of the number of fish tested. That is the investment required 
to switch to the IBOL system (e.g. equipment procurement, staff training, advertisement for the 
use of the technology to consumers, etc.) 
                                                          
89
 This does not enter the decision whether to adopt. 
 Parameter indicating adoption or non-adoption cases 
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The change in profit resulting from technology adoption is given by (4.4) – (4.3). That is  
																																															∆d =  − 
& − l																																																																										4.5
 
Two important assumptions are made. First, the retailer will objectively adopt the technology 
based on its expected market benefits relative to the costs of adoption and operation without any 
regulatory control from the government. Second, the expected benefits (e.g. revenue) exceed the 
cost of technology adoption. There is need for a certain level of profit to justify investment in the 
authenticity technology. Thus, the incentive to adopt the technology would potentially occur when 
																																								∆d =  − 
& − l ≥ 0																																																																											4.6
 
However, Q is the market size (quantity of fish). If the size of Q is too small relative to Z, this may 
affect the decision to adopt for small, medium and large scale fish retailers. This implies that IBOL 
technology adoption may be affected by the market size of the firm.  
 
The incentive to adopt IBOL technology is modelled under two scenarios. The first (section 4.4.1) 
is adoption by a retailer (honest) to test the fish supplied by upstream suppliers and protect his 
reputation against cheating elsewhere in the supply chain or cheating by other retailers that could 
cause damage to collective reputation. The second scenario (section 4.4.2) is adoption by a third 
party to monitor the supply chain and guard against cheating by retailers and other participants 
along the fish supply chain. 
 
4.4.1 IBOL Technology adoption by a retailer 
The decision to adopt the technology by the retailer could be examined in three stages of 
technology development or evolution.  
 
Stage 1: 
This is assumed to be the stage when the technology is newly developed and relatively costly, 
there will be no adoption due to the high cost of the technology. By assumption, the price of IBOL 
authenticated fish would be less than the average total cost (ATC) of adoption. This is shown in 
figure 4.6 for different market structures of perfect competition and monopoly. In both markets, 
the firm will not cover the cost of adoption at market price P*. 
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In panel (a), the firm’s short-run supply curve is the portion of the marginal cost curve labelled 
‘de’ that lies above the average variable cost curve. In panel (a) market, MR = D (i.e. demand is 
perfectly elastic at price P*). 
 
Stage 2: 
This is the second stage of the technology development where costs start to fall, as shown in figure 
4.4 of section 4.3.1 above. At this stage, although costs start to fall, the private market incentive to 
adopt the technology is insufficient. However, if the technology is deemed to have broader social 
benefits, potentially the public sector might adopt it or subsidize its adoption. Thus, adoption of 
the technology yields zero economic profit at point b in figure 4.7. The slope of the ATC curve is 
equal to the slope of the demand curve at point ‘b’. This is shown in figure 4.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(b) Monopoly (a) Competitive market P($) P($) 
ATC MC 
a MC 
e 
ATC ATC 
Loss AVC 
P* 
a 
d Loss P* MR = D 
D 
MR 
Q (kg) Q (kg) Q* Q* 
 
Figure 4.6: Disincentive to adopt IBOL technology due to initial costs 
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Stage 3: 
Studies in the technology adoption literature have shown that adoption costs typically decrease 
overtime (Smith and Ulu, 2012). At this stage, it is assumed that fish consumers are willing to pay 
premium k* for IBOL authenticated fish (see figure 4.8). The short-run profit (price effect) 
equivalent to area ‘k*abATC’ would serve as an economic incentive for a (large) fish retailer to 
pay for the technology and enjoy the first-mover advantage. That is the private market incentive is 
sufficient to adopt the technology by an early adopter (retailer) who could set his price above 
marginal cost and make economic profit before adoption by other retailers. The profit would attract 
other retailers and incentivize them to adopt the technology. Increased adoption of the technology 
could be a way of gaining consumer trust and assist in collective reputation building for the 
industry as a whole. However, as other retailers adopt the technology, the premium declines and 
will eventually disappear when every retailer adopts the technology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
a 
ATC 
MC 
P* b 
D 
MR 
P 
Q* Q (kg) 
Figure 4.7: Technology adoption when profit is zero 
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P($) 
a MC 
ATC 
a 
k* 
b ATC 
Profit 
D 
e 
Q Q* MR 
Figure 4.8: IBOL technology adoption by a retailer when profit is positive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In modelling the first scenario (adoption of IBOL technology by a retailer), an important factor 
considered here that could shape a retailer’s adoption decision for the technology is the number of 
retailers that adopt the technology and the size of their market shares. 
 
In examining this factor, the following assumptions are made: 
a. Linear demand function; 
b. Retailers sell a homogenous product (salmon) and engage in static Cournot competition; 
c. No barriers to entry and exit from the retail fish market. This implies that a retailer adopts 
the technology when the expected profit is positive and exits when profit is negative; 
d. Market demand for salmon is constant; 
e. Economies of scale for use of the IBOL technology (average cost is greater than the 
marginal cost); and 
f. Retailers have identical cost functions 
 
Assume the market demand function for authenticated salmon is given by: 
																																																												&
 = * − &																																																																					4.7
				 
where,  = price premium for IBOL authenticated fish 
* = the highest amount of premium obtainable in the salmon fish market (choke price) 
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& = quantity (kg) of salmon sold in the market90 
 
Figure 4.9 shows how the price premium (k) is derived. In figure 4.9, D0 and S0 represent market 
demand and supply curves prior to technology adoption. Q
 
is the quantity of authenticated fish 
sold in the market. The intersection of D0 and S0 gives the equilibrium price (Pe) and quantity (Qe). 
Adoption of the technology involves some costs and this causes an upward shift in the supply 
curve. On the other hand, the demand curve shifts to the right as a result of an increase in demand 
for the authenticated fish. Intersection of the new demand and supply curves results in a higher 
equilibrium price and quantity. The difference in price is the premium for authenticated fish. 
 
    
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, we determine the number of retailers that could earn non-negative profits from the adoption 
and use of IBOL technology in fish authentication using Cournot competition. The idea is that the 
technology might support a certain number of retailers beyond which the expected profit from the 
technology would be negative. Assume also that there are N salmon retailers in the market, each 
having the same cost function given as: 
 
																																																						0
 = @ + J																																																																		4.8
 
where, 
 = the quantity of salmon supplied to the market by the ith retailer @ = marginal cost 
                                                          
90
 This gives an idea of the market size for salmon. 
S1 
S0 
Pibol k = Pibol - Pe k 
Pe 
D1 
P 
D0 
Qe Qibol Q 
Figure 4.9: Derivation of premium for IBOL authenticated fish 
 147 
 
J = fixed cost of switching to the IBOL system91 
 
The market demand is given by equation (4.7) where total quantity of fish supplied in the market 
is & = ∑ > . The retail fish market is modelled as a free entry Cournot oligopoly (Cournot, 
1960) to determine the number of retailers the technology could support. The Cournot model is 
chosen because in a Cournot equilibrium, a retailer that first adopts the technology would have the 
incentive (market power) to set his price above marginal cost. This power decreases as other 
retailers switch to the IBOL system with their demand curves shifting inwards (Church and Ware, 
1999, p.239).  
 
Following Cournot (1960), assume retailer i wants to adopt the technology. At equilibrium his best 
response function is determined by equating his marginal revenue to marginal cost. 
   																																															* −  ∑ // − 2 = @																																																																		4.9
 
By selling a homogenous product, the retailers’ Cournot equilibrium quantity of authenticated 
fish sold, denoted by K , will be symmetric. Therefore, equation (4.9) could be written as 
																																										* − K
>

− 2K = @																																																																										4.9*
	 
This implies that: 
																																										* −  − 1
K − 2K = @																																																																	4.9
 
Solving for the equilibrium quantity of authenticated fish sold by each retailer, market quantity, 
price and profit, we have; 
																																												K = * −@ − 1
																																																																																									4.10
 
																																					&K =  ∗ K = * − @
 + 1
 																																																																												4.11
 
																																														K = * + @ + 1 																																																																																										4.12
 
																																						dK = * −@


 + 1
 − JR7																																																																																4.13
 
                                                          
91
 The fixed costs associated with IBOL technology adoption will not affect the equilibrium quantity of authenticated 
fish sold in the market. It will only affect market equilibrium profit. 
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Equations (4.10) and (4.11) respectively show that an increase in the number of retailers adopting 
the IBOL technology will reduce the market share for each retailer and increases total market 
supply. Consequently, market price and profit will decline. Equation (4.13) indicates that a retailer 
would have an economic incentive to adopt the technology if his market profit is greater or at least 
equal to the fixed costs of technology adoption. Therefore, to determine the number of retailers,∗, 
that would potentially adopt and benefit from technology, we have to equate the Cournot 
equilibrium profit to the fixed cost associated with the IBOL system. That is: 
 
 * − @
 + 1
 = JR7	⇒	d = 0	$1+"1@
 
Solving, we have; 
																																																									∗ = 	 * − @JR7 − 1																																																																					4.14
 
 
Profit can be positive or negative. The sign (value) is contingent on the number of retailers (N), 
the magnitude of the fixed costs (F) and elasticity (b) respectively. However, equation (4.14) 
shows that the bigger the slope parameter, b (elasticity), the lower will be the mark-up and, the 
smaller the number of retailers that will earn positive profits from using the technology. That is: 
																																																													∗ = −
* −@
2uJR7
	< 0																																																																			4.14*
 
																																																											 ∗JR7 = −
* −@
2√JR7
u
	< 0																																																																					4.14
 
																																																											∗* =
1
JR7 	> 0																																																																														4.14#
 
 
The technology would yield positive profits up to 			∗8ℎ (equilibrium) number of retailers that 
adopt the technology. Therefore, 	∗ + 1
8ℎ retailer adopts the technology, all the retailers that 
adopt the technology would earn negative profits. This is based on the assumption that the model 
is static and not sequential. 
To show these outcomes empirically and following the method in Church and Ware (1999, p.249) 
using arbitrary numbers and considering equations (4.7) and (4.8), assume the highest premium 
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obtainable from a kilogram of IBOL authenticated fish, a = $8, b = 0.7, m = $1.5 and F = $5; 
table 4.2 shows how an increase in the number of retailers who adopt IBOL technology would 
affect market share and profits (see Appendix 4.III for a detailed calculation). 
 
Table 4.2: Retail profit for IBOL technology adoption as a function of number of retailers 
No. of fish 
retailers (N) 
Market share per 
retailer (
 
Market quantity 
( 
 
Price per fish 
(~
 
Average 
costs (AC) 
Profits 
($) 
1 4.64 4.64 4.75 2.58 10.08 
2 3.10 6.2 3.67 3.11 1.73 
3 2.32 6.96 3.13 3.66 -1.22 
Source: Non-Market data (results based on author’s calculations using arbitrary values) 
 
Results of table 4.2 and figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 respectively show that the first two retailers 
that adopt the technology would earn positive profits in the context of this model. When the third 
retailer adopts the technology, however, all the three retailers would earn negative profit, which 
would serve as a disincentive to adopt the technology. Substituting the values of a, b, m and f in 
equation (4.14), we determine the optimal number of retailers that would earn positive profits from 
the technology as follows: 
			∗ =	 8 − 1.5√0.7 ∗ 5 − 1 = 2.46	 ≈ 2 
 
The equilibrium number of retailers in this case is 2. What happens as retailers adopt the 
technology is graphically shown in figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 respectively. The retailer is assumed 
to be profit maximizing. Assume the first retailer that adopts the technology in the market supplies 
0q1 quantity of authenticated fish and earns a premium equal to k1. The second retailer adopts the  
technology and supplies 0q2 quantity of fish with an increased average costs. The total quantity of 
authenticated fish supplied and sold in the market by retailers 1 and 2 is ‘0q1 + 0q2’. 
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The increase in market supply, assuming market demand and all other factors remain constant, 
reduces the premium from k1 to k2 when the second retailer adopts the technology. The decrease 
in revenue as a result of the lower price would be (k1 – k2)q2. Despite the decrease in revenue, the 
retailers would still make a positive profit. 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
The third retailer would supply only q3 quantity of authenticated fish thereby increasing the total 
market quantity to ‘0q1 + 0q2 + 0q3’ while premium decreases to k3, which would be negative. This 
amount of premium and market share could be a disincentive for switching to the IBOL system. 
The premium will eventually diminish when all the retailers adopt the technology. 
P Retailer # 1 
MC 
k1 ATC 
q1 Q 
D1 
0 MR1 
P 
Retailer # 2 
k1 
ATC1 k2 
MC2 
MC1 
ATC2 
D1 
D2 
q2 q1 0 Q MR2 MR1 
Figure 4.10: Technology adoption by the first retailer 
Figure 4.11: Technology adoption by the second retailer 
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Results of the analysis in this sub-section suggest that as the number of retailers selling 
authenticated fish increases, the market share for each retailer decreases as well as the premium 
for the authenticated fish. 
 
4.4.2 Outcomes of third Party adoption of IBOL technology for supply chain monitoring 
In this section, the outcomes of a third party (e.g. CFIA or an environmental/consumer group) 
incentive to adopt IBOL technology for fish supply chain monitoring are modelled. The fish supply 
chain comprises suppliers/producers, processors/distributors and retailers who (most times) sell 
directly to consumers. A major assumption here is that fish suppliers, processors and retailers have 
an incentive to cheat through substitution and/or mislabelling of species, particularly if price 
premiums exist. This could be an incentive for a third party to adopt the technology for supply 
chain monitoring to catch cheaters given the accuracy of the technology in detecting fraud, and 
possibly impose penalties for fraudulent misrepresentation of products.  
 
The methodological framework used here is drawn from the fish supply chain model (figure 4.5, 
p.138). The analysis is done at the retail level for several reasons. First, the analysis provides a 
P 
Retailer # 3 
ATC1 
k1 
k2 
MC1 
MC3 
MC2 
ATC2 
k3 
D1 
ATC3 
0 q1 q2 q3 
D2 
Q 
MR3 
D3 
MR2 MR1 
Figure 4.12: Technology adoption by the third retailer 
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starting point to model incentives to adopt an authenticity technology by a third party for supply 
chain monitoring. Second, the retailer sells directly to the consumers, and following the incidence 
of substitution of horse meat for beef in processed meat products in Europe, the illegitimate market 
activity was uncovered at the retail level. Hence comparatively the retailer would potentially have 
more incentive to adopt an authenticity technology to protect its reputation against any illicit 
market activity that may occur upstream along the supply chain. Third, focusing on the fish 
producer might entail a different method of analysis and, therefore, could be a potential area to 
consider for future studies. Nevertheless, the results of the analysis at the retail level potentially 
would apply also to processors. 
 
Although different in focus, the analytical approach follows that of Malik (1990), Lear and 
Maxwell (1996) and Popkova (2013). Malik (1990) examines how existing government 
enforcement policy shapes a firm’s compliance with pollution control, while Lear and Maxwell 
(1996) examine a firm’s incentive to comply with environmental regulation. Popkova (2013) 
examines government’s willingness to combat corruption (i.e. how government handles anti-
corruption policies). In this sub-section, we model the potential outcomes of a third party adoption 
of the IBOL technology for supply chain monitoring to catch cheaters, which can be retailers, 
processors or suppliers. 
 
The stylized analytical framework drawn from figure 4.5 (fish supply chain in Canada) is shown 
in figure 4.13. As mentioned earlier, while recognizing that cheating (substitution or mislabelling) 
may occur at any point in the fish supply chain (i.e. by fish suppliers, processors/distributors or 
retailers), it is assumed that the processor or distributor sources fish from a known supplier.  
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Assume a regulator (e.g. CFIA) or a consumer/environmental group carries out periodic random 
tests of retailers’, processors’ and suppliers’ fish stock using the IBOL technology. Following 
figure 4.13, assume a fish processor and/or distributor buys wild and farmed salmon from known 
suppliers. The processor supplies both wild and farmed salmon to the retailer who finally sells to 
the consumers. At every stage along the supply chain, it is assumed that the player has more 
information about the product than the next player, hence, there is an incentive to cheat for 
economic gain. 
 
The retailer who sells directly to consumers is assumed to have two choices. First, an honest retailer 
can truthfully sell wild and farmed salmon separately to the consumers without deception and 
makes different levels of profit. In this case, he may still pay for the IBOL testing to avoid 
inadvertent misrepresentation of his product, which may affect his reputation, as IBOL has up to 
Consumers 
Mixed  
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Figure 4.13: Analytical framework for modelling third party adoption of IBOL technology for supply        
         chain monitoring 
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99.84 percent accuracy in identification without false negatives (Ko et al. 2013).92 Second, a 
dishonest retailer (who wants to make more gains through cheating) would have an incentive of 
knowingly diverting some farmed salmon, mislabel and sell them as wild-caught at a higher price. 
Under such a situation, the retailer’s profit would be a weighted average of profits from wild 
salmon (labelled as “wild and tested”), and farmed salmon (mislabelled as “wild and tested” or 
bypassing the testing procedure).  
 
Following Malik (1990), the retailer’s objective is to maximize expected profit given by 
 
																																								MaxA£,A¤ od
|¦ = d§§ + 1 − 
d§ 		, ¨0,1																																4.15
 
 
Where α is the detection parameter, superscript F and subscript W respectively represent fish type 
(wild or farmed) and label (wild or farmed), while qw and qF represent quantities of wild-caught 
and farmed salmon. Without loss of generality, we assume q=1. In the first part of equation (4.15), 
it is assumed that the retailer may not be falsely accused when tested by a third party as the type 
of fish is truthfully declared and sold. This potentially is the case for an honest retailer. For the 
second part of equation 4.15, the retailer could successfully misrepresent and sell farmed salmon 
as wild-caught without being caught or he may be caught if tested. That is: 
 
																													MaxA£,A¤ od
|¦ = d§§ + 1 − 
©d	K§ + 1 − ©
dK§																											4.16
 
 
Where subscripts ‘nc’ and ‘c’ respectively refers to not caught and caught, and © is the probability 
of being caught cheating. The retailer’s profit will depend on whether the firm is caught cheating 
                                                          
92
 Accuracy in species identification depends on whether or not the sample is contaminated. It is easy to distinguish 
existing old fish species, such as salmon using their barcodes. However, barcoding discriminates 99% of marine 
species and ~95% of fresh water (Communication with Dr. Robert Hanner of IBOL laboratory, University of Guelph, 
Ontario). Therefore, false detection is possible and can go either way (i.e. detecting wild salmon when it is in fact 
farmed or vice versa). However, following Ko et al. (2013) and communication with Dr. Robert Hanner, the error rate 
is insignificant and, therefore, ignored for a retailer that truthfully sells either wild or farmed to consumers. 
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and pays a penalty. If not caught, the retailer will enjoy the premium associated with wild salmon. 
Let the retailer’s expected profit be given as: 
																																																	od	K§ 
 =  + 
ª − 0ª − J«																																																4.17
 
 
Where J« and C are the fixed and variable production costs incurred by the retailer, ª is the quantity 
of fish sold, k is the premium and P is the selling price. Assume the probability of being caught 
cheating (substitution or mislabelling) © is a function of increase in accuracy of the IBOL system 
Φ, the sampling frequency (percentage of q tested) δ, and leakage,	 ψ  following Popkova (2013).93 
This is given by 
																																																© = ¬\­	 12ψ®		 ; 	\, ­,
1
2ψ 	 ∈ 0,1
																																													4.18
 
 
Equation (4.18) implies that the probability of being caught cheating will be high the more accurate 
is IBOL in detection and the larger the sampling frequency and leakage. Since the testing rate is 
exogenous to the retailer; assuming the testing rate is constant, the degree of leakage (substituting 
farmed for wild) would be independent of the retailer’s scale of operation. Instead, large scale 
retailers would make higher profits.  
 
Assume the fish industry has the objective of ameliorating externalities and/or spillover effects 
(e.g. reputation loss) arising from fish fraud and, therefore, encourages the regulator to establish a 
legal punishment in the form of a monetary fine given by β and other indirect costs ω (e.g. product 
recall, withdrawal of license to operate); drawing from Popkova (2013), if caught cheating, the 
expected penalty cost of cheating would be 
																																																													© = ¬\­2ψ® ±																																																																			4.19
 
While the expected profit when caught (assume he has not sold any fish) would be 
																																														oπK§
 = ª − 0ª − J − ¬\­2ψ® ±																																															4.20
					 
                                                          
93
 Leakage in this context refers to the quantity of farmed fish that are misrepresented and sold as wild. It also shows 
the inability of the existing system (use of morphological features) to detect substitution as the consumer cannot 
differentiate between the two by physical examination. 
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Therefore, the expected net profit from cheating will be (4.20) minus (4.17). That is; 
 
                                              ∆oπ
 = oπK§
 − od	K§ 
 
 
																									∆oπ
 = ²ª − 0ª − J − ³´ψµ±¶ −  + 
ª − 0ª − J«  
 
																																											∆oπ
 = ª − ­\±2· − ª + 
																																										4.21
 
Taking the derivative of equation (4.21) with respect to the legal penalty β, and other indirect costs 
ω incurred by the retailer when caught cheating, we have; 
																																									∆oπ
 = −
1
2· ­\±	 < 0																																																										4.22
 
Also 
																																											∆oπ
± = −
1
2·­\ < 0																																																											4.23
	 
 
Equations (4.22) and (4.23) show that a legal penalty and other associated (indirect) costs would 
negatively affect a retailer’s profit if caught cheating by a third party using the IBOL technology. 
This would serve as an incentive to reduce fish market fraud and encourage truthful declaration of 
product origin or identity.  
 
Further, equation (4.18) shows that the probability of being caught cheating is a direct function of 
sampling frequency (testing rate), which is exogenous to the retailer and determined by the third 
party carrying out the test. This could also have an influence on the quantity of leakage and a firm’s 
profit. Potentially the higher the testing rate or frequency and accuracy of the technology in 
detecting fish market fraud, the higher the chances of catching cheaters by the third party. Similar 
outcomes could occur for cheating at other stages of the fish supply chain (e.g. cheating by 
processors). In this case, retailers would be vulnerable to unintentionally selling mislabelled fish 
to consumers. 
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4.4.3 Feasibility of IBOL technology for a typical retail store in Canada 
The threat of third party monitoring of the fish supply chain (e.g. by a regulator or a consumer or 
environmental group) could incentivize a retailer to adopt the IBOL technology and use it to test 
fish supplied by upstream suppliers in order to protect its reputation. Determining the testing rate 
above which a retailer would make a negative profit, and therefore not use the technology, would 
give an indication of the feasibility of the technology for a typical retail store. The retailer may 
face a decision of whether he can afford the fixed cost of acquiring the IBOL technology in-house 
or to outsource testing to an external laboratory for authentication. 
 
To determine the feasibility of IBOL technology adoption, a simulation analysis is carried out 
using data on the estimated fixed and variable costs of fish authentication collected from the IBOL 
laboratory of the Biodiversity Institute of Ontario (BIO), University of Guelph as well as a fish 
market survey data gathered from retail stores in Canada. Table 4.3 shows the actual fees for 
authenticating fish samples based on information provided by the Biodiversity Institute of Ontario. 
The data is used to derive the cost function of a prospective retailer who would adopt the 
technology. The idea is to determine if the average cost of testing a fish sample decreases with a 
higher number of fish samples. The data in table 4.3 could be used to approximate a cost function 
for authenticating fish. 
 
                        Table 4.3: Fees for authenticating fish samples 
No. of samples (X) Actual fees (CAD$) 
1 200 
15 125 
1000 25 
Above 1000 Negotiable but below 25 
                       Source: Biodiversity Institute of Ontario (2013) 
Assume the retailer’s cost function for authenticating fish is of the Cobb Douglas form and 
specified as follows: 
																																								0 = 'R	,  ∈ 0,1
																																																																													4.24
			 
where, 
A = constant 
X = number of fish samples authenticated 
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Taking the first derivative of (4.24) with respect to X will yield the marginal cost. That is: 
                                                 
¸¹
¸ = º0 = 'Rf																																																																	4.25
  
Estimating the values of b and A by considering two points (X = 1; MC = $200 and X = 1000; MC 
= $25) in table 4.3 and substituting them into equation (4.25), we have: 
																																																						200 = '																																																																																		4.25*
 
When X = 1000 and MC = 25, 
																																																					25 = '1000Rf																																																																					4.25
 
From (4.25a), = »  , and substituting this in (4.25b), we have; 
 = 0.7 , and A = 285.71 
Therefore, the retailer’s cost function is given by: 
																																															¼ = ½¾¿. ÀÁÂÃ.À																																																																										4.26
 
and  
                                          º0 = ¸¹¸ = 1999.997f.u																																																													4.27
 
Using a range of samples (1-50,000), the estimated average total costs (ATC) of fish 
authentication (testing) are shown in figure 4.14. See appendix 4.II for the table. 
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Figure 4.14: Average total costs of testing a fish sample 
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Figure 4.14 shows that the average total costs of authenticating a fish sample decreases as the 
number of samples increases. This suggests that large scale retailers are likely to enjoy economies 
of scale, while small scale retailers will incur higher costs to authenticate a fish sample.  
 
Results of some market studies in Canada (e.g. Hanner et al., 2011; ICES, 2012) show that salmon 
is the most widely substituted and mislabelled fish specie because of its high market value, 
followed by red snapper. A market survey of three food retail stores (A, B and C) in Saskatoon 
was carried out in May 2014 to inform the simulation analysis. Information on the average standard 
weight (1.098kg) of Atlantic salmon sold in the stores, number of kilograms sold daily and average 
price per fish were collected through observation at the stores and discussion with the store 
managers. The information is used to compute other variables such as the number of fish sold per 
day (month) and total revenue per month from fish sales.94 The results are shown in table 4.4 for 
a single retail store in Saskatoon. The analysis is based on one month of sales. 
 
 
    Table 4.4: Market (store-level) data analysis for Atlantic salmon fish 
     C = B/A; D = C*30; F = A*E; G = F*D 
Source: Market survey data, 2014 
Note: 1. ATC for testing a fish sample is derived using data on table 3(see appendix) 
          2. Premium of $6 for authenticated fish is assumed by the author 
          3. Revenue (column G) is for the total number of fish sold in a month 
          4. Store B recently acquired store C and therefore, their prices were the same when the   
   market survey was carried out 
 
                                                          
94
 The footnote at the base of table 4.4 shows how other variables in different columns are calculated. 
Retail 
store 
Fish 
type 
 
 
 
Std 
weight 
/fish 
(Kg) 
 
(A) 
No. of Kg 
sold/day 
 
 
 
(B) 
No. of 
fish 
sold/day 
(Kg) 
 
(C) 
No. of fish 
sold/month 
 
 
 
(D) 
Ave. 
price/ 
kg 
sale($) 
 
(E) 
Ave. 
price/ 
Fish 
($/Kg) 
 
    (F) 
TR/month 
without 
testing 
($) 
 
      (G) 
Price 
premium 
($/fish) 
ATC 
of 
testing 
/fish 
sample 
($) 
Store A wild 1.098 30 27 820 30.99 34.03 27891.00 6.00 38.32 
 farmed 1.098 30 27 820 24.99 27.44 22491.00 6.00 38.32 
 total   60 55 1640     50382.00   31.01 
                     
Store B wild 1.098 15 14 410 31.99 35.13 14395.50 6.00 46.66 
 farmed 1.098 15 14 410 26.99 29.64 12145.50 6.00 46.66 
 total   30 27 820     26541.00   38.18 
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In this analysis, it is assumed that the testing (authentication) is done at an external laboratory (e.g. 
IBOL laboratory in Guelph) once a month. Therefore the fixed cost of adopting the IBOL system 
and other associated costs (e.g. inputs, transportation) are not considered.95  
 
The idea is to see whether use of the technology would be feasible for a typical retailer who may 
not afford the fixed costs associated with the technology, and therefore, has the alternative of 
accessing an external laboratory for authentication. In the absence of an external laboratory testing 
service, the retailer would incur additional fixed costs of acquiring testing equipment and facilities 
(not shown in table 4.4).96 Column ‘G’ of table 4.4 shows the estimated monthly revenue for a 
retail store that sells fish without authentication. This implies that the magnitude of the net revenue 
is contingent on the retailer’s scale of operation and the number of samples tested at a particular 
time.  
 
Assume a price premium of $6 per 1.098kg for authenticated fish.  The key question is: Why should 
a retailer authenticate his fish and consumers pay a premium for authenticated fish? Potentially, 
a consumer will be willing to pay a premium for authenticated fish if the authenticating body is 
credible and trusted. Comparing stores ‘A’ and ‘B’, store ‘A’ sells an estimated 820 wild and 
farmed Atlantic salmon respectively in a month and makes an assumed revenue of $50,382 without 
authentication and related premium; while store ‘B’ sells 410 wild and farmed salmon respectively 
with total projected revenue of $26,541. Considering scale effects, and using the simulated cost 
functions in equations 4.26 and 4.27, it would cost stores ‘A’ and ‘B’ an average of $38.32 and 
$46.66 respectively to test a fish sample.97 
 
                                                          
95
 Inputs and transportation costs are not available at the time when data were collected. 
96 Estimates of the fixed costs of establishing a DNA barcoding laboratory are provided in appendix 4.IV and range 
from $130,000 to $350,000 (year 2000). 
 
97
 Data on retail price is for a whole fish while testing (authentication) is done with a piece of a whole fish (specimen). 
Costs of testing (authentication) per sample were calculated using the cost function (equation 4.26). See Appendix 
4.II for the table. Total mark-up for wild salmon in store ‘A’ is calculated by multiplying the total number of fish sold 
in a month by the assumed premium. The product of the average total cost of testing a fish sample, number of fish 
sold in a month and the testing rate (δ/100) gives the variable cost of authentication for store ‘A’. 
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Given an assumed premium of $6 per whole fish, the total number of fish sold in a month and the 
costs of authenticating a fish sample, what testing rate (δ) would yield the same net revenue 
obtained without authentication? This would give an idea of the optimum testing rate beyond 
which a retailer may not use the technology and would prefer to sell his fish without authentication 
given that consumers cannot distinguish between farmed and wild salmon. Calculating the testing 
rates for stores ‘A’ and ‘B’, we have: 
Store A: 
Net revenue from authentication = total mark-up – variable costs of authentication 
820 ∗ 6 − ¬38.22 ∗ ­100 ∗ 820® 
Equating to zero and solving for δ we have 
3134.40­ = 492000 
Therefore, 
­ = 16% 
 Store B: 
410 ∗ 6 − ¬46.66 ∗ ­100 ∗ 410® 
246000 = 19130.60­ 
­ = 12.8% ~ 13% 
 
This shows that, under the assumptions used in this illustrative example, a large company (retail 
level) such as store ‘A’ comprised of ‘X’ number of stores would spend less on authentication 
using IBOL technology and generate higher revenue at a testing rate of 16 percent or less. On the 
other hand, small retail stores (e.g. store B) would pay more for every fish sample authenticated, 
and potentially may not use the IBOL technology for a testing rate above 13 percent.98 The 
simulation results for estimated contribution margin at different testing rates for a large retail store 
(store A above) is shown in figure 4.15. 
 
                                                          
98
 The testing rates of 16 and 13 percent calculated above for stores ‘A’ and ‘B’ do not represent exact figures as these 
are derived based on the assumptions of the simulation. They are for illustrative purposes. 
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       Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Results in figure 4.15 suggest that a large retail store in Canada potentially would use the 
technology if the testing rate does not exceed 16 percent.  A testing rate above 16 percent will 
result in a loss and could be a disincentive for technology adoption. 
 
Considering the fixed costs (see appendix 4.IV) and other variable costs (e.g. staff salaries) 
associated with establishing a testing laboratory given the assumed premium of $6 for 
authenticated fish, it becomes clear that paying for IBOL technology would not likely be feasible 
for a typical retail store at this time. The payback period would be high and could serve as a 
disincentive for adoption. Although the analysis is based on the level of an individual retail store, 
a large-scale food retailer (e.g major supermarkets) with multiple retail stores, however, would be 
in a position to spread the fixed costs of establishing a DNA barcoding/testing facility over a larger 
number of retail stores or outlets. Given the magnitude of the fixed costs for the IBOL technology 
and the low food safety risk associated with fish species substitution in Canada presently, a 
potential way to afford the technology at this time, particularly for small scale retailers, may be to 
go into strategic alliance and pool resources together. In addition, reducing the size of technology 
into hand-held tools would make it more affordable and easy to use within the domestic supply 
chain (e.g. food restaurants) and at the border. 
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Figure 4.15: Estimated contribution margin from technology adoption at different testing rates for a large      
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4.5 Commercialization of IBOL technology 
Commercialization in this context is the process of introducing the technology into the market. 
Successful commercialization of IBOL technology for fish species authentication would require 
strategic involvement and collaboration of market actors (key stakeholder groups) in the food 
control system (e.g. regulatory agencies, industry associations). The different actors have diverse 
interests and expectations. For example, the interest of regulatory agencies (e.g. Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency) is in enforcing quality and safety in the food system, while industry 
associations (e.g. National Fisheries Institute in the U.S.) would be interested in preserving the 
reputation and integrity of the food supply chains. In addition, the interest of other third parties, 
such as consumer and environmental groups, are to protect consumers or provide them with useful 
information that enables more informed purchase decisions, and the protection of endangered or 
threatened species, respectively. 
 
Consumers’ valuation (potential benefits) and trust in the technology would influence their 
demand for authenticated fish, and consequently drive retailers’ adoption of the technology. This 
implies that the commercialization strategy has to be consumer focused (building consumers’ trust 
for the technology). A potential way to gain consumers’ confidence for fish authenticated using 
IBOL technology is for retailers to cooperate with groups such as the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC). Consumers may be more confident and willing to pay premium for fish authenticated using 
the technology and bearing the logo of a trusted body, such as MSC, whose credibility can more 
easily be ascertained by consumers.  
 
Although not directly derived from the analysis, comparing the relative strengths of different 
incentives to adopt the IBOL technology by different agents (retailers, third parties, regulators), it 
is possible that retailers are more likely to adopt the technology in order to protect their collective 
reputation. For example, drawing from the horsemeat scandal in Europe, the retailers may not be 
the ones that substituted horsemeat for beef, but sold the final product (processed meat products) 
to consumers. Thus, an increased demand for IBOL authenticated fish would potentially increase 
the use of the technology in fraud mitigation in the market place. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
IBOL technology offers a potential improvement over the existing DNA-based techniques (e.g. 
Polymerase Chain Reaction) in detecting food fraud, particularly in fish markets. The paper uses 
a theoretical approach to examine the incidence of species substitution and mislabelling in fish 
markets using welfare analysis to determine who gains and loses relative to a status quo and models 
private (retailer and third party) incentives to adopt IBOL technology to protect their reputation 
from fraudulent activities carried out by upstream suppliers, and for monitoring the supply chain 
as an incentive to encourage truthful labelling. It also employs an empirical approach to determine 
the feasibility of the IBOL technology for a typical retail store in Canada through a simulation 
analysis using estimated fixed and variable costs of fish authentication and market survey data 
gathered from retail stores in Saskatoon.  
 
The analyses in this paper provide some key results. First, factors including post adoption market 
profit relative to costs of technology adoption, number of fish retailers in the market already using 
the IBOL system and their market shares influence a retailer’s decision to adopt the IBOL 
technology. Retailers who adopt the technology early (i.e. early adopters) are likely to earn a 
premium from fish authentication, and the premium would diminish as more retailers adopt the 
technology. The implication of this result is that only the first few early adopters (retailers) would 
potentially enjoy economic benefit (price premium) from using the technology, hence, the 
distribution of the market benefits are not equal. Second, the likelihood or probability of catching 
a retailer, or other key players along the supply chain, cheating (substitution or mislabelling) by a 
third party is dependent on the accuracy of the IBOL technology in detecting fraud, the sampling 
rate or frequency, and the rate of species substitution. This suggests that increased accuracy of the 
IBOL technology and testing rate would mean that cheaters could more easily be caught. This, 
however, has implications for monitoring. Setting the testing rate by a third party or regulator 
(perhaps using the IBOL) would affect the incentives of retailers to adopt IBOL technology to 
detect cheating by upstream suppliers and/or mislabel or label honestly themselves.  Leakage 
would be an important issue of concern even with IBOL technology adoption. This is because 
retailers may find a way of bypassing testing (authentication) and claim to be tested. Therefore, 
third parties monitoring the fish supply chain can effectively reduce leakage by indicating the 
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sampling rate and frequency, pay unscheduled visits without prior notice, and randomly self-
selects samples to be tested.  
 
Third, enforcement of legal penalties and other indirect costs (e.g. product recall) would negatively 
affect expected profit if a retailer is caught cheating by a third party.  This would serve as a 
disincentive for cheating in fish markets. Fourth, based on the assumptions used in the empirical 
analysis, testing rates above 13 and 16 percent (which are purely illustrative) for small and large 
retail stores would yield negative net revenue and would be a disincentive to adopt the technology 
by retailers. Fifth, results also suggest that currently it appears that IBOL technology could be 
feasible for a typical retail store if testing is done in an external testing facility, while it may not 
be feasible if fixed and other associated costs of switching to the IBOL system are considered. 
Although not directly derived from the analysis, large food retail stores with multiple outlets 
potentially could spread the fixed costs associated with establishing a testing laboratory over the 
numerous retail stores. 
 
Presently in Canada, IBOL technology adoption is voluntary and little food safety risk has been 
identified to be associated with illegitimate market activities in the Canadian fish markets. 
Reducing the size of the technology, government subsidization and coordination of small scale 
retailers are potential ways the private sector could pay for the technology and set up their own 
laboratories, particularly in the absence of any food safety risk associated with market fraud in the 
Canadian fish markets. Availability of hand-held IBOL technology would make on-site testing at 
retail locations more affordable. Strategic involvement of the key stakeholder groups in the food 
control system and credible third party certification would ensure successful commercialization of 
the technology. 
 
In sum, quality verification at all levels of the fish supply chain and credible disclosure of product 
attributes are essential ingredients in building trust and reducing market opportunistic behaviour. 
This would also guide consumers’ purchase decisions and protect the integrity and reputation of 
the fish industry. 
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Appendix 4.I 
 
A4.1: Trend in the cost of DNA barcoding 
Date Cost per Mb 
($) 
Cost per 
Genome 
($) 
 Date Cost per 
Mb ($) 
Cost per 
Genome ($) 
Sep-01 5292.392885 95263072   Jul-08 8.356443 752079.9 
Mar-02 3898.635412 70175437   Oct-08 3.805578 342502.1 
Sep-02 3413.801195 61448422   Jan-09 2.585949 232735.4 
Mar-03 2986.204671 53751684   Apr-09 1.71904 154713.6 
Oct-03 2230.975235 40157554   Jul-09 1.200724 108065.1 
Jan-04 1598.909789 28780376   Oct-09 0.781481 70333.33 
Apr-04 1135.698674 20442576   Jan-10 0.519714 46774.27 
Jul-04 1107.463652 19934346   Apr-10 0.350134 31512.04 
Oct-04 1028.850676 18519312   Jul-10 0.345833 31124.96 
Jan-05 974.1649757 17534970   Oct-10 0.323241 29091.73 
Apr-05 897.7610799 16159699   Jan-11 0.23292 20962.78 
Jul-05 898.9013391 16180224   Apr-11 0.185689 16712.01 
Oct-05 766.7291219 13801124   Jul-11 0.116633 10496.93 
Jan-06 699.2032723 12585659   Oct-11 0.086038 7743.438 
Apr-06 651.8074733 11732535   Jan-12 0.08518 7666.219 
Jul-06 636.4064012 11455315   Apr-12 0.06557 5901.293 
Oct-06 581.9197978 10474556   Jul-12 0.066497 5984.721 
Jan-07 522.7077172 9408739   Oct-12 0.073537 6618.349 
Apr-07 502.6112761 9047003   Jan-13 0.063015 5671.346 
Jul-07 495.9634524 8927342   Apr-13 0.063641 5826.262 
Oct-07 397.0872994 7147571   Jul-13 0.06167 5550 
Jan-08 102.127333 3063820   Oct-13 0.056623 5096 
Apr-08 15.03313588 1352982   Jan-14 0.044535 4008.107 
               Source: Wetterstrand (2014) 
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Appendix 4.II 
 
A4.2: Costs of testing and authenticating fish samples using IBOL technology 
x MC ATC TC 
1 199.997 285.71 285.71 
10 100.2359 143.1942 1431.942 
50 61.84897 88.35567 4417.784 
100 50.23698 71.76711 7176.711 
200 40.8051 58.293 11658.6 
300 36.13159 51.61656 15484.97 
400 33.14404 47.34863 18939.45 
420 32.66245 46.66064 19597.47 
500 30.99791 44.28274 22141.37 
600 29.34797 41.92568 25155.41 
700 28.02167 40.03096 28021.67 
800 26.92133 38.45904 30767.23 
820 26.72264 38.1752 31303.66 
840 26.53015 37.90021 31836.18 
900 25.98668 37.12382 33411.44 
1000 25.17813 35.96876 35968.76 
1100 24.46841 34.95487 38450.35 
1200 23.83796 34.05423 40865.08 
1500 22.29442 31.84917 47773.75 
1640 21.70553 31.0079 50852.95 
2000 20.451 29.21571 58431.42 
3000 18.10869 25.86956 77608.68 
4000 16.61137 23.73053 94922.12 
5000 15.53576 22.19394 110969.7 
10000 12.61896 18.02708 180270.8 
20000 10.24978 14.64254 292850.8 
50000 7.786324 11.12332 556166 
Source: Calculated from data on actual fees (table 4.3) of fish authentication obtained from 
 Biodiversity Institute of Ontario (2013) 
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Appendix 4.III 
 
Calculation of Retailers’ Post Technology Adoption Market Shares, Prices and Profits 
 
N = 1: K = Lf:>Å
R =	 Æf.M∗.Ç = È.M.w = 4.64	 
          &K =  ∗ K = 1 ∗ 4.64 = 4.64	 
          K = LÅ>:>Å = 	 ÆÅ∗.M 	= $4.75	 
          0 = @K + J = 1.5 ∗ 4.64 + 5 = 11.96  
          '0AÊË
 = Ì¹AÊË =	
.ÍÈ
w.Èw = 2.58 
         d> = K ∗ K − Y@K + JZ = 4.75 ∗ 4.64 − 1.5 ∗ 4.64 + 5 = $10.08	 
 
N = 2:   K = È.M. = 3.10 
 &K = 2*3.10 = 6.2 
 K = 	 ÆÅ∗.Mu = 3.67  
           0 = @K + J = 1.5 ∗ 3.10 + 5 = 9.65             
          '0AÊË
 = Ì¹AÊË =	
Í.ÈM
u. = 3.11 
 d> = 3.67 ∗ 3.10 − 1.5 ∗ 3.10 + 5 = $1.73 
   
N = 3:   K = È.M.Æ = 2.32 
 &K = 3 ∗ 2.32 = 6.96 
 K = ÆÅu∗.Mw = 3.13 
           0 = @K + J = 1.5 ∗ 2.32 + 5 = 8.48 
           '0AÊË
 = Ì¹AÊË = 	
Æ.wÆ
.u = 3.66 
 d>u = 3.13 ∗ 2.32 − 1.5 ∗ 2.32 + 5 = 	−$1.22 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Appendix 4.IV 
 
A4.3: Costs of establishing a DNA Barcoding laboratory 
 Large Scale 
S/N Item Description Quantity Unit Cost ($) Total ($) 
1 DNA Sequencer 3500xL Genetic Analyzer, 24 capillaries (Applied 
Biosystems) 
1 214,500.00 214,500.00 
2 Eppendorf 
Thermocylers 
Mastercycler EP Gradient S Thermal Cycler with Manual 
Lid 
2 12,853.75 25,707.50 
3 Centrifuge for 
DNA-extraction 
room 
Beckman-Coulter Allegra 25R Centrifuge with S5700 
Swinging Backet Rotor (Beckman-Coulter) 
 
1 10,918.00 10,918.00 
4 Centrifuge for 
sequencing room 
Thermo IEC CL40 Centrifuge with swing rotor for 
microplates 
1 7,502.51 7,502.51 
5 Agarose gel 
documentation 
system 
AlphaImager Gel Documentation System with MultiImage 
II (DE-500) Light Cabinet, Standard Computer and 17” 
LCD Monitor; Alpha Innotech DTP-2001 Large Format 
Digital Thermal Grayscale Printer 
1 21,471.52 21,471.52 
6 Fisher Isotemp 
5.0Cu Ft Standard 
Microprocessor 
Control Incubator 
 
New Brunswick Innova Model 2000 Gyratory Platform 
Shaker (120V, 60Hz) to fit inside of lysis incubator 
 (one for lysis, one for DNA extraction) 
2 3,912.98 7,825.96 
7 Small table-top 
centrifuges 
Brinkmann Eppendorf Minispin Centrifuge, 115V  (one for 
DNA extraction room, other for sequencing room) 
2 1,590.75 3,181.50 
8 Small autoclave 
for sequencing 
plates 
Harvey® MC8 Hydroclave, with non-recirculating feature 
 
1 7,924.52 7,924.52 
9 Pipettors: 
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a Single channel Eppendorf Research Single Channel Pipettor Pack 
Includes: one 2-20µl, 20-200µl and one 100-1000µl pipette 
packs (one for reagents in DNA extraction room, second 
one for reagents in sequencing room) 
2 packs 920.94 1,841.88 
b 8-channel Matrix Matrix Impact2 pipettor, 15µl-1250µl 2 1,385.00 2,770.00 
c 12-channel 
pipettors for DNA 
and PCR transfer 
Biohit mLINE 12-channel Mechanical Pipettors (0.5-10 µl) 
- for PCR setup, for sequencing setup and for E-gels) 
3 1,251.34 3,754.02 
10 PCR Product 
Check 
Invitrogen™ E-Base™ electrophoresis station (Mother E-
Base™ device EB-M03) 
1 512.00 512.00 
11 Spectrophotometer ND-1000 Nanodrop® ND-1000 Spectrophotometer 1 11,244.00 11,244.00 
12 Reagent preparation equipment: 
a Analytical 
Balance 
Denver Summit Series Model SI-124 Analytical Balance 
120g x 0.1mg 
1 2,919.72 2,919.72 
b Top-loading 
Balance 
Denver Summit Series Model SI-4002 Top-loading 
Balance 4000g x 0.01g 
1 1,997.84 1,997.84 
c PH Meter Orion 3-Star Benchtop pH Meter with Probe 1 1,298.88 1,298.88 
d Stirring Hotplate Corning Model PC420D Digital Display Stirring Hotplate 
5x7"  
1 542.60 542.60 
13 Fridges/Freezers: 
a +4°C fridge One for DNA extracts; one (small) for reagent stocks; one 
for PCR products and sequencing plates 
 
3 500.00 1,500.00 
b -20°C freezer One for PCR reagents; one for sequencing reagents). Note: 
regular freezers (avoid no-frost system) 
2 183.00 366.00 
c -80°C freezer Forma 900 -86C Ultra low Freezers (9 cu ft, 255 litres) 1 5,495.00 
(5,095 for 5 
cu) 
5,495.00 
14 AirClean System AirClean 600 PCR workstation, AirClean Systems (Fisher 
Scientific) 
1 4,134.38 4,134.38 
15 UV Ultrpure water 
system 
Millipore Simplicity UV Personal Ultrapure Water System, 
115V 60Hz 
1 4,260.00 4,260.00 
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    Total 341,668.00 
Small Scale 
S/N Item Description Quantity Unit Cost ($) Total ($) 
1 Eppendorf 
Thermocylers 
Mastercycler EP Gradient S Thermal Cycler with Manual 
Lid 
2 12,853.75 25,707.5 
2 Centrifuge for 
DNA-extraction 
room 
Beckman-Coulter Allegra 25R Centrifuge with S5700 
Swinging Backet Rotor (Beckman-Coulter) 
 
1 10,918.00 10,918.00 
3 Centrifuge for 
sequencing room 
Thermo IEC CL40 Centrifuge with swing rotor for 
microplates 
1 7,502.51 7,502.51 
4 Agarose gel 
documentation 
system 
AlphaImager Gel Documentation System with MultiImage II 
(DE-500) Light Cabinet, Standard Computer and 17” LCD 
Monitor; Alpha Innotech DTP-2001 Large Format Digital 
Thermal Grayscale Printer 
1 21,471.52 21,471.52 
5 Fisher Isotemp 
5.0Cu Ft Standard 
Microprocessor 
Control Incubator 
 
New Brunswick Innova Model 2000 Gyratory Platform 
Shaker (120V, 60Hz) to fit inside of lysis incubator 
 (one for lysis, one for DNA extraction) 
2 3,912.98 7,825.96 
6 Small table-top 
centrifuges 
Brinkmann Eppendorf Minispin Centrifuge, 115V  (one for 
DNA extraction room, other for sequencing room) 
 
2 1,590.75 3,181.50 
7 Small autoclave 
for sequencing 
plates 
Harvey® MC8 Hydroclave, with non-recirculating feature 
 
1 7,924.52 7,924.52 
8 Pipettors: 
a Single channel Eppendorf Research Single Channel Pipettor Pack Includes: 
one 2-20µl, 20-200µl and one 100-1000µl pipette packs (one 
for reagents in DNA extraction room, second one for 
reagents in sequencing room) 
 
2 packs 920.94 1,841.88 
b 8-channel Matrix Matrix Impact2 pipettor, 15µl-1250µl 2 1,385.00 2,770.00 
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c 12-channel 
pipettors for DNA 
and PCR transfer 
Biohit mLINE 12-channel Mechanical Pipettors (0.5-10 µl) - 
for PCR setup, for sequencing setup and for E-gels) 
 
3 1,251.34 3,754.02 
9 PCR Product 
Check 
Invitrogen™ E-Base™ electrophoresis station (Mother E-
Base™ device EB-M03) 
1 512.00 512.00 
10 Spectrophotometer ND-1000 Nanodrop® ND-1000 Spectrophotometer 1 11,244.00 11,244.00 
11 Reagent preparation equipment: 
a Analytical 
Balance 
Denver Summit Series Model SI-124 Analytical Balance 
120g x 0.1mg 
1 2,919.72 2,919.72 
b Top-loading 
Balance 
Denver Summit Series Model SI-4002 Top-loading Balance 
4000g x 0.01g 
1 1,997.84 1,997.84 
c PH Meter Orion 3-Star Benchtop pH Meter with Probe 1 1,298.88 1,298.88 
d Stirring Hotplate Corning Model PC420D Digital Display Stirring Hotplate 
5x7"  
1 542.60 542.60 
12 Fridges/Freezers: 
a +4°C fridge One for DNA extracts; one (small) for reagent stocks; one 
for PCR products and sequencing plates 
3 500.00 1,500.00 
b -20°C freezer One for PCR reagents; one for sequencing reagents). Note: 
regular freezers (avoid no-frost system) 
2 183.00 366.00 
c -80°C freezer Forma 900 -86C Ultra low Freezers (9 cu ft, 255 litres) 1 5,495.00 (5,095 
for 5 cu) 
5,495.00 
13 AirClean System AirClean 600 PCR workstation, AirClean Systems (Fisher 
Scientific) 
1 4,134.38 4,134.38 
14 UV Ultrpure water 
system 
Millipore Simplicity UV Personal Ultrapure Water System, 
115V 60Hz 
1 4,260.00 4,260.00 
    Total 127,168.00 
Notes: 
* Equipment costs are for the year 2000 
Data source: Personal communication with E. Zakharov of the Canadian Centre for DNA Barcoding, Biodiversity Institute of Ontario, University 
of Guelph, 2013. 
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Note: Appendix 4.IV shows the equipment that would be needed to establish a standard large and 
small scale laboratory. The only difference between a large and small scale testing laboratory is 
that large scale laboratory uses a DNA Sequencer, which constitute about 63% of the total cost of 
equipment. The cost of the DNA Sequencer is the difference in cost of establishing a small and 
large scale laboratory. Various steps involved in fish authentication (from specimen collection to 
amplification of the barcode region) can be done in a small scale laboratory, while the final stage, 
sequencing and barcode generation, is done in a large scale laboratory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
5.1 Summary 
Truthful declaration and signalling of quality attributes to consumers has become a critical issue 
to policy makers and industries given the increasing spate of market fraud that has attracted recent 
media attention. This study represents an initial attempt to examine technological (International 
Barcode of Life) and industry-led certification (Vintners Quality Alliance) solutions to authenticity 
and information asymmetry issues in agri-food and natural resource markets. The dissertation 
explores the adoption of authenticity technologies and quality verification systems in the Canadian 
agri-food sector and in international markets. It comprises three stand-alone papers, each 
examining independent but related issues of authenticity, quality verification and signalling in 
agricultural and natural resource markets, and the implications for collective reputation. This 
research contributes to the literature by providing more insights and understanding of authenticity 
issues, and the role of emerging authenticity technologies (IBOL) and industry-led quality 
assurance systems in delivering authenticity signals in agri-food and natural resource markets.  
 
Chapter two (paper 1) takes a look at the role of technologies in verifying authenticity, and 
enhancing the implementation of CITES trade restrictions for endangered tree species. A review 
of literature shows that the technology has a potential role in enhancing authenticity, safety and 
sustainability; and has been used in species identification including: seafood, invasive and/or 
endangered species, natural health products, vectors of zoonotic diseases, among others. An 
important feature of this technology is that it has high speed and accuracy in measurement 
(detection) and can identify credence attributes in food products; thereby enabling consumers to 
make more informed purchase decisions.  
 
To examine how technological solutions (IBOL technology) could enhance restrictions for 
international trade in endangered species, the paper uses a case of an endangered species of tree, 
Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra). Three scenarios are analyzed using a graphical partial 
equilibrium trade model to adapt a base case including: adoption and use of IBOL technology to 
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test imported rosewood by a single large importing country (the U.S.); multilateral adoption of 
IBOL technology for imported rosewood timber testing; and upstream adoption of the authenticity 
technology and a certification system within the domestic supply chain of the exporting country 
(Brazil) in response to a threat of multilateral testing by importing countries.  
 
Results of the analyses suggest the following: first, the use of an authenticity technology by one 
country to test imports of rosewood may not be effective in reducing commercial trade in 
Dalbergia nigra as exports of the endangered species could be diverted to a third market where 
there is no testing for authenticity. Second, while multilateral implementation of regulations 
requiring authenticity testing for imported rosewood may not completely eliminate the harvesting 
of the endangered species it could eliminate cross border trade in Dalbergia nigra, thereby 
reducing the equilibrium domestic price and quantity (due to demand/supply factors of illegal 
rosewood), which would discourage its harvesting. Third, product differentiation (separating 
rosewood timber from the endangered species from those not threatened with extinction) through 
credible upstream testing and certification of authenticity in the exporting country (Brazil) may 
increase the confidence level of importers and their demand for Brazilian legally harvested 
rosewood exports. Overall, the results suggest that technological solutions to authenticity and 
information asymmetry issues in international markets could serve as a complement to, rather than 
a substitute for, existing regulatory enforcement.  
 
This paper makes a new contribution to the literature. Previous studies tended to focus on the use 
of IBOL technology in the identification of different plant and animal species. This paper, in 
addition to contributing in understanding of authenticity issues in agri-food and natural resource 
markets, illustrates the potential role of the authenticity technology in providing a solution to 
problems of authenticity and information asymmetry in the context of international trade. The 
paper develops partial equilibrium trade models and uses them to illustrate how IBOL technology 
can be used to enhance effective implementation of the CITES trade restriction on cross border 
commercial trade in Dalbergia nigra, an endangered species of Brazilian rosewood. Although the 
analysis focuses on a case study, the potential outcomes of the analysis extend more broadly to 
other at-risk species listed by CITES including invasive species for which sustainability or 
eradication is relevant.  
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Chapter three (paper 2) examines the VQA certification system for Canadian wines to determine 
empirically whether VQA certification elicits a price premium and enhances the individual and 
collective reputation of Canadian wines. Hedonic pricing and Probit models are estimated. This 
paper is different from existing wine studies. In addition to empirical estimation of the marginal 
contributions of wine attributes to the price of wine as done in previous studies, the paper 
incorporates Probit analysis to ascertain what could drive a winery’s decision to seek quality 
assurance (VQA certification). The paper also incorporates winery characteristics (winery, region) 
in the hedonic model to separate the effect of individual and collective reputations on the price of 
wine. Unlike other wine studies that examine the marginal contribution of VQA to the price of 
wines (e.g. Rabkin and Beatty, 2007), the paper examines whether there is endogeneity between 
VQA and the price of wine. The results suggest that in the data set VQA certification leads to high 
wine prices and not the other way around. 
 
Results of the hedonic model show that there exists a premium for VQA wines. On average, the 
price of VQA wines is 16.72% higher than non-VQA wines in Ontario, the price of VQA red and 
white wines are 21.42% and 13.58% respectively higher than the non-VQA base red and white 
wines. This suggests that the VQA quality assurance program established by the Canadian wine 
industry has been a successful quality signalling strategy, valued by consumers and generates a 
premium for authenticity that it represents. This may be a valuable lesson as well as an incentive 
for other Canadian agri-food industries to establish similar industry-led quality assurance systems. 
The paper separates the effects of two different dimensions of reputation, including individual 
(winery) and collective (region, VQA) reputation on the price of wine. The results show that while 
individual (firm-level) reputation is important, collective (industry-wide) reputation signals have 
the potential to add additional price premiums when consumers perceive them as being credible 
and reliable, and therefore, can act as a shorthand for quality and reduce their search costs. Further, 
results of the hedonic model indicate that attributes such as percentage alcohol content, sweetness 
(sugar content), volume of wine delivered by wineries to retail outlets in Ontario (small) and 
vintage (year of production) significantly affect the price of wine; while the prices of wines 
delivered by small and medium wineries are higher than the price of wines delivered by large 
wineries potentially due to volume of sales.  
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In addition, the hedonic results of the interactions of the VQA variable with grape varieties and 
region suggest that VQA certification does not depend on grape variety, and VQA and region can 
serve as complementary collective reputation signals. While controlling for individual winery and 
collective reputation signals, the results suggest that the VQA signal adds value beyond other 
collective reputation signals. Presumably this is because VQA is a third party certified quality 
signal, which may be perceived to be more reliable and transparent by consumers, and this 
potentially makes VQA a stronger assurance of quality and authenticity. The Probit analysis results 
identify significant factors that could influence a winery’s decision to seek quality assurance (VQA 
certification) for a specific wine. Such factors could serve as a guide for wineries who want to 
enjoy premium for their wines.  
 
In chapter four (paper 3), incidence (substitution and mislabelling) analysis in fish markets and the 
incentives for the private sector (retailers) or  a third party to adopt IBOL technology for fish 
species authentication are presented. Understanding the factors that could influence private sector 
adoption of authenticity technologies would be an important element to technology developers and 
policy makers. In the context of this study, while development of authenticity technologies could 
be seen as an advancement in the agri-food sector, adoption of the technologies is critical to feel 
the impacts of the technologies in the markets. This paper contributes to the economics of 
information asymmetry literature by providing insights on the economic incentives for species 
substitution and mislabelling in fish markets and the negative outcomes associated with such illicit 
market activities. The paper also adds to the literature by identifying key economic parameters that 
are likely to influence adoption of authenticity technologies by fish retailers. 
 
IBOL technology is new and yet to be commercialized. Results of the analyses suggest that the 
costs (fixed) associated with the technology, number of retailers already using the technology and 
their market shares, and the use of the technology by a third party in monitoring fraud along the 
fish supply chain are the factors that could influence IBOL technology adoption by the private 
sector. Further, in modelling the use of IBOL technology for fish supply chain monitoring by a 
third party, the results suggest that the likelihood (probability) of catching a retailer (or other key 
players along the fish supply chain) cheating is contingent on the accuracy of the technology in 
detecting substitution and mislabelling, the sampling rate (frequency) and rate of species 
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substitution. The results of the theoretical model also show that enforcement of legal penalties and 
other indirect costs would negatively affect a retailer’s expected profit if caught cheating by a third 
party. This could serve as a disincentive for cheating. 
 
To determine whether the technology would be feasible for a typical retailer at this stage of its 
development, an empirical analysis is carried out using fish market survey and testing cost data 
from the IBOL laboratory in Guelph Ontario. Presently it appears that IBOL technology would be 
feasible for a typical retail store if testing is done in a third party laboratory (external testing 
facility), while it may not be feasible if fixed and other associated costs of switching to the IBOL 
system are considered. Feasibility of the technology for a typical retail store would mean that the 
testing (sampling) rate potentially should not exceed 16% for large retailers and 13% for small 
and/or medium retailers. While it is anticipated that the cost of the technology would decline 
overtime, reducing the size of the technology to a hand-held tool would make it more affordable 
and could expand its use for identification and authentication.  
 
The three papers in this dissertation focus on authenticity and collective reputation, and show 
different motivations by different actors (firm, industry and regulator) used in the analyses. For 
example, while firms (in paper 3) are motivated to adopt the IBOL authenticity technology to 
protect their individual firm reputation, an industry’s (e.g. wine industry in paper 2) motivation for 
the uptake of a quality assurance system is to preserve the collective reputation and integrity of the 
industry. On the other hand, the regulator (government) may have a role to play when there is a 
market failure, such as the imposition of a testing regulation as modelled in paper 3.  
 
Public policy has a role to play in the development and adoption of technological innovations such 
as IBOL. Publicizing offending producers or firms and establishment of severe legal penalties may 
reduce fraud. This reputational threat would encourage due diligence and investment in quality 
and authenticity. Richard Macrory in his study, “making sanctions effective” contends that: 
“When thinking about how to motivate firms to change their behavior, 
reputational sanctions can have more of an impact than even the largest financial 
penalties. […]. The consequences of damaging a firm’s reputation can 
potentially exceed the effect of a maximum fine that a court could impose 
(Macrory, 2006, p.129).” 
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Therefore, when the expected cost of cheating outweighs the potential benefits, producers would 
be more likely to play by the rules. 
 
5.2 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research 
There were certain limitations in the course of this study. The first is timely and availability of 
data. In chapter two (paper 1), non-availability of data (e.g. volume of trade in endangered species 
and the economic costs) limits the study to only a theoretical analysis. Such data would have been 
used to quantify the outcomes as well as test the reliability of the theoretical results.   
 
In chapter three (paper 2), empirical analysis is carried out to determine the attributes that influence 
wine prices and the factors that drive a winery’s decision to seek VQA status. Information on the 
aggregate quantity of wines sold annually and quarterly could not be accessed from the Liquor 
Control Board of Ontario. This information is important to control for possible seasonality effects 
on the price of wine. In addition, only Canadian wines data in Ontario Liquor Control Board stores 
were accessible, which under represents sales of other non-Canadian wines. Data on sales of 
imported wines were not available to the researcher. Such data would have enabled the researcher 
to examine the role of VQA as a signal of Canadian origin. In chapter three (paper 3), data on 
border rejections in seafood (fish) trade in Canada (before 1999 and after 2002) arising from 
authenticity issues could not be assessed. Such data could be useful in making an objective 
comparison of fish species identification before and after the emergence of the IBOL technology.  
 
The issue of food authenticity in agri-food markets has not been widely explored in the literature. 
This leaves room for further research and improvements on this study. In chapter one (paper 1) for 
example, data on the volume of trade and the economic costs of cross border trade in endangered 
species, if available in future studies, could be used to examine the costs/benefits trade off in using 
IBOL technology to implement international trade restrictions on endangered species. In chapter 
two, further work could be done to identify the attributes that drive consumers’ willingness to pay 
for wines. More so, future studies could use data on both Canadian and imported wines to examine 
how the VQA quality assurance system affects price competition for regional and imported wines. 
Inclusion of data on wine sales from other provinces in Canada (e.g. British Columbia) in the 
dataset would give more generalizable results and conclusions about the VQA system. Such a 
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dataset may provide the opportunity of applying the instrumental variable estimation approach to 
get a better sense of whether price significantly influences a winery’s decision to seek VQA for a 
specific wine. In chapter four (paper 3), the analysis of the incentive to adopt IBOL technology by 
a third party focuses on the retail level. This gives room for extension of the analysis to other 
(processor and producer) levels of the supply chain in future studies. In addition, it would be 
interesting to examine the potential of embedding IBOL technology as a protocol for fish species 
identification within the international regulatory system. This would further strengthen its 
institutionalization as a common protocol in the current food system. 
 
Overall, this study aims to provide insights on the causes, impacts and solutions to authenticity 
issues in agri-food and natural resource markets. Specifically, the analysis centers on the role of 
industry-led quality assurance systems (certification) versus technological solutions to verifying 
authenticity and reducing quality uncertainty in the markets. Essentially, identifying mechanisms 
that will address authenticity and information asymmetry issues in the markets potentially will 
help gain consumers’ confidence, reduce negative spillovers or externalities arising from market 
fraud, enhance industry-wide collective reputation and the integrity of supply chains.  
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